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Abstract
Owing to the advancement of wireless communication technologies, drivers can rely on
smart connected vehicles to communicate with each other, roadside units, pedestrians, and
remote service providers to enjoy a large amount of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services,
including navigation, parking, ride hailing, and car sharing. These V2X services provide
different functions for bettering travel experiences, which have a bunch of benefits. In
the real world, even without smart connected vehicles, drivers as users can utilize their
smartphones and mobile applications to access V2X services and connect their smartphones
to vehicles through some interfaces, e.g., IOS Carplay and Android Auto. In this way, they
can still enjoy V2X services through modern car infotainment systems installed on vehicles.
Most of the V2X services are data-centric and data-intensive, i.e., users have to upload
personal data to a remote service provider, and the service provider can continuously
collect a user’s data and offer personalized services. However, the data acquired from
users may include users’ sensitive information, which may expose user privacy and cause
serious consequences. To protect user privacy, a basic privacy-preserving mechanism, i.e,
anonymization, can be applied in V2X services. Nevertheless, a big obstacle arises as well:
user anonymization may affect V2X services’ availability. As users become anonymous,
users may behave selfishly and maliciously to break the functions of a V2X service without
being detected and the service may become unavailable. In short, there exist a conflict
between privacy and availability, which is caused by different requirements of users and
service providers. In this thesis, we have identified three major conflicts between privacy
and availability for V2X services: privacy vs. linkability, privacy vs. accountability, privacy
vs. reliability, and then have proposed and designed three privacy-preserving mechanisms
to resolve these conflicts.
Firstly, the thesis investigates the conflict between privacy and linkability in an auto-
mated valet parking (AVP) service, where users can reserve a parking slot for their vehicles
such that vehicles can achieve automated valet parking. As an optional privacy-preserving
measure, users can choose to anonymize their identities when booking a parking slot for
their vehicles. In this way, although user privacy is protected by anonymization, malicious
users can repeatedly send parking reservation requests to a parking service provider to
make the system unavailable (i.e., “Double-Reservation Attack”). Aiming at this conflict,
a security model is given in the thesis to clearly define necessary privacy requirements
and potential attacks in an AVP system, and then a privacy-preserving reservation scheme
has been proposed based on BBS+ signature and zero-knowledge proof. In the proposed
scheme, users can keep anonymous since users only utilize a one-time unlinkable token gen-
erated from his/her anonymous credential to achieve parking reservations. In the mean-
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time, by utilizing proxy re-signature, the scheme can also guarantee that one user can only
have one token at a time to resist against “Double-Reservation Attack”.
Secondly, the thesis investigates the conflict between privacy and accountability in a car
sharing service, where users can conveniently rent a shared car without human intervention.
One basic demand for car sharing service is to check the user’s identity to determine
his/her validity and enable the user to be accountable if he/she did improper behavior.
If the service provider allows users to hide their identities and achieve anonymization
to protect user privacy, naturally the car sharing service is unavailable. Aiming at this
conflict, a decentralized, privacy-preserving, and accountable car sharing architecture has
been proposed in the thesis, where multiple dynamic validation servers are employed to
build decentralized trust for users. Under this architecture, the thesis proposes a privacy-
preserving identity management scheme to assist in managing users’ identities in a dynamic
manner based on a verifiable secret sharing/redistribution technique, i.e. the validation
servers who manage users’ identities are dynamically changed with the time advancing.
Moreover, the scheme enables a majority of dynamic validation servers to recover the
misbehaving users’ identities and guarantees that honest users’ identities are confidential
to achieve privacy preservation and accountability at the same time.
Thirdly, the thesis investigates the conflict between privacy and reliability in a road con-
dition monitoring service, where users can report road conditions to a monitoring service
provider to help construct a live map based on crowdsourcing. Usually, a reputation-
based mechanism is applied in the service to measure a user’s reliability. However, this
mechanism cannot be easily integrated with a privacy-preserving mechanism based on user
anonymization. When users are anonymous, they can upload arbitrary reports to destroy
the service quality and make the service unavailable. Aiming at this conflict, a privacy-
preserving crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring scheme has been proposed in
the thesis. By leveraging homomorphic commitments and PS signature, the scheme sup-
ports anonymous user reputation management without the assistance of any third-party
authority. Furthermore, the thesis proposes several zero-knowledge proof protocols to en-
sure that a user can keep anonymous and unlinkable but a monitoring service provider can
still judge the reliability of this user’s report through his/her reputation score.
To sum up, with more attention being paid to privacy issues, how to protect user
privacy for V2X services becomes more significant. The thesis proposes three effective
privacy-preserving mechanisms for V2X services, which resolve the conflict between privacy
and availability and can be conveniently integrated into current V2X applications since no
trusted third party authority is required. The proposed approaches should be valuable for
achieving practical privacy preservation in V2X services.
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With the advancement of wireless communication technologies, from dedicated short-range
communication (DSRC) [1] and LTE-V2X [2] to 5G V2X [3], “Vehicle-to-Everything”
(V2X) communication has become more critical and realistic, which paves the way for fu-
ture intelligent transportation systems and fully automated driving applications. Through
V2X communications, plenty of V2X applications can be enabled [4] to offer various V2X
services to the drivers and the passengers, with the assistance of smart vehicles and smart-
phones, including parking, navigation, and ride hailing, which can lead to a more convenient
driving experiences for drivers and more effective traffic management.
Although V2X services bring the benefits for both users and service companies, they
also face one of the fundamental challenges, i.e., how to protect user’s privacy [5, 6]. As
the communication is not a bottleneck for V2X services, current V2X applications are
more data-intensive and require users to upload a lot of personal data to help increase
their service quality. On one hand, these data can be well utilized by the service com-
panies in many aspects, e.g., building a more accurate artificial intelligence (AI) model
for their services. On the other hand, these data may reveal users’ sensitive information,
such as locations, preferences, and habits [7]. In particular, the company, equipped with
powerful computational resources, can even take the advantage of AI technologies to ex-
tract more sensitive information from a user’s data through deep learning analysis, which
would seriously violate the user privacy. Therefore, protecting user privacy is an impera-
tive requirement from users’ perspective. However, privacy preservation for V2X services
is still in a quite embarrassing situation. While some privacy-preserving mechanisms can
be applied in these services, most of them will severely affect the system availability and
eventually may make these services unavailable. In this thesis, we investigate the privacy
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issues of V2X services, especially focusing on identity privacy, and propose several effective
privacy-enhancing mechanisms for V2X services.
1.1 V2X Communication and Its Services
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication can be regard as an umbrella term of vehicle-
related communication systems, which provides real-time and highly reliable information
flows to enable different kinds of V2X services for drivers. Currently, two representative
V2X communication modes are the dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) based on
the IEEE 802.11p standard, and the cellular vehicle-to-everything communication (C-V2X)
based on 3GPP LTE network. Although the DSRC has been proposed earlier than the
C-V2X and commercialized for many years, it still has several inextricable limitations due
to the vehicles’ high mobility and high quality-of-service (QoS) provisioning requirements
of V2X services. Alternatively, LTE C-V2X and its future 5G NR-based C-V2X are built
on existing cellular infrastructures, which can provide better QoS support, low latency,
larger coverage, higher and more reliable data rate for moving vehicles, paving the road to
future connected vehicles and autonomous vehicles. Based on the completed 3GPP Release
16 specification [8], the C-V2X offers superior performance over the DSRC in terms of
coverage, mobility support, transmission delay, reliability and scalability, which turns the
C-V2X into the most suitable candidate meeting the requirements of V2X services.
1.1.1 V2X Communication Architecture
A general V2X communication architecture mainly consists of four entities [9]: user equip-
ment (UE), radio access network (RAN), core network, and third-party service providers,
as shown in Figure 1.1.
B User Equipment (UE): UE includes smart vehicles equipped with the on-board units
and mobile smart devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets) carried by drivers and
pedestrians. They can communicate with other UE through V2X communications.
B Radio Access Nework (RAN): RAN includes base stations (or radio transceivers or
road-side units) which act as intermediates to connect UE to the core network. Most
base stations are primarily connected via fiber backhaul to the core network. It also
assists ib coordinating the management of resources across the base stations.
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B Core Network: core network mainly provide networking services for UE accessed
through RAN based on innovative networking technologies, such as software-defined
networking and network function virtualization. It also connects to the external
service providers such that various V2X services can be provided for UE.
B Service Providers: Service providers are different V2X service companies that main-
tain and offer different V2X services to UE such as parking, navigation and ride
hailing.
There are mainly four types of V2X communications in this architecture, includ-
ing vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) communication,
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication and vehicle-to-network (V2N) communica-
tion.
B V2V communication. Vehicles can communicate with other vehicles or UE and ex-
change useful information through device-to-device communication/broadcasting or
via the infrastructure. Namely, V2V communications allow UE to transmit messages
carrying self-generated data to other vehicles, such as location and speed, road con-
ditions, and traffic flow information. For example, a vehicle, after receiving a nearby
vehicle’s attribute-related data, can alert the current driver in case of a predictable
collision with this vehicle in the same lane and direction [10].
B V2P communication. Similar to V2V communications, V2P communications expect
the information exchange between pedestrians’ UE and vehicular UE to minimize po-
tential dangers and raise the acceptance of autonomous vehicles (AVs) on roads. For
example, people walking, children being pushed in strollers, people using wheelchairs
or bicyclists, can be detected by the moving vehicles to avoid dangerous situations.
Meanwhile, the pedestrians can also be notified with their movements. Different from
the vehicles, the pedestrians’ UE normally have a lower battery capacity, therefore
they may not be able to send/receive messages with the same periodicity [11].
B V2I communication. The UE supporting V2I communication transmits messages
containing vehicle-related information to a local base station or road-side unit (RSU),
and relevant local edge nodes. Generally, a local base station/RSU serves a particular
geographic area and multiple base stations/RSUs can serve overlapping areas. For
example, the traffic light device in the intersection can be a local edge node to
communicate with the vehicles which are close to them, and adjust their red/green













V2I V2I V2I V2I
V2N V2N
Figure 1.1: A general V2X communication architecture
B V2N communication. The UE can communicate with a remote service provider
through V2N communications. Various applications can be deployed and are able to
provide multiple services for the drivers and passengers. A fashionable case is the
ride-hailing applications, e.g., Uber and Lyft, where the passengers can use the UE
to hail the nearby vehicles remotely and the nearby drivers can pick the passengers
up and ride the passengers to their desired locations [13].
1.1.2 V2X Services
Under the V2X communication architecture, we focus on V2X services that provided by re-
mote service providers, which have been widely accepted. These services can be abstracted
into a system that mainly involves two entities: remote service providers and users.
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Remote service providers are companies that maintain various V2X services in online
servers, and they also have connections with other entities related to vehicles, e.g., electric
vehicle charging stations. Users including driver and passengers that would like to make
use of V2X services provided by remote service providers, such as parking, navigation, and
ride hailing. Since current smart connected vehicles are still in its developing and most
of them are not equipped with V2X communication modules like antennas and on-board
unit. In the real world, most of users rely on their smartphones to connect to these V2X
services by installing mobile applications published by remote service providers. Users’
smartphones can also connect to vehicles through some interfaces, such as IOS Carplay
and Android Auto, and users are allowed to utilize these services in the car infotainment
system.
Typical V2X services including navigation services, parking services, car sharing ser-
vices, ride hailing services, road condition monitoring services, etc. These services have
already been deployed by industrial companies, such as Google Map 1, Uber 2, WAZE 3,
ZipCar 4, Impark5. Some real-world V2X services are introduced as follows, which bring a
lot of convenience to our daily lives.
B Ride Hailing Services: In ride hailing services [13], users can recruit proper drivers
to drive them to the destinations where they would like to go. The process of a
ride hailing service is as follows. A user first sends a ride request to a ride hailing
service provider using a ride hailing mobile application installed on the smartphone,
and the service provider can match drivers with the request to locate a proper driver
according to the location information. Then, the chosen driver will receive a request
from the service provider. If the request is confirmed by the driver, he/she then drives
to the user’s place to pick up the user and drives to the appointed destination. If the
request is denied by the driver, the service provider can find another driver until a
driver confirms the request or a user withdraws a request. After the user reaches the
destination, the user can pay for the ride-hailing service through the smartphone.
B Automated Valet Parking Services: In Automated Valet Parking (AVP) services [14],
a user can utilize his/her smartphone to achieve parking without human interven-







autonomous vehicle at a specific dropping-off place, and use a parking mobile ap-
plication installed on the smartphone to book a nearby parking slot by sending a
parking reservation request to a parking service provider. Then, the parking service
provider can lock a nearby unoccupied parking slot for the user and inform the user
that a parking slot is prepared. Next, the user can enable his/her autonomous ve-
hicle to automatically achieve the parking process, i.e., the vehicle can self-drive to
the reserved parking slot. Finally, the user can pick up his/her vehicle by finishing
the payment on his/her smartphone and enable the vehicle to self-drive to a specific
pick-up position.
B Car Sharing Service: In car sharing services [15], a user can utilize his/her smartphone
to rent a shared car without human intervention. The process of a car sharing service
is as follows, a user can first reserve a shared car at a nearby car sharing station
using a car sharing mobile application installed on the smartphone, by sending a
reservation request to a car sharing service provider. After receiving the request, the
service provider can lock the unoccupied vehicle at the car sharing station, and send
a response back to the user. After receiving the response from the service provider,
the user can go to the car sharing station to pick up the shared vehicle, unlock the
vehicle using his/her smartphone, and drive anywhere. When a user would like to
return the vehicle, the user can search and select a car sharing station nearby his/her
destination, return the shared car at the chosen station, and pay for the car-sharing
service using his/her smartphone.
B Crowdsourcing-based Road Condition Monitoring Services: Crowdsourcing-based
road condition monitoring services [16] enable a user to report road conditions as
voluntary mobile sensors using a monitoring mobile application installed on his/her
smartphone. The services bring a lot of advantages compared with traditional road
condition monitoring services based on fixed sensors, including improving the sens-
ing coverage range, reducing the delay of local traffic perturbation updating, and
reducing the costs of sensor deployment. After collecting the road conditions from
users, a real-time map can be updated and shared with all users such that users can
obtain changes of road conditions and traffic conditions timely. In the meantime, the
real-time map can be utilized to improve the service quality of other V2X services,
e.g. increasing the accuracy of navigation.
6
1.2 Privacy Requirements in V2X Services
Privacy has become a fundamental right in the digital age. The evolution of technologies
brings people into a new world, where almost any data can be stored electronically for
a long period and can be online and available. Under the circumstances, users, when
using the third-party companies’ services, need to upload personal information and cannot
control their data in a proper way. Actually, one-time data breach is not so important since
it cannot reveal much information related to one person, but a very dangerous and often
ignored fact about privacy is that the data from one person can be accumulated over a long
period and be evaluated automatically, that is, even small correlations of the data may
reveal useful information. For instance, the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal
involves the collection of personally identifiable information of up to 87 million Facebook
users since 2014. The accumulated data is analyzed and used to attempt to influence
voters’ opinions on behalf of politicians who hired them. Long-term data analysis gives
the chance for the Cambridge Analytica company to learn the private behaviors of users
and leads them to its desired voting outcome. What’s worse, once user privacy is lost, it is
very hard to re-establish that state of personal rights. The situation also happens in V2X
services. Diverse mobile devices owned by drivers, such as smart vehicles and smartphones
highly increase the possibility that a person’s data will be collected by accompanying V2X
service providers and the risks of data disclosure. For example, Uber suffers from a crucial
data breach, where a hacker breaks Uber servers to gain access to personal information
of 57 million riders and drivers, including names and driver’s license numbers for 600,000
drivers.
These privacy leakage events have attracted a lot of attentions, and many standards
related to security and privacy in V2X services have been proposed. The IEEE 1609.2
standard [17] and the 3GPP TS 33.185 standard [18] both give the official illustration that
user privacy is a necessary part of V2X services. From the perspective of laws, starting from
2017, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has harmonized data protection
laws to protect user privacy. The GDPR imposes new rules on companies and organizations
that offer services to people, whose primary objective is to give people back control of their
personal data. That is, in this era of privacy protection, the companies does not only need
to offer high-quality service to their customers, but also need to follow a privacy-by-design
principle, address privacy concerns and comply with regulations especially regarding the
GDPR. If serious data breaches happen under the GDPR, a company can be fined either
20 million euros or up to 4% of their annual revenues, which is a great amount. Besides, the
researchers and industry communities also put a lot of efforts in this area. The University of
Alberta in Canada has received approximately $500,000 in funding for a connected vehicle
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privacy program [19], and the Privacy4Cars company 6, has published the first mobile
app designed to help erase personally identifiable information from modern vehicles, which
enables consumers and businesses to quickly and efficiently delete personal data retained
by modern vehicle infotainment systems.
Privacy can be breached by both internal attackers and external attackers in V2X
services. As internal attackers, V2X service providers cannot be fully trusted and may
be curious about their users’ data as there may exist malicious employees that will trade
users’ personal data for self-interests [20] if all user data is accessible. Other users cannot
be trusted as well since some of them may be malicious to collude with the service provider
to steal honest users’ data. External attackers like hackers or competitors may also aim
to compromise user privacy. Hackers can steal users’ personal information for data selling
in illegal markets while competitors may break other competitor’s V2X services such that
affected users may move to their services due to the data leakage events. According to
the attacks, privacy requirements in V2X services can be roughly categorized into three
classes: identity privacy, location privacy, and content privacy.
B Identity Privacy. Identity privacy normally means the anonymity of users, i.e., users
cannot be identified from an anonymity set of users in V2X services. It is a basic
privacy requirement for V2X services, since V2X services will continuously collect
a user’s sensitive data and the accumulated data of one user may reveal sensitive
information of a user, such as his/her home location, his/her preferences about point
of interests, his/her career, etc. Specifically, anonymity can be further divided into
two properties: pseudonymity and unlinkability. Pseudonymity means a user uses
pseudonyms as specific identifiers when communicating with others. Unlinkability
means the pseudonyms, belonging to one user, cannot be linked by others, that is,
two pseudonyms cannot be exactly identified from the same person even if they comes
from the same person.
B Location Privacy. Location privacy is a privacy requirement built based on identity
privacy but with some extensions. In some situations, anonymity is enough to provide
location privacy protections for users, i.e., anonymous users reveal their location
information to a V2X service provider, but the V2X service provider cannot determine
the sources of location information and link a user’s two locations. However, in some
extreme situations, e.g., only one user exists, or the V2X service provider can link
the location of a user based on some background information, additional location
privacy requirements are needed, i.e., users reveal their obfuscated or faked location
6http://privacy4cars.com/
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information to a service provider, and a V2X service provider cannot determine the
precise location information of users.
B Content Privacy. Different from identity privacy and location privacy, content pri-
vacy is a more broad concept, which normally means that the data content owned by
users should be concealed before sharing with V2X services such that only authorized
entities can obtain the data content. The data content may include users’ identities
and locations, but also include many other information such as reputation. Specifi-
cally, content hiding can be further divided into two types : 1) users can encrypt the
content with an encryption key, and others without a decryption key cannot decrypt
the ciphertext to obtain the content; and 2) users can perturb or obfuscate the data
with noises, and others cannot extract the original data from the noised content.
From another perspective, content privacy also means that a proper fine-grained ac-
cess control mechanism should be deployed to determine the access permission of the
content.
1.3 Research Motivations and Objectives
The motivation of this thesis is to protect user privacy in V2X services. More specifically,
the thesis focuses on protecting users’ identity privacy through anonymization, which is
a basic privacy requirement for preventing V2X services from collecting user behavior.
Namely, when users enjoy V2X services provided by third-party companies, they can choose
to hide their identities as an option. Note that, when anonymity is guaranteed, location
privacy and content privacy are protected somehow, since the linkage among identity,
location, content have been broken.
However, this basic privacy requirement may be seriously conflict with the availability
of V2X services, since the privacy is always a double-edged sword. As users are anony-
mous, some users may perform malicious behavior that breaks the system functions of
V2X service, and eventually makes the V2X services unavailable. Informally, for some
V2X services that have access limitations for users, strong anonymity always means that
unlimited access permissions, which may damage the system. We name the conflict as
“privacy vs. linkability”. For some V2X services that need to trace a user’s real identity,
strong anonymity means a user cannot be accountable, which may break the system. We
name the conflict as “privacy vs. accountability”. For some V2X services that need to
judge a user’ reliability according to the user’s historical behavior, strong anonymity always
means that the user does not have historical behavior, which may ruin the system. We
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name the conflict as “privacy vs. reliability”. In the following, we use three typical V2X
services to clearly demonstrate these conflicts, including automated valet parking (AVP)
services, car sharing services, and crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring services.
B Privacy vs. Linkability: Linkability is required in an AVP service because it can
assist a parking service provider in resisting against a special attack on the system
availability, i.e., one user maliciously repeats a parking reservation request, occupies
all nearby parking slots, and finally destroys the system. This attack does not exist
if all users use real names to book parking slots, but users’ identity privacy cannot
be protected under this circumstance. If a strong anonymous mechanism has been
applied in an AVP system and the parking service provider cannot link a user’s two
parking requests, the attack becomes a critical issue and the availability of the AVP
service cannot be guaranteed. Hence, how to resolve the conflict between privacy
and linkability is a very challenging issue.
B Privacy vs. Accountability: Accountability is required in a car sharing service. It is
necessary since a car sharing service provider should have the ability to reveal a user’s
identity for liability issues in the real world, e.g., a user who maliciously damages
a shared vehicle should be traced. If all users use real names to reserve shared
vehicles, the accountability is naturally satisfied. If an anonymous mechanism has
been applied in the car sharing system, the car sharing service provider cannot trace
a user’s real identity due to user anonymization. Accordingly, the availability of the
car sharing service cannot be guaranteed. As a result, how to resolve the conflict
between privacy and accountability is a very challenging issue.
B Privacy vs. Reliability: Reliability is required in a crowdsourcing-based road condi-
tion monitoring service. When a user makes a road condition report, a monitoring
service provider should have the capability to judge the reliability of the report. Gen-
erally, the reliability is determined by the reputation score of the user who made the
report and the reputation score is calculated based on the user’s previous reports
(historical information). If all users use real names to report, the monitoring service
provider can easily link a life-time reputation score to each user and the reliability
of every report can be measured. In contrast, if a strong anonymous mechanism has
been applied. the monitoring service provider cannot bind a user’s real identity with
an updatable reputation score due to user anonymization. Accordingly, the availabil-
ity of the car sharing service cannot be guaranteed. Consequently, how to resolve the
conflict between privacy and reliability is a very challenging issue.
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In summary, the objective of this thesis is to resolve the conflict between privacy and
availability, and to design effective privacy-preserving mechanisms for V2X services.
1.4 Research Contributions
To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, we develop a suite of privacy-preserving schemes.
Specifically, the main contributions lie in the following aspects:
• Resolving the conflict between privacy and linkability : To resolve the conflict, we pro-
pose a new privacy-preserving parking reservation scheme for securing AVP systems.
Specifically, each anonymous user must have only one valid reservation token at any
moment, and the token can only be used for booking one vacant parking space once.
The proposed scheme does not only preserve the user’s identity privacy and location
privacy but also prevents the “Double-Reservation Attack” based on several elegant
building blocks, i.e., zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and proxy re-signature. De-
tailed security analysis confirms the security properties of our proposed scheme. In
addition, extensive simulations are conducted to compare our proposed scheme with
three previous schemes, and the experiment results demonstrate that our scheme is
also much efficient in a WiFi-based testbed.
• Resolving the conflict between privacy and accountability : To resolve the conflict,
we propose a decentralized, accountable, and privacy-preserving architecture for car
sharing services, named DAPA. In specific, to overcome the limitation of the sin-
gle point of failure, multiple dynamic validation servers are employed to substitute
a single trusted third-party authority and assist in building decentralized trust for
customers. In addition, to protect customers’ privacy and achieve accountability si-
multaneously under the decentralized architecture, a new privacy-preserving identity
management (PPIM) scheme is introduced as a basic module for DAPA. Customers’
identities are protected in a distributed and dynamic manner but publicly verified
based on a well-designed zero-knowledge proof protocol. Only the misbehaving cus-
tomers’ identities can be recovered by a majority of validation servers using adaptive
verifiable secret sharing/redistribution techniques. Detailed security analysis shows
that DAPA can minimize privacy breaches and guarantee the accountability. Perfor-
mance evaluations via extensive simulations demonstrate that DAPA is efficient in
terms of computational costs and communication overheads.
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• Resolving the conflict between privacy and reliability : To resolve the conflict, we pro-
pose a privacy-preserving crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring scheme,
which innovatively supports anonymous user reputation management. Specifically,
based on well-designed zero-knowledge proofs, a user can anonymously generate a
road condition report with a hidden reputation score, while the monitoring ser-
vice provider can verify the user’s reputation score and authenticate the report in a
privacy-preserving manner. By utilizing homomorphic commitments, the proposed
scheme does not require any other third party to manage a user’s reputation score,
as the user can self-maintain it locally and get it updated with the help of the mon-
itoring service provider according to the accuracy of his/her reports. Moreover, we
also design a K-bound reputation updating mechanism such that a user needs to up-
date his/her reputation score to keep it up-to-date after reporting at most K times.
Detailed security analysis shows that the proposed scheme achieves three security
properties: anonymity, K-tolerant trust, and unforgeability. In addition, a proof-
of-concept prototype is developed based on JAVA, and performance evaluation via
extensive simulations demonstrates the feasibility and practicality of the proposed
scheme in terms of computational and communication overhead.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the preliminaries
exploited to design schemes and introduces a comprehensive overview of literatures related
to anonymous mechanisms and privacy-preserving schemes for V2X services. Chapter 3
develops a privacy-preserving scheme to resolve the conflict between privacy and linkability
in an automated valet parking service. Chapter 4 investigates the conflict between privacy
and accountability and proposes a new decentralized, privacy-preserving, and accountable
architecture for car sharing services. Chapter 5 mitigates the conflict between privacy and
reliability by proposing a privacy-preserving crowdsourcing-based road condition monitor-
ing scheme that supports anonymous reputation management. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes




This chapter introduces the background of privacy-preserving mechanisms for V2X ser-
vices. We first review the underlying techniques leveraged to design the proposed privacy-
preserving schemes. Then, we give a comprehensive survey on the literature of anonymous
mechanisms and privacy-preserving mechanisms for V2X services.
2.1 Basic Techniques
We review the preliminaries, including number-theoretic problems, bilinear pairing, pseudo
random function, Pedersen commitment, proxy re-signature, BBS+ signature, PS signa-
ture, dynamic accumulator, and zero-knowledge proof.
2.1.1 Number-Theoretic Problems
Many secure and privacy-preserving schemes are designed based on the intractability of
solving some hard problems. The following problems are presented since they are relevant
to this thesis. No probabilistic, polynomial time algorithm has non-negligible advantage
in solving the following problems.
Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption [21]. The DL problem in a prime-order group G is
defined as follows: Given ga, where g is a generator of G, no adversary can extract a,
in probabilistic polynomial time with non-negligible probability, then we say that the DL
assumption in G holds.
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Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption [22]. The CDH problem in a prime-order
group G is defined as follows: Given (g, ga, gb) ∈ G3, where g is a generator of G, no
adversary can compute gab, in probabilistic polynomial time with non-negligible probability,
then we say that the CDH assumption in G holds.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [22]. The DDH problem in a prime-order group
G is defined as follows: Given (ĝ, ĝa, ĝb, ĝc) ∈ G4, where g is a generator of G, no adver-
sary can determine c = ab or not, in probabilistic polynomial time with non-negligible
probability, then we say that the DDH assumption in G holds.
q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assumption [23]. The q-SDH problem in a prime-order
group G is defined as follows: Given a (q+ 2) tuple (g, g0, gx0 , gx
2
0 , · · · , gx
q
0 ) ∈ Gq+2, output
a pair (A, c) such that A(x+c) = g0 where c ∈ Z∗p . We say that the q-SDH assumption in
G holds if there is no algorithm can solve the q-SDH problem in G with non-negligible
advantage in probabilistic polynomial time.
q-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion (q-DDHI) Assumption [24]. The q-Decisional Diffie-
Hellman Inversion problem (q-DDHI) in a prime-order group G is defined as follow: On




, gc) ∈ Gq+2, output 1 if c = 1/x and 0 otherwise. We
say that the q-DDHI assumption in G holds if there is no algorithm can solve the q-DDHI
problem in G with non-negligible advantage in probabilistic polynomial time.
1-Flexible Diffie-Hellman Assumption [25]. The 1-Flexible Diffie-Hellman Assumption (1-
FlexDH) in a prime-order group G is defined as follow: On input a 3-tuple (g, A = ga, B =
gb) ∈ G3, no adversary can output a 3-tuple (C,Ca, Cab) ∈ (G\1G)3 in probabilistic poly-
nomial time with non-negligible probability, then we say that the 1-FlexDH assumption in
G holds.
PS assumption [26]. Let (p,G1,G2,GT , e) be a type-3 bilinear group. g is a generator of G1
and g̃ is a generator of G2. For X̃ = g̃x and Ỹ = g̃y where x and y are random elements
chosen from Zp, we define the oracle O(m) on input m ∈ Zp that chooses a random h ∈R G1
and outputs the pair P = (h, hx+my. Given (g, X̃, Ỹ ) and unlimited access to this oracle,
no adversary can efficiently generate such a pair, with h 6= 1G1 , for a new scalar m∗, not
asked to O.
2.1.2 Bilinear Pairing
(G1,G2,GT ) is a set of cyclic groups of the same prime order p. ê : G1 ×G2 → GT is the
bilinear map, if the following three properties are satisfied:
B Bilinear: for all g ∈ G1, ĝ ∈ G2, and a, b ∈R Zp, ê(ga, ĝb) = ê(g, ĝ)ab;
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B Non-degenerate: If g 6= 1G1 , ĝ 6= 1G2 , then ê(g, ĝ) 6= 1GT ;
B Computable: for all g ∈ G1, ĝ ∈ G2, the map ê(g, ĝ) is efficiently computable.
According to the definition due to Galbraith et al. [27], If there is no efficiently com-
putable homomorphism in either direction between G1 and G1, the bilinear map ê is a type
3 pairing. If G1 = G2, the bilinear map ê is a type-1 pairing. If there exists an efficiently
computable homomorphism π : G2 → G1, but there is no efficient homomorphism in the
other direction, the bilinear map ê is a type-2 pairing is that G1 6= G2.
2.1.3 Pseudo Random Function
Given a seed and an argument, a secure pseudo random function (PRF) can return a string
that is indistinguishable from a string generated from a truly random function. Dodis and
Yampolskiy [28] proposed a secure pseudo random function that is secure under the q-DDHI
assumption. The construction of the pseudo random function is as follows.
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of a prime order p. Let g be a generator of





Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of a prime order p. Let g and h be two independent
generators of G. A Pedersen commitment scheme [29] works as follows.
To commit an element m ∈ G, a prover chooses a random element r ∈R Zp, and sends
com(m) = gmhr to the verifier. The commitment has two properties: perfect-hiding and
computation-binding. The perfect-hiding property guarantees that given com(m), it is
feasible for a verifier to obtain any information about x. The computation-hiding property
guarantees that given com(m), it is feasible for a verifier to find two different pairs (m, r)




unless the verifier knows logg h.
The commitment scheme also has additively homomorphic property, which means given
two commitments com(m1) and com(m2), a new commitment com(m1 + m2) can be ob-
tained by computing com(m1) · com(m2), i.e., com(m1 +m2) = com(m1) · com(m2).
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2.1.5 Proxy Re Signature
A proxy re-signature scheme allows a semi-trusted proxy to translate one party’s signature
to another party’s signature on the same message. It usually consists of five algorithms as
follows [25] and its security can be proven under the 1-FlexDH assumption.
B Key Generation: Let G and GT be bilinear groups of prime order p. Let ê be a
bilinear map G × G → GT . Let g be a generator of G. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a
hash function. Entity i’s public key is Xi = g
xi , where xi ∈R Zp is a random element.
Entity j’s public key is Xj = g
xj , where xj ∈R Zp is a random element.
B Signature Generation-I: Given a message m and the entity i’s private key xi , a
signature of the entity i can be calculated as σi = H(m)
xi .




the entity i’s public key Xi, a new signature of the entity j can be calculated as






ij), where t ∈R Zp is a random element.
B Signature Verification-I: Given a message m, a signature σi on m, and the the entity
i’s public key Xi, the signature can be verified the following equation.
ê(σi, g) = ê(H(m), Xi).
B Signature Verification-II: Given a message m, a signature σj on m, and the public
key of the entity i Xj, the signature can be verified the following equation.
ê(σj,1, g) = ê(σj,2, H(m)), ê(σj,2, g) = ê(Xj, σj,3).
2.1.6 BBS+ and PS Signatures
BBS+ Signature. BBS+ signature is a variant of BBS signature [23] proposed in [30],
which can be utilized to sign `-message vector (m1, · · · ,m`). Its existential unforgeabil-
ity is proven against chosen message attacks without random oracles under the q-SDH
assumption.
B Key Generation: Let g, g1, · · · , g`+1 be generators of G with a prime order p. An
random element x is chosen from Zp as the secret key, and the corresponding public
key is set as y = gx.
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B Signature Generation: A signature on messages (m1, · · · ,m`) is (A, e, s), where A =






x+e and (e, s) are random values chosen from Zp.
B Signature Verification The signature (A, e, s) can be checked by the following equa-







PS Signature. The PS signature is a public-key signature scheme proposed in [26] and its
existential unforgeability is proven against chosen message attacks without random oracles
under the PS assumption [26]
B Key Generation: Let ĝ be a generator of G2. (y, x1, · · · , xr) ∈R Zr+1p is the secret
key of the signer and (Ŷ , X̂1, · · · , X̂r)← (ĝy, ĝx1 , · · · , ĝxr) is the public key.
B Signature Generation: A digital signature on multi-block messages (m1, · · · ,mr) ∈
Zrp is φ = (φ1, φ2) = (h, hy+
∑r
j=1 xjmj), where h is a random value chosen from G1\1G1 .





j ) = ê(φ2, ĝ).
2.1.7 Dynamic Cryptographic Accumulator
The dynamic universal crytographic accumulator [31] allows a set of values to be dynami-
cally accumulated into one value and a prover can use a witness to prove to the verifier that
he/she knows a value that is accumulated not accumulated. Generally, there are two types
of accumulator designs, one is designed based on the RSA assumption [32], and another is
designed based on the q-SDH assumption [33].
The accumulator designed based bilinear pairing mainly consists of four parts: setup,
accumulator generation, membership witness generation, non-membership witness genera-
tion, and accumulator checking.
B Setup: Let ẽ : G̃1×G̃1 → G̃T be a symmetric bilinear pairing such that |G̃1| = |G̃T | =
p̃, where p̃ is a l̃-bit prime. Let g̃ be a generator of G̃1 and τ̃ is randomly picked
from Z∗p̃ . Let G̃q̃ ⊂ Z∗p̃ be a cyclic group of prime order q̃ satisfying p̃ = 2q̃ + 1. The
public information is {ẽ, G̃1, G̃T , p̃, g̃, g̃τ , g̃τ
2
, ..., g̃τ
n}, where n is the upper bound of
the accumulator.
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B Accumulator Generation: The domain of accumulated elements is G̃q̃/{−τ̃}. To
accumulate a element ỹ ∈ G̃q̃/{−τ̃} in the accumulator, we have c̃ = g̃ỹ+τ̃0 . Adding a
value ỹ to the accumulator c̃ can be computed as c̃ = c̃ỹ+τ̃ . Deleting a value ỹ from
the accumulator c̃ is computed as c̃ = c̃
1
ỹ+τ̃ .
B Witness Generation: Assuming that the current set of elements is SList = (ỹ1, ỹ2, ..., ỹk),





knowing τ , the witness can be calculated by the following steps: 1) setting a poly-
nomial w(x) =
∏k
i=1,i 6=j(ỹi + x); 2) expanding w(x) as w(x) =
∏k−1
i=0 ci · xi; and 3)




For another element ỹ, the non-membership witness w̃it = (ã, d̃) can be calculated
as d̃ =
∏k





ỹ+τ̃ with knowing auxiliary
information τ . Without knowing τ , the witness can be calculated by the following
steps: 1) setting a polynomial w(x) satisfying
∏k
i=1,i 6=j(ỹi + x) = w(x)(x + ỹ) + d,
where d is a constant; 2) expanding w(x) as w(x) =
∏k−1
i=0 αi · xi; and 3) calculating




B Accumulator Checking: An element ỹj exists in the accumulator c̃ can be checked by
the following equation based on the membership witness w̃it: ẽ(w̃it, g̃ỹj g̃τ ) = ẽ(c̃, g̃).
An element ỹ does not exist in the accumulator c̃ can be checked by the following
equation based on the non-membership witness wit = (ã, d̃): ẽ(ã, g̃ỹj g̃τ )ẽ(g̃, g̃)d̃ =
ẽ(c̃, g̃).
2.1.8 Zero-Knowledge Proof
The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [34] allows the prover to generate a cryptographic
proof with a corresponding statement, and the verifier can verify the proof to check the
correctness of the statement. Generally, a zero knowledge proof of knowledge can be
expressed in a particular notation as ZkPoK{(a,B) : A = ga ∧ C = e(A,B)}. It denotes
“zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a and B such that A = ga and C = e(A,B)
hold”. The proof can also be transfered to an non-interactive zero-knowledge proof based
on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [35], which has been proven secure in random oracle model.
We denote the non-interactive proof as NIZK{(a) : A = ga}. There also exist another
counterpart named non-interactive signature proof of knowledge on a message M , and we
denote it as NIZK{(a) : A = ga}(M), i.e., a signature on the message M signed by a
private/public key pair (a, ga).
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Plenty of ZKPoK protocols have been proposed, in which Σ-protocols are a special
format of interactive three-move ZKPoK protocols, which has the following three properties
between a prover P and a verifier V :
B (Completeness) if P and V follow the zero-knowledge proof protocol on input a
public input x and a private input w, where (x,w) ∈ R and R is a non-deterministic
polynomial time relation, V always accepts P ’s proof.
B (Special Soundness) for any x and any pair of accepting conversations on input x
with different random challenges ch and ch′ (ch 6= ch′), an extractor can efficiently
extract w such that (x,w) ∈ R.
B (Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge) there is a polynomial time simulator S,
which on input x and a random challenge ch, outputting an accepting conversation,
with the same probability distribution as conversations between the honest prover
and the honest verifier on input x.
2.2 Related Work
We first review the literature about anonymity-based privacy-preserving mechanisms, which
can be applied in V2X services to protect user privacy, and then comprehensively discuss
the related works about privacy-preserving schemes for smart parking services, car/ride
sharing services, and crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring services.
2.2.1 Anonymity-based Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms
Before reviewing the traditional privacy-preserving mechanisms for V2X services, we first
present the identity privacy metrics for measuring the user privacy. Two most popular
metrics are illustrated and we refer to [36] for more details.
Anonymity Set Size. One user’s identity is indistinguishable from a set of users’
identities, and this set is called anonymity set (AS). Anonymity set size means the size
of the anonymity set, i.e., the number of users that this set has. Commonly, the size of
the anonymity set represents the level of the identity privacy [37] and it is simple and
easy to calculate the anonymity set size to measure the privacy level. However, the prior
knowledge of adversary is not considered in this metric.
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Entropy of Anonymity Set Size. Based on the AS size, a more detailed privacy
definition has been proposed with the help of entropy. The entropy of the anonymity set,
compared to the AS set, is more accurate and allows expressing the adversary’s knowledge
about each user of the anonymity set. The following equation formally defines the entropy





where pi refers to the probability of user i being the victim. If all N users have a same
probability to be attacked, i.e., probabilities are uniformly distributed over the anonymity
set, the entropy then achieves its maximum as Hmax = log2N , but in reality, the inference
probability pi is different to be determined.
Many anonymous schemes have been proposed for achieving privacy preservation for
V2X services, which can mainly categorized into two classes: one is designed based on
pseudonym management and traditional public key infrastructure (PKI), and another is
designed based on group signature. We review some relative works in the field as follows.
PKI-based Mechanisms with Pseudonym Management. The anonymity of users
can be achieved with the conventional PKI architecture. The users can be assigned a large
number of X.509 public key certificates as pseudonyms and the corresponding private
keys. These certificates are the unlinkable pseudonyms of users and can be generated by
a trusted certificate manager. When users communicate with other users or entities in
V2X-based applications, they can sign the message with one of the private key and attach
the created signature, as well as the corresponding certificate, to the message. Receivers
can verify the received certificate using the root certificate of the certificate manager and
verify the signature using the received certificate to validate the sender without knowing
the sender’s real identity. The first idea of PKI-based anonymous mechanisms comes
from [39], and then many following researches have been proposed. Among them, how
to change the pseudonyms of users is one of the hot topics and the pseudonym change
rate has a great impact on the communication, computation, storage overhead, and the
level of privacy. Wiedersheim et al. [40] showed that the simplest pseudonym change,
that a user changes its pseudonym according to a fixed and periodic schedule, is not
enough with regard to anonymity. Hence, different kinds of pseudonym change polices
have been proposed. Eckhoff et al. [41, 42] proposed a new pseudonym management
scheme that every user maintains a set of pseudonyms of static size, each pseudonym
can be used for the specific time slot and these pseudonyms can be exchanged between
users. In their schemes, the change rate is still fixed and the prediction of change rate
will easily reveal the relationship between pseudonyms. To solve this issue, Pan et al. [43]
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proposed a pseudonym change scheme where the users randomly change their pseudonyms.
As a result, the next pseudonym change is not easy for prediction. However, anonymity
is still not guaranteed if only one or few users change pseudonyms at a specific time,
because the nearby users who keep the same identity will leak the pseudonym change
information. Consequently, the idea of silent random period has been proposed [44, 45]
where users remain silent for a short period after they change their pseudonyms, although
it has no explicit definition. The silent-period-based schemes are more complex compared
to the previous schemes. More questions come up, such as how long for the silent period
and where to change the pseudonym to satisfy the silent requirement. A good silent
period strategy should balance a trade-off between privacy and safety. Therefore, Lu et
al. [46, 47] analyzed the social spot based pseudonym change and proposed a social spot
based pseudonym change strategy to maximize the privacy in terms of anonymity size.
Furthermore, Yu et al. [48] proposed a scheme called MixGroup, where users constructs
extended pseudonym-changing regions from the social spots and are allowed to successively
exchange their pseudonyms. From another point of view, Emara et al. [49] proposed a
context adaptive pseudonym changing scheme which allows a user to decide autonomously
when to change its pseudonym and how long it should remain silent to ensure unlinkability.
There also exist other pseudonym change schemes based on different characteristics, e.g.,
the users’s reputation [50]. Despite different strategies proposed for pseudonym changing,
it still remains unclear which strategy is the most effective in practice.
Group-signature-based Anonymous Schemes. To mitigate the overhead of man-
aging a mass of certificates for users and updating the pseudonyms, Calandriello et al.
[51] proposed to use a group-signature-based method to enable each user to generate and
certify their own pseudonyms without interacting with the certificate authority. Basically,
their scheme allows a authority to distribute traditional public key certificates using group
signature. More following works [52, 53, 54] go further step and design more comprehen-
sive anonymous authentication schemes for V2X services. For example, Lin et al. [52]
proposed the GSIS scheme which first presents the anonymous authentication protocol for
V2X communications. Their scheme brings up a better way to meet the anonymity and
traceability requirements rather than storing all the certificates in the vehicle, in contrast
to PKI-based schemes.
Group signature [55] enables any group member in a specific group to produce a sig-
nature on behalf of the group, i.e., the signature can be verified with a group-oriented
public key. The group-signature-based scheme provides user privacy protection as signers
are anonymous within the group, which can perfect match the privacy requirement of users
when communicating with other as well as passing the authentication. At the beginning,
two messages signed by the same vehicle are not linkable as one cannot determine if two
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messages came from the same or different user. Thus, the linkable group signature [56] was
proposed for this goal and can achieve the linkability property. Also, the linkable group
signature supporting dynamic group [57] was also proposed recently, which provides more
flexibility for V2X services. However, a group-signature-based approach, when applying to
V2X services, also has its disadvantage. Although the group signature approach does not
require each user to store a large number of certificates, the unrevoked users have to update
the revocation lists with the group manager when some users in this group are revoked. To
solve the issue of revocation overhead, Lu et al. [58] proposed an ECPP scheme to deal with
the issue of growing revocation lists. Their scheme allows users to obtain the short-term
pseudonyms via group signature, and to use the short-term pseudonyms for communication
and authentication. If a user is revoked, other users do not need to update the revocation
lists since the revoked users cannot renew its short-term pseudonyms. However, the group-
signature-based methods face a big issue about revocation efficiency. There are basic two
approaches to support user revocation. The first approach is to achieve verifier-local revo-
cation [59, 60]. The revocation lists are distributed to verifiers and when receiving a group
signature, a verifier can traverse members in the revocation list to judge whether a user
who generated the signature is revoked. The approach supports backward unlinkability
assuming that there exist a trusted revocation manager who can update the revocation
list according to time. Another is to achieve accumulator-based revocation [61, 62]. All
revoked users are accumulated into one value, and non-revoked users can prove to the ver-
ifier through zero-knowledge proof that they are not accumulated. However, this method
requires all users share a large number of public parameters which is linear to the size of
revocation list in most cases. Currently, there is no solution for this issue.
2.2.2 Privacy-Preserving Schemes for V2X Services
In this section, we review privacy-preserving schemes of three V2X services, which are most
relative to this thesis, including secure and privacy-preserving smart parking, secure and
privacy-preserving car/ride sharing, secure and privacy-preserving road monitoring.
Secure and Privacy-Preserving Smart Parking: Many researches in V2X-based
smart parking scenarios related to security and privacy have been proposed in recent years.
Yan et al. [63] proposed a secure and intelligent parking service, which enables users to
securely book parking slots. They also model the parking process as birth-death stochastic
process and design a new business model for the parking system based on the prediction
of revenues. Biswas et al. [64] proposed a secure and privacy-preserving car parking assis-
tance application using priority-based vehicular communications. Their scheme is designed
based on a modified version of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and
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offers message authentication and user anonymity for a parking service. Unlike PKI-based
message authentication approaches, their scheme uses the geographical location of an en-
tity to validate a received message. Lu et al. [65, 66] presented an intelligent secure and
privacy-preserving parking scheme through vehicular communications. They use roadside
units (RSUs) to localize the vehicles and assist users to find vacant parking spaces in a
privacy-preserving way. That is, the users use the pseudonyms, assigned by a third-party
trust authority, to protect their privacy when communicating with the RSUs. Ni et al.
[67] proposed a cloud-based privacy-preserving parking navigation system in VANETs to
locate accessible parking spots for users. They utilize anonymous authentication to pro-
tect the privacy of the users in VANETs and additionally construct a navigation system
for users. Namely, users can retrieve the protected navigation responses from RSUs when
the vehicles are passing through the RSUs. In their extended version [68], they provided
more details about the navigation performance analysis and demonstrate the practicality
of their scheme. Garra et al. [69] proposed a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking
system by implementing an anonymous e-coin-based payment protocol. Their scheme can
keep the payment information secret while providing the evidence that the payment has
been finished without leaking the user’s privacy. Through achieving anonymous payment,
a parking slot can be locked and the user can enjoy the parking service afterwards. Borges
et al. [70] proposed a new a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking system based on
Garra et al.’s scheme [69], and offering the same privacy as [69]. Furthermore, the new
system can tolerate that the mobile devices of users fall out of coverage while their cars
are parked, which is not achieved in [69]. Ni et al. [71] proposed a secure and privacy-
preserving automated valet parking protocol for self-driving vehicles. Their protocol not
only achieves anonymous authentication but also supports multi-factor authentication for
reducing the risks of vehicle theft and preventing the privacy leakage of users. Chatzi-
giannakis et al. [72] proposed a privacy-preserving smart parking system based on elliptic
curve cryptography and zero-knowledge proof. They also study the performance of the
system in an real-world outdoor IoT testbed to demonstrate the system’s feasibility.
As blockchain has become becomes a hot platform to achieve some security proper-
ties, some secure parking systems are designed atop blockchain. For example, Hu et al.
[73] proposed a blockchain-based framework for parking-management, which can preserve
the privacy of its users, without relying on a reliable third-party entity. The parking
information is managed in a consortium blockchain and can be shared with users. The
privacy is protected based on the natural characteristic of the consortium blockchain, i.e.,
only authorized entities can access the parking information with permissions. Wang et al.
[74] proposed an airbnb-like privacy-enhanced private parking spot sharing scheme. All
parking spaces are managed by individuals but can be shared in a consortium blockchain.
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Their scheme achieves decentralized anonymous credentials and confidential anonymous
payment with a variant Monero to protect user privacy. Amiri et al. [75] proposed a
blockchain-assisted privacy-preserving smart parking system, where users can retrieve the
parking offers nearby without leaking privacy through a method named private informa-
tion retrieval. Ahmed et al. [76] proposed a blockchain-based architecture for integrated
smart parking systems. Several parking service providers can work together to construct a
consortium blockchain to provide parking services for users. The user privacy is achieved
through fine-grained access control, i.e, only vacant space information can be accessed by
parking service providers.
Different from the above-mentioned schemes, in this thesis, we mainly focus on resolv-
ing the conflict between privacy and linkability and consider a special attack “Double-
Reservation Attack” in the parking system. Although most of the existing secure parking
schemes address the privacy concerns of users by utilizing pseudonym-based mechanisms
or group-signature-based mechanisms, they somehow ignore the malicious behavior where
a user could occupy all parking spaces without being detected. This attack happens in an
automated valet parking scenario, where a user is only allowed to reserve one parking space
for his/her automated vehicle. Some schemes offer a traceability function by introducing a
trusted third party to help the parking service provider trace a user’s malicious behavior,
but it cannot prevent such an attack in advance and needs to rely an trusted party, which
is not practical to be deployed in the real world.
Secure and Privacy-Preserving Car/Ride Sharing: Plenty of works have been
proposed recently related to secure and privacy-preserving ride sharing, while few works
aim to solve the security and privacy issues in car sharing services.
To address the security and privacy issues in ride sharing (carpooling or ridehailing)
services, Kanza et al. [77] proposed a ride-hailing service powered by cryptocurrency and
blockchain to preserve location privacy of users and guarantee pseudonymity of users and
drivers. They scheme use blockchain-inherited pseudonymity to protect users’ and drivers’
privacy and only requires users to report coarse areas to hide the exact locations to protect
location privacy. Ni et al. [78] proposed an anonymous mutual authentication scheme
for carpooling systems. Their scheme uses BBS+ signature to achieve anonymous mutual
authentication between user and driver and relies on a trusted judger to achieve traceability.
Hallgren et al. [79] proposed a privacy-preserving scheme to achieve user-driver matching
through private set intersection. Zhao et al. [80] studied privacy leakage for drivers in a
ride sharing system by measuring and analyze privacy attacks in 20 ride-hailing apps, , e.g.,
tracking the driver’s daily routine, uncovering employer status and preference, and business
information leakage. Khazbak et al. [81] proposed a privacy-preserving scheme to protect
user privacy when matching his/her locations with drivers. They use drivers’ location to
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generate the spatial cloaking to match the user’s locations and also design a probabilistic
driver selection algorithm to reduce the background knowledge of attackers. Pham et al.
[13] a privacy-preserving yet accountable ride-hailing service. Their scheme depends on
a somewhat homomorphic encryption mechanism to encrypt the locations of users and
drivers, and user-driver matching can be achieve through the computations on encrypted
data. Goel et al. [82] proposed a ride-hailing service that improves the safety while
preserving user privacy. Their scheme helps in choosing the pick up/drop off locations for
passengers from a fixed set and use Voronoi diagram-based k-anonymity model to preserve
user privacy. They also proposed a privacy-aware dynamic ride sharing scheme [83] by
obfuscating on the user’s and the driver’s locations and time. Luo et al. [84] proposed a
privacy-preserving ride-matching over road networks for online ride hailing service. They
improve the accuracy of user/rider matching while preserving their privacy by introducing
the road network and designing the matching algorithm based on homomorphic encryption
and garble circuit.
To address the security and privacy issues in car sharing services, Symeonidis et al. [85]
proposed the first physical keyless car sharing system (KSS) where customers can share
their cars with others remotely using a smartphone. They defined a threat model for car
owners and customers, and also performed a security and privacy analysis of KSS. Then,
they proposed a secure and privacy-enhancing scheme, named SePCAR [86], to address
these threats. SePCAR provides generation and distribution of car access tokens for car
sharing service, as well as update and revocation operations. To advance forensic evidence
provision in the case of emergency, they applied a technique called secure multi-party
computation (SMPC) [87], i.e., SePCAR utilized SMPC to achieve accountability while
protecting customers’ privacy. However, this method sacrifices computational efficiency
since SMPC is time-consuming. Moreover, the requisite driving qualification checking is
not mentioned in their scheme before customers share their cars. Similarly, Dmitrienko et
al. [88] proposed a secure free-floating car sharing system that supports car sharing between
customer and the car sharing service provider. The proposed system mainly focuses on an
access control issue and is designed based on a two-factor authentication scheme including
mobile devices and RFID tags. They did not consider the privacy of customers and thus a
fully trusted car sharing service provider exists to manage the master keys for customers
and vehicles.
Different from the above-mentioned schemes, in this thesis, we mainly focus on resolving
the conflict between privacy and accountability in a car sharing service. These existing
schemes address the security and privacy issues of a car sharing service in terms of different
aspects such as digital forensics and authentication security, but none of them considers
the accountability issue and just assume that there exist a trusted entity to assist the
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car sharing service provider in achieving accountability and tracing the malicious behavior
of customers. To get rid of the deployment of a trusted party, some other works deploy
decentralized authorities to achieve accountability in a more secure and robust manner. As
long as the majority of the authorities are honest, the privacy and accountability can be
guaranteed at the same time. However, they do not apply this mechanism in the car sharing
scenario, and they do not consider a strong attack model, where eventually an adversary
could compromise a majority of the decentralized authorities if they do not change.
Secure and Privacy-Preserving Crowdsourcing-based Road Condition Mon-
itoring: To achieve privacy preservation in a scenario of crowdsourcing-based road con-
dition monitoring, there exist two major approaches: 1) anonymizing each user’s road
condition report such that a monitoring service provider cannot distinguish the source of
the report; and 2) encrypting a road condition report such that only authorized author-
ities can decrypt and obtain the report. In short, the approach 1) is to hide the user
identity (anonymization) while the approach 2) is to hide the report content (encryption).
For example, Li et al.[89] proposed a privacy-preserving traffic monitoring scheme via
fog-assisted vehicular crowdsourcing, where users who make the report are anonymized
but can still be authenticated by a monitoring service provider. They mainly utilize a
group-signature-based method to achieve anonymous authentication between users and
the monitoring service provider. Instead of utilizing group signature, Basudan et al.[90]
proposed a privacy-preserving vehicular crowdsensing-based road surface condition moni-
toring scheme, where users utilize registered pseudo-identities to authenticate themselves
to a monitoring service provider and then make reports. They are two representative works
that achieve privacy preservation based on the anonymization.
Different from them, Wang et al. [91] proposed a privacy-preserving cloud-based road
condition monitoring scheme, where users encrypt their reports before submitting them to
a monitoring service provider and only a root authorized entity can decrypt them with the
assistance of the monitoring service provider. They mainly utilize a public key encryption
primitive with equality test in their scheme, which enables users to encrypt their reports and
the monitoring service provider to statistically aggregate the reports without decryption.
Similar to Wang et al. [91], there also exist other schemes such as [92, 93, 94, 95], and these
schemes’ design concept is to conceal the user’s report to achieve privacy-preservation based
on encryption. However, the above-mentioned schemes, although achieving anonymization
or pseudonymization to some extent, do not consider data manipulation attacks or apply
reputation management to filter a faked or biased report based on the user’s reputation
score to improve the data availability.
Therefore, on the premise of anonymity, we discuss two major reputation management
approaches that are widely adopted in crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring
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scenarios. The first approach is to rely on one centralized third party or decentralized
third parties to manage the reputation scores for anonymous users. Zhu et al. [96] pro-
posed a privacy-preserving trusted-based traffic monitoring architecture, where users are
anonymized during the data reporting process and a trusted authority is introduced to
maintain the reputation scores of the users. This method suffers from the single point
of failure and requires the trusted authority to be always online, which is not practical.
Similar to Zhu et al. [96], Li et al. [97] and Yu et al. [98] proposed pseudonym-based
crowdsourcing schemes where users are pseudonymized but linkable. In their schemes, the
reputation scores are bound with the pseudonyms and are published on a decentralized
blockchain. Differently, Wu et al. [99] proposed a trustworthy and privacy-aware mobile
crowdsensing scheme that enables an honest-but-curious group manager to manage the
reputation scores for users. The users can authenticate themselves to a monitoring service
provider and can update their reputation scores by communicating with the group man-
ager. Through a blind signature method, even though the monitoring service provider and
the group manager collude together, the anonymity property still holds for users. How-
ever, their scheme reveals the mapping between reputation scores and users if the group
manager is curious. this information can be further utilized by a curious service provider
to track a user’s reputation change although the reputation score is blurred. From another
perspective, Zhao et al. [100] proposed a tracking-resistant anonymous reputation man-
agement scheme that can be applied in the crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring
scenario, where multiple anonymity providers are introduced to maintain the reputation
scores for users. As long as one anonymity provider is honest, the mapping between repu-
tation scores and users is hidden. Their scheme has stronger privacy guarantee but is more
time-consuming as each anonymity provider needs to shuffle users’ reputation scores and
prove that their behavior is correct.
The second approach does not rely on third parties and the anonymous users can self-
maintain their reputation scores locally. Yi et al. [101] proposed a privacy-preserving
mobile crowdsourcing scheme with anonymous reputation management, which is designed
based on a blind-signature-based method. Their scheme achieves privacy preservation,
and they are designed based on RSA assumption. Nevertheless, they do not consider
collusion attacks among users, i.e., each user can share his/her anonymous reputation
score with other users without being detected since the reputation scores are not bound
with the anonymous identity credential. Both Ni et al.’s [102] and Hartung et al.’s [103]
schemes address the collusion issue but they utilize different methods. Ni et al. [102]
proposed a privacy-preserving mobile crowdsourcing scheme, which is designed based on a
group-signature-based method. Hartung et al. [103] proposed a privacy-preserving credit
points collection scheme, which is designed based on a structure-preserving-signature-based
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method. They have sophisticated protocol designs such that users can self-manage and
update their reputation scores with the help of a monitoring service provider. But these
schemes cannot be straightforwardly applied in a crowdsourcing-based road condition mon-
itoring scenario. The reason is that they assume that users will automatically and spon-
taneously update their reputation scores after completing some tasks, e.g., road condition
reporting, but users may behave maliciously and does not choose to update their reputa-
tion scores since they know they uploaded a faked or biased report and does not want their
reputation score to be downgraded. In addition, there exist other reputation management
schemes such as [104, 105], their motivation is different, since they mainly address the
reputation management issue for service vendors but not users, e.g., managing reputation
scores for restaurants.
In this thesis, we mainly focus on resolving the conflict between privacy and reliability
in a crowdsourcing-based road monitoring service. Different from some existing schemes, a
trusted third party or decentralized trusted third parties are not desirable since they rely
on impractical assumptions and may be compromised by adversaries to break user privacy
and accountability. From another point of view, Yi et al.’s [101], Ni et al.’s [102], and
Hartung et al.’s [103] schemes cannot be straightforwardly applied in the road monitoring
scenario, as their schemes have some vulnerabilities and are not fit for the reputation-based
solutions due to some security issues such as suffering from collusion attacks and reputation
manipulation attacks, which will cause serious security concerns.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have briefly reviewed the preliminaries, including number-theoretic
problems, bilinear pairing, pseudo random function, Pedersen commitment, proxy re-
signature, BBS+ signature, PS signature, dynamic accumulator, and zero-knowledge proof.
Also, we have given a comprehensive survey on the existing works about anonymous mech-
anisms and privacy-preserving schemes for V2X services, including secure and privacy-
preserving smart parking, secure and privacy-preserving car/ride sharing, secure and privacy-
preserving crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring. From the comprehensive liter-
ature review, we are aware that the privacy challenges have not been well-addressed. In the
following chapters, we will introduce several countermeasures to address the challenging




Reservation for Automated Valet
Parking Services
3.1 Introduction
Parking, as one of the perennial headaches of urban life, is a common but especially vexing
problem for big cities. This hassle is not only caused by the fast-growing number of
vehicles, but also by the unbalanced distribution of parking lots and the lack of a parking
guidance system. Hence, a fantastic solution, automated valet parking (AVP) [106] has
been proposed recently, which relies on the autonomous driving techniques to avoid the
defects of valet parking. Taking the AVP solution of Daimler-Benz company as an example
[107], an automated valet parking mission starts when a driver drops the AV in a designated
drop-off area, and then he/she can monitor and control the autonomous vehicle (AV)
via the smartphone until the parking task is accomplished. On one hand, the sensors
installed in the parking lot can help steer the parking process; on the other hand, the AV
itself can perform safe driving manoeuvres in response to the commands from the parking
infrastructure and stop the vehicle if an emergency situation takes place.
Though the Daimler-Benz’s AVP system has been licensed by the government, it is
still an incomplete autonomous parking solution. It just achieves the “partial self-parking
functionality” since the AV has to be dropped at a drop-off area but not anywhere else.
Similarly, another automotive company, ZongMu Technology [108] has just released its



















Figure 3.1: A high-level remote automated valet parking scenario
parking solution step by step using the close-to-market sensors. As shown in Figure 3.1,
when a driver has reached his/her destination (e.g., place of work, gym, or hospital), he/she
can leave the vehicle and control the self-parking process by the smartphone remotely, e.g.,
following the parking route in a high-level parking scenario. Considering the low velocity
of AV (up to 30 km/h) and the light traffic situation, the deployment of AVP is mostly
limited to the immediate vicinity of the location where the driver leaves the vehicle, which
will reduce the requirements regarding the capabilities of AV significantly.
Generally, an AVP system can be virtualized as three subsystems [109]: mapping, per-
ception, and communication as shown in Figure 3.2. The mapping subsystem involves the
localization module, the planner module, and the map module: the localization module
supports GPS and GPS-denied localization to avoid collisions and plans appropriate mo-
tions; the planner module is responsible for generating an optimal trajectory from a start
position to a destination, including on-road trajectory and the trajectory into the parking
bay inside the parking lot; the map module creates a high-precision 3D geometric map
which contains the detailed on-road and parking lot information. The perception subsys-
tem consists of the sensing module and environment modeling module: the sensing module
collects the sensing information from the LIDAR, radar and multiple cameras; the envi-
ronment modeling module constructs a dynamic environment model based on the sensing
information, such as detecting and tracking moving vehicles and pedestrians. The com-
munication subsystem takes charge of sending/receiving the messages/commands to/from
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the parking service provider, the parking lot terminal and the driver’s smartphone. The
above modules are hot research topics for an AVP system, but less works have been done
in the related area of security and privacy issues.












Parking Lot Terminal Smartphone
Figure 3.2: The diagram of an AVP system
Different from the traditional parking systems, the AVP system requires the driver
to reserve a nearby vacant parking space in advance so that his/her vehicle can park
itself autonomously without human intervention. However, this reservation procedure is
under risk of privacy violation. In specific, when parking is required, the AVP system
requires the AV to report its current location to the parking service provider (PSP) via
the communication subsystem so that a better parking choice can be offered to locate an
optimal nearby parking space for that vehicle. In this situation, the PSP will learn the
personal and location-privacy-sensitive information, such as the most visited places of the
vehicle, by investigating its uploaded locations [110, 111], which means that the driver’s
location privacy has been compromised. To address the privacy issue, a naive way is to
introduce the anonymous mechanism into the AVP system: each autonomous vehicle will
have plenty of pseudonyms which can also be authenticated by the PSP to protect the
driver’s privacy. Since the location privacy attacking method [112] needs at least four
continuous location points in a trace, with both spatial relation and temporal relation,
to identify a particular driver, the anonymous mechanism is effective due to the discrete
characteristic of the parking behavior. In the parking scenario, the PSP cannot obtain
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four continuous location points from the AVP system because the average time interval
between two parking demands is long enough.
From another perspective, the reserved parking space will be kept until the automated
vehicle finishes the parking process or the reservation is expired, which gives the chance
for malicious drivers to launch the “Double-Reservation Attack”. The drivers cannot be
assumed to behave honestly in order that he/she can launch an attack with the aid of
the anonymous mechanism. Namely, the driver, as an adversary, would like to maximize
his/her interest when making the parking space reservation. Despite the fact that the
vehicle only needs a parking space, it could pretend to be many vehicles and preoccupy
all possible parking space in the nearby parking lots. This attack could also be launched
by competitors that run the similar parking services. When all available parking slots of
a parking service are occupied, users may choose to use its competitors’s parking services
and the competitors could attract more users to gain more benefits. Under such condition,
it is very difficult for the PSP to detect and track the attack due to the anonymity if no
trusted third party exists.
In this chapter, to address the above-mentioned challenges in the parking reservation
scenario, we propose a novel privacy-preserving reservation scheme for securing AVP sys-
tem, which can protect the users’ privacy using cryptographic techniques and prevent the
“Double-Reservation Attack” in a simple but efficient way. The fundamental intuition of
our scheme is to design a mechanism which makes sure that each anonymous user must
have only one valid reservation token at any moment, and the token can only be used for
booking one vacant parking space once. The contributions of this chapter are summarized
as twofolds.
B We define the system and security model for a reservation/parking case of an AVP
system without a trusted third party. Following the models, we propose a privacy-
preserving parking reservation scheme based on four building blocks: zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge, geo-indistinguishable mechanism, proxy re-signature, and bloom-
filter data structure. The proposed scheme does not only protect the driver’s identity
privacy and location privacy, but also prevents the “Double-Reservation Attack”.
B We run extensive simulation to evaluate our scheme’s performance in terms of compu-
tational costs, communication overheads and storage costs, by comparing our scheme
with three previous proposed schemes [113, 114, 115]. The comparison results show
that our scheme is more efficient. Additionally, we establish a WiFi-based testbed and
run some experiments to further study our scheme’s performance in the real-world
environment, demonstrating its practicality.
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3.2 Models and Design Goals
In this section, we define the system model, security model, and also identify the design
goal for a reservation/parking case of an AVP system.
3.2.1 System Model
Our system model mainly consists of the following four entities: the parking lot termi-
nal (PLT), the parking service provider (PSP), the autonomous vehicle (AV), and the
smartphone (SM) as shown in Figure 3.3.
B Autonomous Vehicle (AV): the AV is a critical and mobile component for an
AVP system. With the support of self-driving techniques, smart vehicles can achieve
automated parking operations. The AV is supposed to have an autonomous capability
(can be low-level to high-level depending on different situations) in automated driving
and parking modes, and also has a communication ability based on cellular network
(e.g. LTE V2X [116]) so that it can be directly connected with other entities in the
network. The AV is owned by and under the control of a driver (a.k.a user), and the
user could command the AV to accomplish some tasks, such as self-parking.
B Smartphone (SM): the SM is an intelligent portable device, which has a restricted
computational capability and is bound with the AV. Obviously, any well-designed
smartphone is able to communicate with others through the internet (e.g., WiFi).
The SM is owned by and under the control of a driver (a.k.a user), and the user could
install the parking application and use this application to complete the reservation
process.
B Parking Service Provider (PSP): the PSP is a bunch of online servers who provide
the on-demand parking service for the users, involving finding nearby parking space,
making parking space reservation and other superior services. These services, offered
by a parking management company, are the subscription services. Only the registered
user who pays for the membership fee can enjoy these convenient services. Further-
more, the services could be published to the users as a smartphone application, like
an Android/IOS App.
B Parking Lot Terminal (PLT): the PLT is a terminal deployed by the owner of
the parking lot, which is responsible for monitoring and managing the parking lot
through IoT devices (e.g. cameras and sensors), such as recording the parking space
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status and charging the fee for the parking car. In addition, the PLT will upload
its parking lot’s real-time status (e.g. the parking fee, the unoccupied parking space
and the high-definition map) to the PSP so as to attract more vehicles. Meanwhile,













I know who 
your are and 
where you stay!
I can have 
more parking 
spaces than I 
need !
User Authentication & Query & Reservation
Figure 3.3: A system model of reservation and parking case for AVP
To clearly illustrate a reservation and parking case, only one type (reservation then
parking) of AVP parking services is discussed detailedly in this chapter as shown in Fig-
ure 3.3. Above all, the users should download the parking App in their SMs and register
themselves at the PSP. Moreover, the valid parking lots’ public information is collected
by the PSP in real time. When a user intends to find a parking space, he/she first needs
to pass the authentication as a registered subscriber using the installed App, and then
queries based on his/her current location and makes a parking space reservation according
to his/her requirements. Finally, the user will let his/her AV check in and park at the
reserved space by communicating with the AV through the SM, and gets the confirmation
when the parking process is over. We omit the picking-up process for a parking service
since it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
3.2.2 Security Model
The PSP is honest-but-curious, i.e., it follows the protocols, but is also curious about the
user’s privacy by launching passive attacks. We give an explicit definition of the user’s
privacy for the autonomous valet parking service at the intuitive level. Specifically, we
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desire our privacy-preserving reservation scheme to have the following two properties to
protect the user’s identity privacy:
B Pseudonymity: the PSP will not be able to identify the unique user’s real identity
that generates a particular reservation/parking request/query. The only exception is
at the stage of registration, and the users have to reveal their real identities to the
PSP to prove themselves as the valid users.
B Unlinkability: the PSP cannot correlate a user’s any two reservation/parking ses-
sions. With the knowledge of two sessions’ authenticated credentials, two sessions
cannot be linked any better than guessing even if the they come from the same user.
Pseudonymity and unlinkability could be summarized as anonymity to some extent, which
is a simple but an effective way to protect the user’s identity privacy. To further enhance the
user’s location privacy, the property named geo-indistinguishability [117], is also utilized
to protect from the location-based statistical analysis attack in our system.
B Geo-indistinguishability: The location obfuscation mechanism used by the users
satisfies ε-geo-indistinguishability.
From another point of view, the users should not be totally trusted because they are
selfish to launch the attack driven by self-interest and gain the benefits. In our security
model, the selfish users may deliberately reserve/occupy many parking spaces at once since
they are anonymous and cannot be tracked, although they merely need one parking space.
Therefore, we introduce this new primitive named “Double-Reservation Attack” in the
reservation process for an AVP system.
In addition, we assume that the PLT does not collude with the PSP to compromise
the user’s privacy. Since this kind of collusion attack has become a physical attack, and
it cannot be entirely solved based on secure protocols. Supposing that the PLT, colluding
with the PSP, can use the cameras to record a user’s parking AV, it would definitely
approve the real identity (car’s exclusive license number) of a user to the PSP, no matter
what protocols are proposed to protect the user’s privacy. In this situation, not only should
the secure protocols be designed but also the privacy law should be applied to forbid the
privacy violation behaviors of the parking company in the physical world, which is out of
scope of this chapter.
However, there exist two main limitations in our security model: 1) the exact probability
that two pseudonyms of a user can be linked depends on various “side-information”. The
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linking probability does not just rely on the anonymity but also the user’s requirements and
behaviors. These “side-information” could be linked to identify the unique human [118].
Nevertheless, note that the common parking issues always happen in the most populous
regions (a lot of vehicles needs to be parked nearby and cannot easily find a parking space)
and in a discrete way (a driver usually will not have two continuous reservation/parking
requests), so there could be plenty of similar parking requests during a short period at
the adjacent locations, which will help relieve this limitation; 2) there might be other
ways, outside our security model, where a user’s privacy can be violated. For example, the
original IP address in the cellular network could be a single tag to identify the user (a.k.a,
network traffic analysis). To cope with the issue, our scheme could be coupled with other
techniques (e.g., the anonymous network, Tor [119]) to guarantee the user’s privacy.
3.2.3 Design Goals
Under the aforementioned system model and security model, our design goal is to propose
a privacy-preserving reservation scheme for autonomous valet parking. In particular, the
following three objectives should be achieved:
B Security: the security requirements mentioned above should be satisfied. Namely,
not only is the user’s privacy protected, but also the reservation system must only
allow the user to book one parking space at one time, to prevent the “Double-
Reservation Attack”.
B Functionality: the basic functions supporting reservation for an AVP system should
be achieved. The basic functions covers user subscription, user authentication and
parking reservation/cancelling, etc.
B Efficiency: the proposed scheme should be efficient. To implement the reservation
scheme for a real-world AVP system, both the security and efficiency issues should
be considered to locate a trade-off solution.
3.3 The Proposed Privacy-Preserving Parking Reser-
vation Scheme
In this section, we first define the pieces of our privacy-preserving reservation scheme
and then present a construction for the proposed scheme based on four basic building
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blocks: zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [120], geo-indistinguishable mechanism [117]
and proxy re-signature [25], and bloomfilter data structure. For easier reading, we also
give the description of notations to be used in our scheme in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Notations frequently used in our scheme
Notation Definition
λ the security parameter
G,GT two cyclic multiplicative groups
p a large prime whose length is λ
g a generator of Ĝ
H(), H ′(), Ĥ() three non-cryptographic hash functions
(a,A = ga) the PSP’s private key and public key
X, Y, Z X = gx, Y = gy, Z = gz and x, y, z ∈ Zp
e(., .) a non-degradable bilinear mapping
µ the daily verification day
Ω,Ξ,Ψ three sets for storage
(B, gb) the PLT’s private key and public key
Rab the PLT’s resignature key
cred the anonymous credential of user
Timestamp the current timestamp
SESS the token of each parking session
3.3.1 Design Overview
There are three major pieces of the proposed scheme in an AVP system, as shown in
Figure 3.4, including System Setup, Service Phase, and Parking Phase.
B System Setup: 1© the PLT registers itself at the PSP, and updates its real-time
parking condition for the PSP periodically; 2© the user registers himself/herself at
the PSP; 3© the registered user subscribes to the services based on the online pay-
ment, such as Alipay or Paypal, and acquires the anonymous subscriber credential
by smartphone.
B Service Phase: 1© the user authenticates himself/herself to the PSP as a registered























Figure 3.4: The communication framework of AVP
for the vacant parking spaces, and then choose one vacant parking space according to
the requirements; 3© the user sends the reservation request to the PSP and the PSP
makes the parking reservation at the PLT, and then the parking permit generated
by the PLT is sent back to the user.
B Parking Phase: 1© the user forwards the permit to the AV by smartphone and
commands the AV to park at the reserved parking space in an autonomous driving
model; 2© the AV checks into the parking lot based on the permit and fetches the
confirmation receipt; 3© the AV forwards the receipt to the user via communication
with the SM and the user renews the anonymous subscriber credential at the PSP
using the receipt.
3.3.2 Main Construction
For easy understanding of the construction, we also denote the geo-indistinguishable mech-
anism on the location-based query data (lat, lon, rng) as the function DP(lat, lon, rng, ε),
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where lat, lon are coordinates, rng is the query range and ε is the privacy-related param-
eter, which is similar to [121]. The details will be discussed later.
System Setup
(Offline Setup) the PSP runs the setup algorithm. Bilinear map groups (G, GT) of a
prime order p > 2λ are created, where λ is the security parameter and e(., .) denotes the
bilinear map such that e : G × G → GT. Formally, g is a generator of G and e(g, g)
is defined as gT . H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → G, and Ĥ : Zp → Zp are three
cryptographic hash functions, and the PSP’s public key is set as A = ga for a random
a ∈ Zp and a is the private key. Also, the PSP selects x, y, z ∈ Zp and computes X = gx,
Y = gy and Z = gz. µ ∈ Zp is a daily verification key chosen by the PSP. Then, the tuple
{G,GT, p, g, gT , e,X, Y, Z,H,H ′, Ĥ, µ, A} is published as the common parameters in the
system. Finally, the PSP initializes three empty sets using bloomfilter Ω = {∅}, Ξ = {∅}
and Ψ = {∅}. Note that, µ, Ω, Ξ and Ψ are reseted per day by the PSP, indicating that
the user’s anonymous credential is only valid for daily period.
1© PLT Registration: (1.1) the PLT creates a username and password, and registers
itself in the terminal; (1.2) the PLT uploads the identity information, such as the electronic
commercial parking lot license, to the PSP, and the PSP verifies the qualification of the
parking lot; (1.3) once the verification has been passed successfully, the PLT creates a





b and sends the public key B to the PSP; (1.4) the PSP stores B, the parking
lot information and completes the registration.
2© User Registration: (2.1) the user creates a username and password, and registers
itself in the user App; (2.2) the user uploads the identity information, such as the electronic
driving license, to the PSP, and the PSP verifies the qualification of the user; (2.2) once
the verification has been passed successfully, the user finishes the registration.
3© User Subscription: (3.1) the user logins into the user App via the valid username
and password, and pays the service fee online; (3.2) Once the payment is confirmed by the
PSP, the user chooses (d, r) ∈ Z2p , constructs M = Y dZr, and sends (M, Ĥ(d)) to the PSP;
(3.3) the PSP checks whether Ĥ(d) exists in Ω. If it exists, the PSP guides the user to go
back to the step (3.2). Otherwise the PSP adds Ĥ(d) into Ω; (3.4) the user acts as prover
and the PSP as verifier in the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge:
NIZK{(d, r)|M = Y dZr};
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(3.4) the PSP returns as failure if the proof fails. Otherwise the PSP sends to the user
a tuple (W, v), where v ∈ Zp and W = (XM)
1
v+a+µ ; (3.5) the user checks whether
e(W,Agv+µ)
?
= e(XM, g). If it fails, the user returns as failure. Otherwise the anony-
mous credential is stored as cred = (W, v, d, r) locally.
To avert losing the anonymous credential incidentally and support credential recovery,
cred is encrypted using a preset secret password pass chosen by the user as Epass(cred), and
Epass(cred) can be stored online at the PSP, where E() is a common symmetric encryption
algorithm, such as AES.
Service Phase
1© User Authentication: (1.1) the user acts as prover and the PSP as verifier in the
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge:
NIZK{(W, v, d, r)|W v+a+µ = XY dZr},
and logins to the PSP via the App; (1.2) if the proof is successful, the PSP generates a
temporary session token SESS, and sends it back to the user. Otherwise the PSP returns
as failure; (1.3) the user stores the session token SESS.
2© Parking Query: (2.1) the user’s current location-based query (lat, lon, rng) is
noised by utilizing the geo-indistinguishable mechanism as
(lat′, lon′, rng′) = DP(lat, lon, rng, ε);
(2.2) the user sets the parking requirements and requests the neighbour parking lot infor-
mation by sending (lat′, lon′, rng′) and SESS to the PSP; (2.3) the PSP filters the parking
lots that do not meet the criteria and returns the parking lots list within the query range.
3© Parking Reservation: (3.1) the user selects a parking lot from the returned list,
sends the reservation request Req to the PSP, where Req = Info||SESS||Timestamp
(Info involves the trivial reservation information and Timestamp indicates the current
timestamp); (3.2) the user calculates U = g
1
d+µ as the booking token, sends U to the PSP
and engages in a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with the PSP, in which
the user plays the prover, the PSP plays the verifier:
NIZK{(W, v, d, r)|W v+a+µ = XY dZr ∧ U = g
1
d+µ};
(3.3) after receiving the request, if the proof succeeds and the token U does not exist in Ξ,
the PSP accepts the request and adds U into Ξ. Otherwise the PSP rejects the request;
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(3.4) the PSP signs the request as σ = H ′(Req)a and relays the request Req||σ to the
corresponding PLT; (3.5) the PLT verifies the signature of the request by checking
e(σ, g)
?
= e(H ′(Req), A).
If it fails, the reservation request is rejected. Otherwise the PLT generates a unique
random string as the temporary parking permit code c, stores it in its local database, and
also sends it back to the PSP; (3.6) the PSP signs c as Sigc = H
′(c||Timestamp||SESS)a,
stores SESS in its token pool, and gives c||Sigc back to the user.
Parking Phase
1© Parking Request: (1.1) the user relays c||Timestamp||SESS||Sigc and the parking
lot information to the AV via the SM; (1.2) the AV switches to the self-driving mode and
drives to the selected parking lot according to the received information.
2© Parking Check-In: (2.1) when connecting to the PLT, the AV sends c||Timestamp
||SESS||Sigc to the PLT; (2.2) the PLT verifies the signature Sigc by checking
e(Sigc, g)
?
= e(H ′(c||Timestamp||SESS), A).
If it is valid, the PLT searches c in its database and assures that whether the AV has already
reserved a parking space or not. If c is found in its local database, the PLT deletes c and
allows the AV to park inside. Otherwise the PLT returns as failure and refuses to offer the
service; (2.3) the PLT re-signs Sigc by choosing a random θ ∈ Zp as Sig′c = (Sigθc , Aθ, Rθab),
and transmits Sig′c as the confirmation receipt to the AV.
3© Anonymous Credential Renewal: (3.1) the AV forwards the receipt Sig′c to the
user’s SM and notifies the parking confirmation message on the user’s SM; (3.2) After
waiting for a random delay, the user applies for a new anonymous credential by sending
c||Timestamp||SESS||Sig′c||U to the PSP; (3.3) after receiving the renewal request, the
PSP checks the validity of the credential renewal request by the following three conditions.
- (Condition.1) The PSP searches the session token SESS in the session token pool.
If SESS exists, the PSP deletes it and this condition is satisfied.
- (Condition.2) The PSP verifies the signature Sig′c by the following equations.
e(Sigθc , g)
?




If the equations hold, this condition is satisfied.
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- (Condition.3) The PSP searches U in Ξ and Ψ. If U exists in Ξ and does not exist
in Ψ, the PSP adds U into Ψ and this condition is satisfied.
If any of them are not fulfilled, the PSP rejects the request and returns as failure. Oth-
erwise, the PSP returns with success; (3.4) the user gains a new anonymous credential,
following the steps in User Subscription except the step (3.1). Moreover, the user
can cancel the current parking/reservation session if necessary and perform the above-
mentioned steps similarly to gain a new anonymous credential. The difference is that the
PSP does not need the parking confirmation message, and must recall the current booking
request of the user, according to his/her session token SESS and booking token U .
In addition, to deal with the issue that some important messages, such as the acknowl-
edgment of the parking space, may be lost at the user side accidently, our scheme relies
on the PSP as the intermediate servers to store this information. If the users miss the
acknowledgment, the PSP can help the user check and download this missing information
based on the user’s temporary session token. Since the temporary session token is unique
and only known by the user and the PSP, only the authorized anonymous user who has
already sent this request can check the status of this reservation session. Then, there are
two cases: 1) if the request is successful, the user can download the acknowledgment; and
2) if the request is not successful, the user can resend the reservation request.
3.3.3 Protocol Details
Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
We present the non-interactive zero knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZK) that are secure
in the random oracle model (Fiat-Shamir heuristic).
Proof.I NIZK{(d, r)|M = Y dZr}:
Prover:
1. Choose α, β ∈ Zp, calculate ∆ = Y αZβ
2. Set η = H(Y, Z,M,∆)
3. Send (∆,M, α̂ = dη + α, β̂ = rη + β) to the verifier
Verifier:
1. Calculate η = H(Y, Z,M,∆)
2. Check that Mη∆ = Y α̂Z β̂




Note that, the proof can be transformed and rewrited [30] as









−ve(Y, g)de(Z,A)α1e(Z, gu)α1e(Z, g)r+β1}
where α1, α2 ∈ Zp, W2 = WZα1 , β1 = α1v, and β2 = α2v.
Prover:





ρd , ∆4 = e(W2, g)
−ρve(Y, g)ρde(Z,A)ρα1e(Z, gµ)ρα1e(Z, g)ρr+ρβ1
2. Calculate η = H(X, Y, Z,W1,W2, U,∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4)
3. Send (∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4,W1,W2, U, ρ̂v = vη + ρv, ρ̂d = dη + ρd, ρ̂r = rη + ρr, ˆρα1 = α1η +
ρα1 , ˆρα2 = α2η + ρα2), ρ̂β1 = β1η + ρβ1 , ρ̂β2 = β2η + ρβ2) to the verifier
Verifier:
1. Calculate η = H(X, Y, Z,W1,W2, U,∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4)
2. Check that W η1 ∆1 = Y









)η∆4 = e(W2, g)
−ρ̂ve(Y, g)ρ̂de(Z,A) ˆρα1e(Z, gµ) ˆρα1e(Z, g)ρ̂r+ ˆρβ1
Geo-Indistinguishable Mechanism
Given the parameter ε ∈ R+ (i.e., the default privacy levels can be set as low ε = 0.01,
medium ε = 0.004, and high ε = 0.001), and the actual location pos = (lat, lon) ∈ R2, the
probability density function of noise mechanism (planar Laplacian), on any other point




′), where d denotes the Euclidean




where rad and θ are distance and angle with respect to pos. To obfuscate the real location,
specifically, θ should be uniformly chosen from [0, 2π) and rad should be set as rad =
C−1ε (p) = −1ε(W−1(
p−1
e
) + 1), where W−1 is the Lambert W function (the −1 branch)
and p should be uniformly chosen from [0, 1). Also, two transformation functions are
needed: LatLonToCartesian and CartesianToLatLon, to transform (lat, lon)→ (x̄, ȳ) and
(x̂, ŷ) → (lat′, lon′). Therefore, x̂ = x̄ + rad · cos θ and ŷ = ȳ + rad · sin θ. In addition,





) + 1), where τ is the accuracy parameter (default τ = 0.95).
Efficient Set Membership Test
The construction requires efficient set membership tests for three sets Ω, Ξ and Ψ, and the
standard bloomfilter (BF) data structure is used properly. The characteristics of this data
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structure deeply match the requirements of our construction, which include the compressed
storage for large dataset, the zero false negative rate, and the fast search algorithm: since
the number of reservation/parking requests is large, the BF helps diminish the storage
overheads; since each booking token U can only be used for one time, it could not be
missed by BF if it had been used due to the zero false negative rate; the fast search
algorithm can accelerate the testing speed and reduce the computational costs. Generally,
a BF consists of an array of m cells, each of which is a bit with an initial value 0, and
k independent random hash functions, where m and k are determined by the maximum
number of data items supported by BF and the false positive ratio of BF.
3.4 Privacy and Security Analysis
3.4.1 Privacy Analysis
Following the privacy requirements discussed earlier, our analysis will focus on how the pro-
posed scheme can ensure the user’s pseudonymity, unlinkability and geo-indistinguishability.
Pseudonymity : each user has totally different anonymous credentials (W, v, d, r) for
different reservation/parking sessions in our proposed scheme. The anonymous credential,
as a unique pseudonym defined by the user and confirmed by the PSP (Proof.I), can
be verified by the PSP as the valid anonymous credential (part of Proof.II) during the
anonymous authentication process. Hence, the user’s pseudonymity relies on the security
of two zero-knowledge proof protocols. Specifically, Proof.I is an adapted version of the
CL signature scheme [122] and Proof.II is an adapted version of the BBS/BBS+ signature
schemes [23, 30]. Their security proofs are thus relatively straightforward.
Unlinkability : the PSP can perform the pseudonym linking attack, and our scheme
guarantees that the possibility that the PSP succeeds in linking one user’s two reserva-
tion/parking sessions cannot be better than guessing. In other words, the PSP cannot link
the user’s real identity and the user’s first anonymous credential during user subscription,
and the PSP cannot link the user’s previous anonymous credential and renewed anony-
mous credential during anonymous credential renewal. This property of unlinkability is
dependent on two zero-knowledge proof protocols Proof.I and Proof.II. When the user ap-
plies for the anonymous credential using his/her real identity, the PSP only knows that
the registered user acquires a valid anonymous credential, it does not know the values of
(d, r) but can still acknowledge the anonymous credential (W,d, v, r) (Proof.I) as a valid
BBS+ signature. During parking reservation, the user’s reservation token U cannot be
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linked to a specific anonymous credential by the PSP since the PSP does not have d. Sim-
ilarly, the PSP only knows that a new anonymous credential is generated and assigned
to the anonymous user during the renewal period, but it does not know the content of
this new credential. During anonymous authentication, the PSP and the user run a non-
interactive zero knowledge proof to verify the BBS/BBS+ signature, i.e., the PSP can
verify W v+a+µ = XY dZr without knowing the values of (W,d, v, r), which guarantees the
unlinkability.
Geo-indistinguishability : ε-geo-indistinguishability is defined as P (Z|x)
P (Z|x′) ≤ e
εd(pos,pos′),
where P is the conditional probability. Each observation is Z ⊆ Z, where Z is a set of
possible reported locations, and d(pos, pos′) is the Euclidean distance between pos and
pos′. By adding a planar laplacian noise N = (rad, θ) to the original location (lat, lon)
in the proposed scheme, the reported location can be viewed as an obfuscated location
pos′ = (lat′, lon′), and the ε-geo-indistinguishabilitys is satisfied. The detailed proof can
be found in [117].
3.4.2 Security Analysis
We focus on how the proposed scheme can be resilient to the “Double-Reservation Attack”
in the security analysis. The proposed scheme is designed based on the idea of generating
one-time booking token for each registered user and his/her every booking/parking session.
To prevent the attack, the fundamental intuition is to make sure that each anonymous user
should and must have only one valid token at one time. In specific, each user can obtain
the token in two stages: user subscription and anonymous credential renewal. The PSP
can easily assure that each registered user only applies for one anonymous credential during
user subscription. If the user has been allocated the anonymous credential, other similar
requests will be dropped since the account information will be recorded. For the renewal
process, the situation becomes complex but can still be addressed based on three decision
conditions:
- (Condition.1) The renewal request comes from a current reservation/parking ses-
sion by checking the session token SESS.
- (Condition.2) The verification of a PLT’s confirmation receipt guarantees that the
anonymous user’s parking session is accomplished by checking the signature Sig′c.
- (Condition.3) The booking token U has already been used for booking and has not
been used for renewing by performing set membership tests in Ξ and Ψ. Proof.II
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indicates that the token U is authenticated by the PSP, i.e., the token cannot be
forged.
With the aforementioned three conditions, the PSP can update the user’s exclusive
anonymous credential. Namely, the attack has been prevented. The abnormal timestamp
information for each reservation/parking session (i.e., time duration between reservation
and parking is too short) may help detect the suspicious PLT who may collude with the
malicious user even though this collusion attack gains no benefit for the attackers.
In addition, since the parking reservation is a paid service, the proposed scheme also
guarantees that only the premium users who paid the fees can use this service. The daily
verification key µ, included in each user’s anonymous credential and reservation token,
makes sure that each user needs to refresh his/her subscription information everyday. If
the subscription is expired, he/she will not be allowed to apply for a valid anonymous
credential.
3.5 Performance Evaluation and Implementation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of communi-
cation overheads, computational and storage costs. Also, a WiFi-based testbed has been
built to further demonstrate the scheme’s practicality.
3.5.1 Simulation Settings
Table 3.2: Testbed setting
Role Machine Hardware and Software
PSP Workstation
Intel i7-6700K @ 4.00 GHZ;
32 GB memory; Windows 10
PLT Notebook
Intel Core i5-7200U @ 2.60 GHz;
16 GB memory; Windows 10
AV Galaxy S4
1.9 GHz Krait 300;
2 GB memory; Android 5.0
Smartphone Galaxy S4
1.9 GHz Krait 300;
2 GB memory; Android 5.0
46
In our simulation, we compare our solution with three traditional solutions based on the
blacklistable anonymous credential (BLAC/BLACR) [114], the blacklistable anonymous
credential with universal accumulator (PE(AR)2) [113] and linkable ring signature (LRS)
[115], which could also deal with the “ Double-Reservation Attack” anonymously under
some conditions. This simulation is built on a JAVA-based simulator and conducted on a
notebook with Intel Core i5-7200U CPU @ 2.60GHz and 16.00 GB memory. Then, we test
the scheme’s performance in a testbed of one workstation, one notebook and one Android
phone. These machines play the roles of the PSP, the PLT, the AV and smartphone,
respectively. The hardware and software of these machines are shown in Table 3.2.
3.5.2 Performance Comparisons
Since our solution is particularly proposed for the AVP system, it has many character-
istics which the previous protocols do not have (e.g., location obfuscation at user side
and the participation of PLT). Hence, we mainly investigate performance comparisons
of the anonymous authentication costs (i.e., the costs of parking reservation),
which involves the communication overheads, computational and storage costs. For the
BLAC/BLACR-based solution, each user owns a anonymous credential after finishing pay-
ment, and the PSP maintains an anonymous blacklist. When a user reserves a vacant
parking space via the PSP, he/she has to prove to the PSP (one by one) that he/she is not
shown on that anonymous blacklist. When the reservation is finished, his/her anonymous
credential is added to the blacklist to prevent the “Double-Reservation Attack”. For the
PE(AR)2-based solution, the procedure is similar to that of the BLAC/BLACR-based solu-
tion, while the difference is that the proof between the user and the PSP is designed based
on a universal accumulator to improve the computational efficiency for both sides. For the
LRS-based solution, each user owns a unique ring signature to represent his/her identity in
a pre-defined group. When a user books a vacant parking space via the PSP, he/she has to
generate a ring signature, which indicates that he/she is from this group but conceals the
specific identity, and submits this signature to the PSP. When the reservation is finished,
his/her current reservation request can be linked by the PSP to the future requests to
identify whether these two requests come from the same user in the group anonymously.
We use the BouncyCastle library and JAVA Pairing-Based Cryptography (JPBC) li-
brary to implement the cryptographic building blocks in our simulator. The elliptic curve of
the bilinear pairing is chosen with a base field size of 512 bits and the order p is 160 bits. To
keep the consistency, the simulation is conducted under the same setting. The number of
total users Ntotal is set as {100, 200, 500, 10000}, and the number of reserved users (the user
has finished the reservation but not achieved parking yet) Nres is set as {10, 20, 50, 1000}
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in our simulation. The numerical results of computational costs are shown in Fig 3.5, and
the results are averaged by 100-times simulations.





































(a) Computational costs at user side with different
number of users





































(b) Computational costs at PSP side with different
number of users
Figure 3.5: Computational costs compared with the existing schemes
Apparently, the execution time of BLAC/BLACR-based and LRS-based solutions are
linearly increased with the growth of Nres and Ntotal respectively, but the running time
of our scheme and PE(AR)2-based solution is not impacted by either of them (i.e., our
scheme’s execution time is almost fixed 110 ms and 180 ms at user side and PSP side, and
the PE(AR)2-based solution’s execution time is almost fixed 240 ms and 260 ms at user side
and PSP side). The reason is that, our scheme just requires the user to provide a one-time
reservation token during each anonymous authentication process which is very efficient.
However, since BLAC/BLACR requires each user to retrieve the whole blacklist and to
prove to the PSP separately that he/she does not exist in that list, the proof should be
executed Nres times between the user and the PSP (i.e., the running time of BLAC/BLACR
is almost 101.211 s and 41.332 s at user side and PSP side when Nres = 1000). In another
way, LRS requires each user to sign the signature on behalf of the whole group to preserve
the anonymity, which indicates that the signature should involve Ntotal group member
information (i.e., the execution time of LRS is almost 147.429 s and 146.873 s at user side
and PSP side when Ntotal = 10000) and cannot be distinguished by the PSP. Although
the PE(AR)2-based solution is almost equally efficient as our scheme, it still costs more
time because the user has to re-generate the accumulated witness and perform a more
complex proof on during each anonymous authentication, which are not necessary in our
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scheme. We also give the error bars which indicate the time out and help the users to
determine whether they have lost the messages to some extent. In addition, we compare
the communication overheads and storage costs among our scheme, the BLAC/BLACR,
the PE(AR)2 and the LRS, and the numerical results are shown in Figure 3.6. Note that,
the communication overheads (uplink and downlink) and storage costs are the serializable
output as the byte array type in our JAVA-based simulator, and may be different from
other programming languages due to diverse data types.









































(a) Communication overheads be-
tween user and PSP (uplink and
downlink) with different number
of users












































(b) Storage costs at user side with
different number of users













































(c) Storage costs at PSP side with
different number of users
Figure 3.6: Communication overheads and storage costs compared with the existing
schemes
The Figure 3.6 (a) shows that our scheme only requires around 1200-byte bandwidth per
request but both the BLAC/BLACR and LRS needs more than 2000-byte bandwidth even
if there are only 100 users and 10 reserved users in the system. Especially, the PE(AR)2-
based solution requires more than 7000-byte bandwidth during anonymous authentication
since it has five zero knowledge proofs for every request. When Ntotal = 10000 and Nres =
1000, the bandwidth requirements are significantly large (i.e., each user uploads 295275
bytes for the BLAC/BLACR, 27884 bytes for the PE(AR)2, and 200129 bytes for the
LRS). Here, the BLAC/BLACR-based solution needs more bandwidth than the LRS-based
solution because the user has to download the newest blacklist before any authentication
takes place, and the blacklist changes as long as the parking reservation happens. Hence,
the blacklist downloading overheads cannot be avoided. However, the PE(AR)2 has a
better performance than the BLAC/BLACR and the LRS when Ntotal and Nres is large.
The reason is that the users can download the whole newest blacklist in an accumulator
for the PE(AR)2-based solution, which fills the gap of BLAC/BLACR.
For the BLAC/BLACR and PE(AR)2, the PSP stores the blacklist and its private key,
49
and the user stores the anonymous credential. The storage costs of LRS are decided by
the number of group members (users). If there are more group members, the user has to
store not only his/her key pairs but also other member’s public keys, and the PSP needs
to store all group members’ public keys and reserved users’ signatures. In our scheme, the
user stores the anonymous credential, and the PSP stores its private key and three sets
(i.e., the efficient bloomfilter data structure is not considered in the comparison for the sake
of fairness). Although the storage costs of our scheme are not the best one compared to
that of the previous solutions, the Figure 3.6 (b) and (c) show that the costs are still small
enough to support scalability. In the real world, there may exist more than 10000 users
and 1000 reserved users in the system, the storage costs of our scheme are also acceptable
(1205 bytes and 148889 bytes at user side and PSP side). The BLAC/BLACR’s costs are
1185 bytes and 167724 bytes, the PE(AR)2 costs are 1973 bytes and 22529 bytes, and the






Figure 3.7: Selected interfaces of user, server, and terminal
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3.5.3 Implementation on Testbed
The PSP, PLT and the smartphones are connected via WiFi, and the communication
among them is designed based on the JAVA socket programming. For simplicity, the auto-
mated vehicle and smartphone at user side are programmed into one android application,
while the PSP and PLT own separated JAVA server applications, which support multiple
threads. The information of registered users and PLTs are store in the MySQL database
which is deployed at PSP side. As shown in Figure 3.7, the android application supports
basic functions, such as user registration, user login, user subscription (after user login)
anonymous login (i.e., user authentication), parking query (after anonymous login), park-
ing reservation (after parking query), parking check-in (including parking request) and
anonymous credential renewal. As a research demo, just one PLT application is deployed
with the fixed information near the University of Waterloo, and a single PLT registration
application is developed, but it is still enough to test the performance of our scheme since
multiple PLTs will not impact the performance from a design standpoint. The test results
are shown in Table 3.3. Most of the delays are measured from the android client side, start-
ing from the request generation to the operation completion. The most time-consuming
operation of our scheme is the parking reservation which costs almost 3 seconds. User sub-
scription, user authentication and anonymous credential renewal cost around 2 seconds,
while other operations cost less than 300 ms. Therefore, our scheme is very efficient in the
WiFi-based testbed.
Table 3.3: The performance (delay) of our testbed
Setup Phase Service Phase Parking Phase
Subphase Time Subphase Time Subphase Time
PLT
Registration
≈ 300 ms User
Authentication





≈ 100 ms Parking
Query














In this chapter, we have proposed a privacy-preserving reservation scheme for securing AVP
system. The security model has been first presented to define the privacy requirements
and the potential attacks in this system. Then, the proposed scheme has been designed
particularly based on the features of AVP system, to guarantee both the user’s identity
privacy and location privacy, and prevent the “Double-Reservation Attack” performed
by the malicious users. Note that, the vacant parking spaces are chosen by the drivers








As a new energy-efficient transportation style and a successful business model of collab-
orative consumption, car sharing has significantly enhanced our city’s livability recently
[123, 124]. In essence, car sharing provides a smart automobile rental service in which
a registered customer (a.k.a user) can reserve and access (i.e., check in and check out
using the mobile phone) shared vehicles for short-term or long-term use, without human
intervention. Currently, car sharing services can be roughly categorized into two types:
station-based car sharing or free-floating car sharing [125]. Station-based car sharing sys-
tems require customers to pick up and return vehicles at settled stations, while free-floating
car sharing systems support peer-to-peer car sharing between any two customers without
a fixed pick-up/drop-off position.
Compared with traditional car rental services, car sharing services obviously bring extra
advantages. As they are always charged per time or per mile, a customer can make a flexible
schedule regarding where and when she would like to pick up and return a shared vehicle
[126]. They also benefit the environment by mitigating pollution and traffic congestion,
since car sharing services advance the development of green-energy electric vehicles and
reduce the number of private vehicles on the road [127, 128]. As a result, more companies
have deployed shared cars, built car sharing services, and developed various mobile-based
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car sharing applications in different platforms, such as Enterprise CarShare1, Car2go2, and
Zipcar3. Under this ecosystem, customers can conveniently download and install these
Android/IOS applications from application stores, and utilize these applications to rent
shared cars by performing simple operations on their smartphones.
Most of these applications require customers to take an essential step before enjoying
car sharing services: identity uploading and verification. Specifically, a customer is re-
quired to upload a photo of her driving license (front and back) as well as a selfie of the
customer holding it, and a car sharing service provider can review the personal identifi-
cation to confirm that the customer has the right and ability to drive as a valid driver.
The step is commonly indispensable as car sharing service providers need to check the
driving qualification of the customer and trace the customer in case some bad situations
happen. For instance, if a customer refuses to return a shared vehicle on time or leaves
the shared vehicle in an unacceptable condition after one use, he will be assessed a cer-
tain fee. However, from a security and privacy standpoint [129, 130, 131], this kind of
necessary identity disclosure may lead to serious privacy concerns of customers. In reality,
when a car sharing service provider is honest-but-curious as an internal adversary or has
been compromised by an external adversary, a customer’s privacy can be easily violated by
analyzing the collected sensitive information [132, 133, 134, 135]. The sensitive informa-
tion includes real-time trajectories (through GPS on shared vehicles), pick-up and drop-off
places, time duration of driving, etc. Since an adversary knows the real identity of the
customer, he can link the information to a real person (corresponding to the customer)
in the real world to further reconstruct her mobility patterns. Furthermore, modern laws
(e.g., the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)) obligate service providers to
better protect customers’ privacy in the real-name system, by offering built-in privacy-
preserving mechanisms [136]. Therefore, how to resolve the conflict between privacy and
accountability becomes challenging in the car sharing scenario.
As the study of car sharing is still in its infancy, there are not many secure and privacy-
enhancing schemes designed for this service [86, 88, 137, 138]. The most related work is
SePCAR [86], which proposes two basic approaches: one is designed based on a single
trusted third-party authority (TTPA) and the other is designed from the secure multi-
party computation (SMPC) [139]. Apparently, TTPA can protect customers’ privacy and
achieve accountability at the same time. Customers’ private information can be stored
at TTPA and be revealed as needed, nevertheless it still suffers from vulnerabilities like





by an adversary). To tackle the issue, SePCAR also presents an SMPC-based approach
where multiple fixed parties replace TTPA to manage the private information of customers
and offer the accountability. Compared with the TTPA-based approach, the SMPC-based
approach requires more time-consuming computations among multi-parties, and it is de-
signed based on a non-collusion assumption where these parties cannot collude with each
other.
Different from the existing works, we propose a decentralized, accountable, and privacy-
preserving architecture for car sharing services in this chapter, named DAPA. In DAPA,
to avoid the single point of failure and build decentralized trust for customers, multiple
validation servers are employed to replace a single TTPA. Each validation server is man-
aged by an independent authority, and multiple authorities are organized as a group. The
group is dynamic instead of fixed, i.e. after a time period, the group of authorities will
be substituted by another group of authorities to improve the security level of the sys-
tem due to the timeliness of the compromise attack. The motivation behind DAPA is
to improve the fault tolerance of the car sharing service. Compared with other services,
privacy protection and accountability are more necessary for the car sharing service. Mul-
tiple distributed authorities who manage customers’ identities are substituted periodically
such that attackers have more difficulties in compromising customers’ privacy and break
the accountability. To protect customers’ privacy and achieve accountability simultane-
ously under the decentralized architecture, a new privacy-preserving identity management
(PPIM) scheme is introduced as a basic module for DAPA. Through PPIM, customers’
identities can be efficiently and secretly managed in a distributed and dynamic manner.
As long as a majority of validation servers are honest during a time period, customers’
identities are always hidden from car sharing service providers. With the help of validation
servers, car sharing service providers can verify the validity of customers’ hidden identities
without revealing them and trace real identities of misbehaving customers. Specifically,
there are three major technical challenges in designing PPIM.
Technical Challenges. First, considering that a customer’s identity needs to be
hidden, a trivial approach is to encrypt the identity before uploading. However, once the
uploaded identity is encrypted, it would be difficult for a validation server to verify the
validity of the customer’s identity with the ciphertext. To enable identity validation, the
following three properties should be guaranteed: i) (recoverable property) the ciphertext
can be decrypted by the validation server; ii) (identity property) the plaintext is one
registered customer’s identity credential; iii) (legitimate property) the customer is a valid
customer and has not been revoked. Second, since more than one validation server exist,
the above-mentioned three properties should be verified in a distributed manner, i.e., the
ability of verifying and recovering the customer’s identity should be shared among multiple
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validation servers, which is challenging. Moreover, this ability should be verified as well,
i.e., these validation servers can verify and ensure that they have the ability to accomplish
identity verification and identity recovery. Third, validation servers are dynamic, which
leads to the transferring of the ability of recovering a customer’s identity from one set
of validation servers to another set of validation servers after a time period, which is
not straightforward. This process should also be verified by validation servers to detect
malicious validation servers and ensure the correctness of transferring.
Contributions. The contributions of this chapter are summarized as two-fold.
B A privacy-preserving identity management (PPIM) scheme is proposed. Through
PPIM, a customer can outsource her encrypted identity to multiple dynamic valida-
tion servers for the purpose of decentralized identity management. These validation
servers can verify the validity of the customer’s encrypted identity without decrypt-
ing it based on a well-designed zero-knowledge proof protocol, recover the customer’s
real identity, and dynamically transferring the ability of identity recovery based on
adaptive verifiable secret sharing/redistribution techniques. Although PPIM is a ba-
sic module of DAPA, it can also be integrated into other applications related to the
identity management.
B A decentralized, accountable, and privacy-preserving architecture for car sharing
services (DAPA) is proposed. DAPA is designed based on PPIM and other cryp-
tographic primitives to preserve customers’ privacy during the car sharing process
while providing the accountability, i.e., DAPA enables a car sharing service provider
to check a customer’s driving qualification before the customer rents the car and to ef-
fectively trace the customer without a single trusted authority once the customer mis-
behaves. Detailed security analysis shows that DAPA can minimize privacy breaches
as well as guarantees accountability. In addition, performance evaluations via exten-
sive simulations demonstrate that DAPA is efficient in terms of computational costs
and communication overheads.
4.2 Models and Design Goals






Committee #i Committee #i+1
Multiple Dynamic Validation Servers
Epoch #i Epoch #i+1
Public Bulletin Board (Append-only Ledger)
Customers
Figure 4.1: System model
4.2.1 System Model
In the system model, there exist five entities in a car sharing service, as shown in Figure 4.1:
a large number of customers, some shared vehicles, a car sharing service provider, multiple
dynamic validation servers, and a public bulletin board.
B Customers: customers who install the car sharing application published by the car
sharing service provider, can rent the nearby unoccupied vehicles at the car sharing
station via simple operations using a smartphone. To ensure that a customer is an
authorized driver, the customer needs to pass the identity verification at the service
provider side. After being verified, the customer can reserve the vehicle and access
the vehicle through the car sharing mobile application.
B Shared Vehicles: Vehicles are dispersed into the city and are under the management
of the car sharing service provider. These vehicles can receive the control commands
from the car sharing service provider remotely and then update its access privilege for
different customers, i.e., a vehicle allows one and only one customer’s access when this
customer has successfully completed the car rental through the car sharing mobile
application.
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B Car Sharing Service Provider (CSSP): CSSP is a company, e.g., Zipcar, who possesses
an online server to provide the car sharing service and publishes the corresponding
mobile applications. It is also responsible for verifying the driving qualification of
customers, deploying the vehicles in the city and managing these vehicles. Finally,
the company can make a profit by charging customers based on mileage or time.
B Validation Servers (VSs): VSs can be regarded as dynamic and distributed servers.
VSs are organized to form a fixed-size committee in a fixed time interval (a.k.a
an epoch), and one specific VS is a committee member during this epoch. The
committee members dynamically change after an epoch and they are responsible
for identity management, i.e., verifying customers’ driving qualification, showing the
driving qualification to the car sharing service provider, and managing customers’
real identities in a privacy-preserving way. When disputes arise between customers
and the car sharing service provider, they can collaborate to recover the real identities
of customers such that accountability is clear.
B Public Bulletin Board: An append-only ledger exists in the model, e.g., a public
blockchain [130], where other entities can read/write the data. It can be regarded as
a public bulletin board [140].
Communication Model. There exist private channels among customers and VSs such
that customers can privately transmit data to VSs and VSs can share data with each other
privately. The private channels can be straightforwardly implemented based on the mature
Secure Sockets Layer protocol (SSL). Therefore, we omit the detailed construction of this
part.
4.2.2 Threat Model
There exist two attacks from internal/external adversaries who make profits by selling
personal information. First, VSs themselves are internal adversaries and can collude with
each other to disclose a customer’s identity, but these VSs cannot occupy a majority of
committee members during an epoch. Second, an external adversary can compromise some
honest VSs, but it cannot forecast VSs’ change over time, corrupt a set of VSs in advance
and therefore control a majority of the committee members during an epoch.
All in all, a majority of the committee members are honest during an epoch while some
VSs can be compromised by internal or external adversaries and behave maliciously. In
practice, these VSs can be different servers managed by different operators to limit the risk
of most of the VSs being compromised and colluding against customers.
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CSSP is assumed to be honest-but-curious in the system, that is, it may honestly
provide the car sharing service for customers but may be curious to collect the personal
information of customers and perform a deep analysis on customers’ data which may reflect
the customer’s privacy. In other words, we assume that CSSP does not provide customers
with malicious smartphone applications or malicious vehicles to monitor the customer
since such attacks can be detected by third parties and cause the risk of reputation loss.
Furthermore, CSSP can also collude with the malicious VSs.
From another point of view, customers cannot be fully trusted either, since some of
them may misbehave during the car rental process, e.g., misbehaving customers may not
return the vehicle or damage the shared vehicle unintentionally or intentionally after one
use.
4.2.3 Design Goals
There exists a huge conflict between a customer’s privacy requirement and CSSP’s demand
of accountability. On one hand, customers would like to prevent privacy leakage during
the car sharing service. On the other hand, CSSP needs to have the ability to know the
real identity of a customer so that it can review the customer’s qualification of driving
and claim the responsibility if the customer misbehaves. Hence, the following two security
objectives should be satisfied simultaneously.
B Customer Privacy: The privacy of customers should be protected, which implies
the anonymity and unlinkability of customers. More concretely, when a customer
uses the car sharing application to rent a shared car online, her identity cannot be
distinguished among all registered customers. When a customer uses the car sharing
application to rent more than one shared cars online, her two renting records cannot
be linked.
B Accountability: Customers should be held accountable for their behavior in the car
sharing service, i.e., CSSP is able to check customers’ driving qualification, recover
the misbehaving customer’s real identity, and revoke the misbehaving customer if
necessary.
In addition to customer privacy and accountability, usability is also significant. The
convenience and usability properties offered by the current car sharing service should be
preserved. For instance, CSSP can easily verify the driving qualification of customers and
customers can perform simple and straightforward operations to achieve online car rental.
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In summary, our goal is to design an accountable and privacy-preserving car sharing
architecture that offers strong privacy guarantees to customers as well as provides requisite
accountability for CSSP.
4.3 Proposed DAPA
In this section, we propose a decentralized, accountable, and privacy-preserving car sharing
architecture, named DAPA. We begin with present an overview of DAPA. Then, we propose
a privacy-preserving identity management (PPIM) scheme, serving as a basic module for
DAPA. Finally, we show the detailed construction of DAPA.
4.3.1 DAPA Overview
DAPA consists of five major phases: system setup, customer registration, car rental, car
audit, and customer revocation.
B System Setup: The cryptographic parameters, key pairs, and public information for
car sharing service are generated by CSSP.
B Customer Registration: A customer makes the registration at CSSP by providing the
username, password, and relative driving license info. If the registration is successful,
CSSP sends the identity credential back to the customer.
B Car Rental : Using a valid identity credential, a customer achieves the anonymous
car rental via communicating with VSs (current committee members) and CSSP.
B Car Audit : With the help of VSs (current committee members), CSSP traces and
reveals the real identity of a customer who misbehaves.
B Customer Revocation: CSSP revokes the misbehaving customer and does not accept
these customers’ car rental requests in the future.
Note that, the anonymous payments (car rental fee and car insurance fee) are not in-
cluded in DAPA. If needed, the existing anonymous payment schemes like ZCASH [141]
would be much helpful. Alternatively, the car sharing service can be an optional mem-
bership service. The valid customer who pays the membership fee during registration can
enjoy the unlimited car sharing service without a rental fee or insurance fee.
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4.3.2 Proposed PPIM
We first present PPIM, which is a key module that provides drivers’ identity management
for DAPA. PPIM allows VSs to manage real identities of any customers in a distributed and
dynamic manner. It consists of six steps, namely, Parameter Generation (PGen), Identity
Registration (IDRegister), Identity Hiding (IDHide), Identity Transferring (IDTransfer),
Identity Recovery (IDRecover), and Identity Revocation (IDRevoke). In PGen, all the
public parameters are generated and shared with the entities. In IDRegister, a customer
registers herself at CSSP and obtains a valid identity credential. In IDHide, the customer
uploads her identity credential to multiple VSs in a privacy-preserving manner and these
VSs are organized as a group to manage the identity credential. A single VS cannot
recover the identity credential but can verify the validity of the credential based on the
zero-knowledge proof technique. In IDTransfer, the current group of validation servers
transfers the identity management permission to another group of validation servers after
a time period. In IDRecover, a majority of VSs in the group can cooperate with each other
to recover the identity credential of a customer if necessary. In IDRevoke, a customer
can be revoked by CSSP via revoking her identity credential and the credential becomes
invalid for renting a shared car in the future. For easy understanding, Table 4.1 shows the
notations frequently used in PPIM.
Concretely, PPIM involves six parts: parameters generation, identity registration, iden-
tity hiding, identity transferring, identity recovery, and identity revocation.
• Parameter Generation (PGen). This part is run by CSSP during system setup. CSSP
can generate parameters as follows: i) p̃ is a l̃-bit prime number that satisfies p̃ = 2q̃ + 1
and q̃ is also a prime number; ii) G̃, G and GT are three bilinear groups of prime order
p̃ and an asymmetric bilinear map e : G̃ × G → GT exists; iii) (g̃, h̃) are two generators
of G̃ and g is a generator of G; iv) τ is a random number picked from Z∗p̃ and Ḡ ⊂ Z∗p̃
is a cyclic group of prime order q̃; v) H,H ′ are two cryptographic hash functions: H :
{0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l̃; vi) its private/public key pair is
(y, Y = gy), where y ∈R Z∗p̃ ; vii) a upper bound Ñ for revoked customers and public
information ~Φ = {Φ1 = gτ ,Φ2 = gτ
2
, ...,ΦÑ = g
τ Ñ}.
• Identity Registration (IDRegister). This part is run between CSSP and a customer
during customer registration. If the registration is successful, the customer can obtain the
identity credential from CSSP. Specifically, the customer sends the registration request to
CSSP, and CSSP verifies the received information. As long as it is correct and legitimate,
CSSP generates the identity credential for the customer as Cred = g̃
1
y+σ , where σ is chosen
from Ḡ/{−τ} and is unique for each customer. Then, (σ,Cred) is sent back to the customer
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Table 4.1: Notations frequently used in PPIM
Notation Definition
G̃, G, GT three groups that support bilinear maps
l̃ security parameter
p̃, q̃ two primes satisfy p̃ = 2q̃ + 1
H ′() a cryptographic hash function
g̃, h̃ two generators of G̃
g a generator of G
e(., .) a non-degradable bilinear mapping
Ḡ a cyclic subgroup Ḡ ⊂ Z∗p̃
τ auxiliary information
(y, Y ) CSSP’s private/public key
(Cred, σ) the identity credential
(ỹ, Ỹ ) a customer’s private/public key
(t, N) threshold for identity management
Sinv invalid customer list
(a, d) a valid customer’s witness
(u,w) ciphertext of σ
as the credential. The customer verifies the credential as e(Cred, Y gσ)
?
= e(g̃, g).
• Identity Hiding (IDHide). This part is run between a customer and VSs (current
committee members) during car rental. The customer can upload an identifier, a ciphertext
and a corresponding proof to the bulletin board. The proof indicates that the ciphertext
possesses three properties:
- (Recoverable Property) The ciphertext can be decrypted to obtain a plaintext using
a given private key.
- (Identity Property) The plaintext is one registered customer’s identity credential.
- (Legitimate Property) The registered customer is a valid customer and has not been
revoked.
Supposing that the current committee includes N VSs, the customer and VSs can perform
the following steps.
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- The customer randomly chooses the private key as ỹ ∈R Z∗p̃ and generates the public
keys as Ỹ = g̃ỹ, and writes the public keys Ỹ into the bulletin board.
- The customer distributes the private key ỹ to N VSs (current committee members)
P = (P1, P2, ..., PN) with access structure (t, N), where t = bN2 c+ 1 (bvaluec means
value is rounded down). To distribute the private key ỹ, the customer and VSs
follow the below stages synchronously in a sequential order and each stage has fixed
duration.
* (Sharing Stage) In this stage, the customer chooses a random polynomial f(x) =
a0 +a1x+ ...+at−1x
t−1 over Z∗p̃ of degree t−1. The customer sets f(0) = a0 = ỹ.
The customer then computes the secret shadow si = f(i) from i = 1 to N , and
distributes si to every member Pi ∈ P via the private channel. After that, the
customer writes {g̃sk}Nk=1 and {Dk = g̃ak}t−1k=1 into the bulletin board.
* (Complaining Stage) Pi verifies the shares it received from the customer. Pi
checks if





If the check fails, Pi writes the complaint into the bulletin board in this stage.
* (Responding Stage) The customer, after checking the complaint from Pi, writes
si that satisfies the Eq. (4.1) as a response into the bulletin board in this stage.
* (Confirming Stage) The customer is marked as disqualified if either more than
t complaints are received or the response of a complaint falsifies the Eq. (4.1).
Otherwise, Pi stores the secret shadow as si in this stage and confirms the
sharing in the bulletin board.
- The customer downloads the latest accumulated value c (the value is defined in
IDRevoke) and the revocation list including all invalid customers’ credentials Sinv =





′ + x) = f̄(x) · (σ + x) + d, where ηi is the coefficient of the polynomial
f(ρ), n′ is the size of Sinv, and d is a constant. The customer sets the witness (a, d),





- The customer chooses a random number r ∈R Z∗p̃ and encrypts her identity credential
σ as (u,w):
u = g̃r, w = g̃σỸ r.
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Note that, this is a ciphertext of an Elgamal encryption that provides chosen-plaintext
security.
- The customer generates a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof π, which proves three
properties: 1) (u,w) is a valid ciphertext that is encrypted under the public key Ỹ ; 2)
the ciphertext is an encryption of σ which is used for recovering the identity credential
of the customer; 3) σ, included in the commitment, is a valid identity credential and
has not been revoked by CSSP. The proof can be written as follows. γ is a random
number picked from Z∗p̃ .
NIZK{(r, σ, γ, a, d) :
u = g̃r ∧ w = g̃σỸ r ∧ C = g̃
γ
y+σ
∧ e(a, gσΦ1)e(g̃, g)d = e(c, g) ∧ d 6= 0}. (4.2)
- The customer generates a random public key as the identifier and stores the corre-
sponding private key. Then, the customer uploads the identifier IDuser, the ciphertext
(u,w) and the corresponding proof π into the bulletin board as an identity record,
such that her identity is hidden but publicly verified.
- VS (each current committee member) verifies the proof π and updates the state
(approval or reject) of this identity record. If more than half committee members
updates with success, the identity is successfully hidden. Otherwise, it fails.
• Identity Transferring (IDTransfer). This part is run between the current committee
and the next committee at the end of an epoch. Since committee members change dy-
namically, the current committee should transfer the secrets (namely, the private key ỹ)
maintained by themselves to the committee in the next epoch. N VSs follow the below
stages synchronously in a sequential order to redistribute χ secrets (χ is the number of
secret identities maintained by the current committee) to another N̂ VSs with a new access
structure (t̂, N̂), where t̂ = b N̂
2
c+ 1.
- (Sharing Stage) Each VS in the current committee Pi chooses a random polynomial
f̂i(x) = âi,0 + âi,1x + ... + âi,t̂−1x
t̂−1 over Z∗p̃ of degree t̂− 1. Pi sets f̂i(0) = âi,0 = si
and writes Ĉi,k = g̃
âi,k from k = 0 to t̂ − 1 into the bulletin board. Pi computes
the shares ŝi,j = f̂i(j) from j = 1 to N̂ and sends ŝi,j to each member in the next
committee Pj via the private channel.
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If the check fails, Pj writes the complaint against Pi into the bulletin board in this
stage.
- (Responding Stage) Pi, after checking the complaint from Pj, writes ŝi,j that satisfies
the Eq. (4.3) as a response, into the bulletin board in this stage.
- (Qualifying Stage) 1© Pi is marked as disqualified if either more than t̂ complaints
are received or the response of a complaint falsifies the Eq. (4.3); 2© Pj tests whether
Ĉi,0 is equal to g̃
si . If not, Pi is marked as disqualified; 3© Pj builds the same set of
non-disqualified members QUAL. If the size of QUAL is larger than t, Pj chooses
the first t members in QUAL, as the set QUALt.







x−i , and writes g̃
sj into the bulletin board.
- (Deleting Stage) Pi deletes its old secret shadow si.
• Identity Recovery (IDRecover). This part is run between VSs and CSSP during car
audit. The committee members can recover the private keys used for encrypting identity
credential by contributing their secret shadows. Specifically, if an identity of a customer
needs to be recovered, each committee member Pi (or Pj) first encrypts its secret shadow si
(or sj) using CSSP’s public key (based on any public-key cryptosystem), writes the cipher-
text into the bulletin board, and informs CSSP that the recovery operation is completed.
Then, only CSSP can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the secret shadow and verify the
correctness of the secret shadow by checking g̃si (or g̃sj). After receiving t (or t̂) secret










To decrypt the identity of the customer, CSSP checks Ỹ = g̃ỹ and computes g̃σ = w · u−ỹ.
Finally, by searching all registered users, the CSSP can easily derive σ, which is the identity
credential.
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• Identity Revocation (IDRevoke). This part is run by CSSP during customer revoca-
tion. CSSP can revoke a customer by adding the invalid customer’s identity credential σ
into a revocation list Sinv and updating an accumulator value c. Particularly, CSSP creates
an empty accumulator c as c = g̃ in the beginning. When a customer is invalid, CSSP adds
his identity credential into the accumulator as c = cσ+τ and also adds his credential σ into
the revocation list Sinv. Finally, CSSP publishes the latest accumulator c and revocation
list Sinv to the bulletin board.
4.3.3 Detailed Construction of DAPA
• System Setup: During this phase, CSSP runs PPIM.PGen to generate the public
cryptographic parameters Params and the private key y ∈ Z∗p̃ .
Params = {l̃, p̃, q̃, G̃,G, GT , e, g̃, h̃, g, Ḡ, H ′, τ, Y, ~Φ}.
Eventually, CSSP publishes Params and stores (y, τ) in its local storage.
Customers CSSP
Send user registration request
a) Verify the user info
b) Store the user info
Generate the credential (σ, $%&')
Respond the identity credential(σ, $%&')
Verify & Store (σ, $%&')
DPIE.IDRegister
Figure 4.2: Customer registration procedure
• Customer Registration: As shown in Figure 4.2, a customer registers herself
at CSSP. Following the protocol PPIM.IDRegister, the customer sends a unique user-
name/password (Note that, they are used for re-generating or retrieving the credential if
the credential is missing accidentally) and the corresponding driving qualification info, e.g.,
the photocopy of a valid driver license, to CSSP. After receiving the registration request,
CSSP verifies the validity of the driving qualification info. If the information is correct and
legitimate, CSSP stores the real identity of this customer and generates a unique identity
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credential (σ,Cred). CSSP then returns the credential (σ,Cred) to the customer. Oth-
erwise, CSSP returns with failure. After receiving the credential, the customer verifies
the credential (σ,Cred). If it passes the verification, the customer stores the credential
(σ,Cred). Otherwise, the customer’s registration fails.
• Car Rental: As shown in Figure 4.3, a customer achieves online car rental and
obtains a code to access the shared car through CSSP and VSs. Following the protocol
PPIM.IDHide, the customer generates the key pairs {(ỹ, Ỹ } and publishes the public keys
Ỹ to VSs. The customer then shares the private key ỹ with the distributed VSs and VSs
store the received secret shadows. Subsequently, the customer generates the witness (a, d),
encrypts her identity as (u,w), generates a proof of identity credential π, generates a unique
public key Keyuser, generates an identifier IDuser (note that, the identifier is another unique
public key that generated by the customer), and writes {IDuser, Keyuser, (u,w), π} to the
bulletin board as an identity record. The customer stores the corresponding private keys
of Keyuser and IDuser. Next, she sends a verification request to the current committee
members. The current committee (i.e., each individual committee member) verifies the
uploaded proof, and updates the state of the identity record (approval or reject) at the
bulletin board as well as sends the response back to the customer. After confirming that
the record’s state is updated (approval), the customer sends a car rental request to CSSP,
which includes the identifier IDuser, a signature (i.e., the customer uses the private key
corresponding to the identifier to generate the signature based on any secure signature
scheme, e.g., Boneh–Lynn–Shacham signature [22]), the shared car’s information, and the
rental duration. After receiving the request, CSSP locates the identifier IDuser at the
bulletin board, verifies the signature to ensure that the record belongs to the requester,
and checks the state of this record. If the state is approval, CSSP updates the code for
the shared car, encrypts the car access code using the public key Keyuser based on any
public-key cryptosystem, e.g., ElGamal encryption, writes the encrypted code into the
bulletin board, creates a car sharing record, and responds to the customer. Otherwise, it
rejects the request. The customer downloads the encrypted code from the bulletin board
and decrypts it to obtain the code using the private key corresponding to the public key
Keyuser. Finally, the customer uses the code to unlock the shared car at the car sharing
station.
Meanwhile, since the committee members change periodically (every epoch), following
PPIM.IDTransfer, the previous committee transfers the secret shadows to the next com-
mittee at the end of each epoch. When a customer returns the car, the customer parks
the shared car at any car sharing station and confirms the return operation by sending
the return request to CSSP. If the car is returned properly, CSSP then updates the code
for the shared car and informs the current committee about the accomplishment and the
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Customers CSSPVSs (Committee)Shared Vehicle
Generate key pairs ( )*, +,)
Distribute the secret key )*
Store secret shadows -!"#…%
I. Generate the witness as (., ')
II. Encrypt the identity credential as (/, 0)
III. Generate the proof of identity credential as 1
IV. Generate the identifier as 23&'()
V. Write 23&'() , (/, 0), and 1 to bulletin board
Inform the committee members
Send car rental request
23&'()/signature(corresponding to 23&'())/car info/rental duration
I. Locate the identity record 23&'()
II. Verify the signature
III. Check the state of 23&'()
IV. Generate the car access code
Send car rental response
Download and decrypt the code
Access the shared vehicle
PPIM.IDHide
I. Verify the proof 1
II. Create the identity record
III. Update the state (approval or reject)
Publish the public key +,
Update the car access code
I. Encrypt the code using 23&'()
II. Update the state (approval or reject)
III. Write the encrypted code to bulletin 
board
Update the committee members (each epoch)
DPIE.IDTransfer
Send car return request
Send identity deletion request
a) Delete the secret shadows
b) Update the state (accomplishment)
Send car return response
Figure 4.3: Car rental procedure
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identity record related to the car rental transaction. The committee members delete the
stored secret shadows as well as update the state of the identity record (accomplishment).
After confirming that the record’s state is updated, CSSP confirms the return by sending
the return response to the customer. Otherwise, CSSP goes to the car audit phase.
CSSP Validators (Committee)
Write the evidence of the malicious user
pointing to a unique identifier 23&'()
Send the audit request
Check the evidence
a) Encrypt the secret shadows
b) Write the encrypted secret shadows
Send the audit response
a) Download the encrypted secret shadows
b) Download the encrypted identity
c) Decrypt to get the secret shadows
d) Decrypt to get the identity
DPIE.IDRecover
a) Generate the latest accumulator 5
b) Create the latest revocation list 6!,-
Write 5 and 6!,-
DPIE.IDRevoke
Figure 4.4: Car audit and customer revocation procedure
• Car Audit: As shown in Figure 4.4, CSSP recovers the identity of a customer who
rents a shared car but misbehaves. Concretely, CSSP uploads the evidence to the bulletin
board, pointing to the customer’s identity record based on the unique identifier IDuser,
and updates the state of the record (evil). CSSP then sends an audit request to VSs. After
receiving the audit request, the current committee members check the evidence stored in
the bulletin board. If the evidence exists and is correct, following PPIM.IDRecover, the
current committee members release the encrypted secret shadows, update the state of the
record (release), and send the response back to CSSP. Afterwards, CSSP downloads the
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encrypted secret shadows and encrypted identity from the bulletin board, and recovers the
real identity of the customer via decryption.
• Customer Revocation: As shown in Figure 4.4, CSSP revokes a customer. Follow-
ing PPIM.IDRevoke, CSSP updates the customer revocation list Sinv and the accumulator
c used for identity verification. When a customer is revoked, he cannot pass the iden-
tity verification during identity registration and identity hiding. That is, the customer is
forbidden to use the car sharing service.
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we first analyze the proposed NIZK, i.e., Eq. (4.2), to show its completeness,
special soundness, and special honest verifier zero-knowledge, and then analyze how PPIM
achieves privacy preservation and accountability. As DAPA’s core component is PPIM,
the security of DAPA can be naturally reduced to the security of PPIM.
4.4.1 Security Analysis of NIZK
Lemma 1. Eq. (4.2) satisfies completeness, special soundness, and special honest verifier
zero-knowledge.
Proof. (Completeness) To prove the completeness, the proof should be transformed into
another (equivalent) proof. The reason that the transformation is needed is that the proof
is designed based on Σ protocol which only supports zero-knowledge proof of discrete log.
To achieve the transformation, specifically, the following auxiliaries should be generated
at the beginning. The customer as the prover chooses three independent generators of G̃:
g̃1, g̃2 and g̃3, and computes some auxiliaries as C = Cred
γ, θ1 = σβ1, θ2 = σβ2, θ3 = dβ3,
θ4 = dβ4, B1 = g̃
β1h̃β2 , B2 = ah̃
β1 , B3 = g̃1
β3 g̃β42 , B4 = g̃
θ3
3 , where β1, β2, β3, β4 are chosen
from Z∗p̃ . Then, the proof can be transformed into another (equivalent) proof as follows.
NIZK{(r, σ, γ, d, β1, β2, β3, β4, θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4) :
u = g̃r ∧ w = g̃σ̃Ỹ r ∧ e(B2,Φ1)
e(c, g)
= e(g̃, g)−de(h̃, g)θ1e(h̃,Φ1)
β1e(B2, g)
−σ
∧ C = g
γ
y+σ ∧B1 = g̃β1h̃β2 ∧ 1 = B−σ1 g̃θ1h̃θ2
∧B3 = g̃1β3 g̃β42 ∧ 1 = B−d3 g̃1θ3 g̃
θ4
2 ∧B4 = g̃θ33 ∧ d 6= 0}.
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The above protocol is a standard Σ protocol. Following the Σ protocol, the customer first
chooses random elements ṙ, σ̇, γ̇, ḋ, β̇1, β̇2, β̇3, β̇4
, θ̇1, θ̇2, θ̇3, θ̇4 ∈ Z∗p̃ . Next, the customer computes
u̇ = gṙ, ẇ = g̃σ̇Ỹ ṙ, Ċ = e(C, g)−σ̇e(g̃, g)γ̇,
˙B1,1 = g̃





β̇3 g̃β̇42 , ˙B3,2 = B
−ḋ
3 g̃1
θ̇3 g̃θ̇42 , Ḃ4 = g̃
θ̇3
3 ,
Ḋ = e(g̃, g)−ḋe(h̃, g)θ̇1e(h̃, g)τ β̇1e(B2, g)
−σ̇.
Afterwards, the customer calculates the challenge ch = H ′(g̃, u, w,B1, B2, B3, B4, C, u̇, ẇ, Ḃ1,
Ḃ2, Ḃ3, Ḃ4, Ċ, Ḋ), r̈ = ṙ−ch ·r, σ̈ = σ̇−ch ·σ, γ̈ = γ̇−ch ·γ, d̈ = ḋ−ch ·d, β̈1 = β̇1−ch ·β1,
β̈2 = β̇2 − ch · β2, β̈3 = β̇3 − ch · β3, β̈4 = β̇4 − ch · β4, θ̈1 = θ̇1 − ch · θ1, θ̈2 = θ̇2 − ch · θ2,
θ̈3 = θ̇3 − ch · θ3, θ̈4 = θ̇4 − ch · θ4. The customer finally sends the proof as follows.
π = {A,C,B1, B2, B3, B4, u̇, ẇ, Ȧ, Ċ, ˙B1,1, ˙B1,2, ˙B3,1,
˙B3,2, Ḃ4, Ḋ, r̈, ε̈, σ̈, γ̈, d̈, β̈1, β̈2, β̈3, β̈4, θ̈1, θ̈2, θ̈3, θ̈4}.
After receiving the proof, VS as the verifier computes ch and verifies the proof by
checking whether the following relations hold.
u̇ = uchgr̈, ẇ = wchỸ r̈g̃σ̈,




β̈1h̃β̈2 , ˙B1,2 = 1
chB−σ̈1 g̃




β̈3 g̃β̈42 , ˙B3,2 = 1
chB−d̈3 g̃1











If any of them does not hold, the verification fails. Otherwise, the proof passes the verifi-
cation. The completeness is guaranteed.
(Special Soundness) We assume that the extractor input consists of two transcripts,
i.e.,
{C,B1, B2, B3, B4, u, w, ch, ch′, r̈, r̈′, σ̈, σ̈′,


















The first transcript is the original transcript in the proof while the second transcript is
different from the first one, e.g. r̈′ = ṙ − ch′ · r. The only difference is that the challenges
ch and ch′ is different. If VS accepts both transcripts, the witnesses for the statement in
















































(Special Honest Verifier Zero-knowledge) We construct a simulator S who is given a
















and generates the conversation similarly which is an accepting conversation. In other
words, the simulator can utilize these random numbers to generate another conversation
as follows. For example, u̇′ = u·chgr̈
′
cannot be distinguished from u̇ due to randomness.



























It is indistinguishable from the conversation which is generated by the honest prover.
4.4.2 Security Analysis of PPIM
In this section, a security definition for PPIM is given based on a simulation-based model,
in a similar sense to the model adopted by [114]. First we summarize the idea of the
security analysis.
In the real world, all entities communicate via PPIM while in the idea world, all en-
tities communicate via a trusted party T , who handles the outputs and the inputs of all
entities and achieves the functionality provided by PPIM. There exists an adversary, A,
who controls the same entities (e.g., malicious customers and honest-but-curious CSSP)
in the real world and the ideal world. Also, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) algorithm, the environment E , that provides the inputs to all entities and sched-
ules the interaction among entities. A can freely communicate with E . We adopt a static
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model (during one epoch) and assume the number of entities and whether they are honest
or not are fixed before the system starts. We utilize an event to denote the execution
of a functionality, and there exist six events: INIT, REG, HIDE, TRANS, ROC, and REV,
corresponding to six parts of PPIM. All communications with T are not anonymous, i.e.,
T knows the identity of the entity who communicates with it, while the communication
between honest entities is not observed by A, which can be achieved by the anonymous
network, e.g., Tor network [142].
• INIT. The system begins when E specifies the number of honest/malicious customers
and VSs in the system. CSSP is honest-but-curious in the system.
- Real World. CSSP generates its key pair (spk, ssk). The public key spk is published
to all entities in the system.
- Ideal World. T initializes a database DB, which is used for storing the registration
status and storing the identity of the customer.
• REG. E instructs a customer to register with CSSP.
- Real World. The customer sends a registration request to CSSP, and CSSP responds
to the customer and stores the customer’s registration status. If the customer has
already obtained an identity credential, CSSP would reject the request. Since this
procedure is not anonymous in the view of CSSP, CSSP can identify duplicated
requests from the same customer.
- Ideal World. The customer sends a registration request to T . T then informs CSSP
a customer would like to register and whether the customer has registered before.
CSSP responds to T , and T forwards the response to the customer. If CSSP accepts
the request, i.e., the customer has not registered before, T stores the registration
status of the customer in DB.
• HIDE. E instructs a customer to hide her identity through communicating with VSs.
- Real World. The customer generates the secret for each VS and encrypts her identity
credential. Then the customer uploads the encrypted identity and a proof to the
public bulletin board, and sends an identity hiding request to VSs. VSs verify the
proof and update the state at the public bulletin board.
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- Ideal World. The customer sends an identity hiding request to T . T verifies the
identity, and sends a bit to each VS indicating whether the customer is valid registered
customer and has not been revoked. Each VS replies with the state to T , and T then
updates the state at the public bulletin board. If the state is approval, T stores the
real identity of the customer in DB.
• TRANS. E instructs VSs in the current committee to transfer the secret belonging to
a customer to VSs in the next committee.
- Real World. Each VS in the current committee redistributes the secret belonging
to a customer to each VS in the next committee. Each VS in the next committee
verifies the secret afterwards.
- Ideal World. Each VS in the current committee sends the secret transferring request
to T . T updates the identity credential of the customer in DB, and sends a bit
indicating whether the transferring is successful or not to each VS in the current
committee and next committee.
• ROC. E instructs CSSP to recover the identity of a customer through communicating
with VSs.
- Real World. CSSP sends the identity recovery request, corresponding to a HIDE
event initiated by a customer such that a majority of VSs output success, to each
VS. Each VS replies with its secret and CSSP utilizes the secret to decrypt the
encrypted identity of the customer.
- Ideal World. CSSP sends the identity recovery request to T . T locates the real
identity of the customer in DB. T informs each VS CSSP would like to recover
a customer’s identity. Each VS responds to T with a bit indicating whether the
recovery is approved or not. If a majority of VSs agree to recover the identity, T
replies the customer’s identity back to CSSP. Then, CSSP recovers the identity of
the customer.
• REV. E instructs CSSP to revoke a customer.
- Real World. CSSP adds the identity credential of the customer into the accumulator
c and the revocation list Sinv. CSSP updates the latest accumulator and revocation
list at the public bulletin board.
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- Ideal World. CSSP sends the latest accumulator and revocation list to T , and T
updates them at public bulletin board and delete the customer in its database.
Ideal world PPIM provides all the desired security properties. First, all the events,
in the view of CSSP and VSs, are anonymous. T just informs VSs some anonymous
customers would like to hide their identities and the real identities are only maintained by
T . Thus, customer privacy is guaranteed. Second, T verifies whether the customer is a
valid registered customer and has not been revoked, and T can recover the real identity
of the customer and revoke a customer by deleting the customer in its database such that
accountability is assured. Real world PPIM is secure if its behavior is the same as the
ideal world PPIM. Thus, assuming negl(λ) is a negligible function in security parameter,
the following definition of security can be given.
Definition 1. Let RealE,A(λ) (resp. IdealE,S(λ)) be the probability that E outputs 1
when run in the real world (resp. ideal world) with adversary A (resp. S having black-box
access to A). PPIM is secure if for all PPT algorithms E , A, the following expression holds:
|RealE,A(λ)− IdealE,S(λ)| = negl(λ).
We analyze the security of PPIM based on the following lemmas handling the relevant
combinations of entities controlled by the adversary. The analysis is divided into two cases
according to the subset of entities controlled by A. The first case is proven to achieve
customer privacy and the second case is proven to achieve accountability.
Lemma 2. (Customer Privacy) For all PPT environments E and all real world
adversaries A controlling CSSP, a subset of customers, and a subset of VSs (less than half
VSs), there exists an ideal world simulator S which satisfies |RealE,A(λ) − IdealE,S(λ)| =
negl(λ).
Proof Sketch. A simulator S is defined which interacts with E as an ideal world adver-
sary, and meanwhile has black-box access to a real world adversaryA. Note that the output
of S is always indistinguishable to the output of A as long as the following conditions are
satisfied. During an HIDE event, S represents the dishonest VS to T and represents the
honest customer/VS to A. The simulation fails if A can recover the identity credential σ
corresponding to the ciphertext (u,w). This happens with negligible probability under the
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. The security proof is similar to the proof of the
chosen plaintext security property of the Elgamal encryption. The simulation also fails if
A can distinguish two proofs π and π′. This happens with negligible probability due to
the zero-knowledgeness of the ZkPoK, which has been proven in Lemma 1. In addition,
the simulation fails if A can break the the confidentiality of the t out of N secret sharing
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[143]. This happens with negligible probability under the Discrete Log (DL) assumption.
Intuitively, since the share shadow obtained by each VS is distributed uniformly at ran-
dom, so it does not contain any information about the secret. During a TRANS event, S
represents the dishonest VS to T and represents the honest VS to A. The simulation fails
if A can break the the confidentiality of the secret redistribution [144]. This happens with
negligible probability under the DL assumption.
Lemma 3. (Accountability) For all PPT environments E and all real world adver-
saries A controlling a subset of customers and a subset of VSs (less than half VSs), there
exists an ideal world simulator S which satisfies |RealE,A(λ)− IdealE,S(λ)| = negl(λ).
Proof Sketch. A simulator S is defined which interacts with E as an ideal world ad-
versary, and meanwhile has black-box access to a real world adversary A. Note that the
output of S is always indistinguishable to the output of A as long as the following con-
ditions are satisfied. During a REG event, S represents the dishonest customer to T and
represents the honest CSSP to A. The simulation fails if A can forge a valid identity
credential (σ,Cred = g̃
1
y+σ ). This happens with negligible probability under the q-Strong
Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumption. The security proof is similar to the proof of the exis-
tential unforgeability property of the Boneh-Boyen short signature [23]. During an HIDE
event, S represents the dishonest customer to T and represents the honest CSSP to A.
The simulation fails if S fails to extract from A the values (r, σ, γ, a, d). This happens with
negligible probability under the soundness property of NIZK, which has been proven in
Lemma 1. During an HIDE event, S represents the dishonest VS to T and represents the
honest customer/VS to A. The simulation fails if A can break the the correctness of the t
out of N verifiable secret sharing [143]. This happens with negligible probability. During
a TRANS event, S represents the dishonest VS to T and represents the honest VS to A.
The simulation fails if A can break the the correctness of verifiable secret redistribution
[144]. This happens with negligible probability.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
Since the core component of DAPA is PPIM, we mainly focus on the performance of
PPIM. We simulate PPIM and compare our scheme with two existing schemes: VEGS
[145] and Vote-to-Link [146], in terms of functionalities and computational costs, and also
simulate the communication overhead of PPIM. The existing scheme can only achieve
partial functions provided by PPIM, and the comparison results are in Table 4.2. VEGS
[145] does not support the dynamic architecture, and a customer cannot be revoked after
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the registration. Vote-to-Link [146] does not support the dynamic architecture either, and
a customer’s identity can only be linked but cannot be recovered or revoked.
Table 4.2: Functionality comparison of PPIM with existing schemes
Properties Distributed Dynamic Confidential Verifiable Recoverable Revocable
PPIM 3 3 3 3 3 3
VEGS [145] 3 7 3 3 3 7
Vote-to-Link [146] 3 7 3 3 7 7
The VEGS is a group-signature-based scheme: a customer can encrypt her group sig-
nature and prove to CSSP that the uploaded ciphertext contains a valid group signature
that can be verified and opened by VSs (also called the adjudicator in the original pa-
per). Under the circumstances, the encrypted group signatures can be maintained by VSs
to guarantee both privacy and accountability. The Vote-to-Link is another distributed
identity management scheme that the customer can encrypt her identity credential using
a threshold encryption scheme and prove to CSSP that the ciphertext contains a valid
credential. In this case, the encrypted credential can be managed by VSs (also called the
moderator in the original paper) to guarantee both privacy and accountability. To make
the comparison fair, we simplify the calculations of PPIM.
For the cryptographic settings, we utilize the Java pairing based cryptography (JPBC)
library [147] and choose the type F pairing (Barreto-Naehrig curve) in our simulation,
since it supports asymmetric bilinear pairing. To guarantee security level, the security
parameters l̃ is set as l̃ = 160.
4.5.1 Computational Costs
To evaluate the computational costs, we first analyze the computational complexity of
PPIM’s each part (except PGen since it only needs to be run one time in the beginning). To
measure the computational complexity, we count the number of time-consuming operations
like bilinear pairing and exponentiation in G̃. The computational costs of bilinear pairing
is denoted by PAIRT , and the computational costs of exponentiation in G̃ is denoted by
EXP G̃T . Assuming that there are N (t = bN2 c + 1) current committee members (VSs), N̂
(t̂ = b N̂
2
c+1) committee members in the next epoch, and χ engaged customers (iAn engaged
customer means the customer who rents a shared car but does not return it), the results are
shown in Table 4.3. PPIM.IDHide is the major computational burden for the customer.
The customer’s computational complexity is O(N) since the customer needs to distribute
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the secret ỹ according to the number of current committee members. Nevertheless, this
calculation only needs to be performed once when the customer wants to rent a shared
car. PPIM.IDTransfer is the major computational burden for VSs. The computational
burden of VSs should be discussed separately. The computational complexity of current
committee members is O(χ · t̂) since they have to transfer χ engaged customers’ secrets to
N̂ next committee members with the threshold t̂. The computational complexity of next
committee members is O(χ ·N · t̂) since they need to verify the received χ secrets from N
current committee members.
To show the efficiency of PPIM, we also simulate PPIM and two existing schemes VEGS
[145] and Vote-to-Link [146]. These schemes are simulated on a Macbook Pro notebook
with Intel Core i7 processor. The memory is 8GB and the clock rate is 2.6 GHz. The
performance metric used in the comparison is the computational cost of PPIM.IDHide
with the different number of VSs. The results are shown in Figure 4.5 (a) and (b). PPIM
is more efficient than two existing schemes in terms of computational costs and communi-
cation overheads. The reason is since 1) the VEGS is designed under the bilinear group
of composite order, its computational cost is larger than PPIM which is designed under
the bilinear group of prime order; and 2) the Vote-to-Link uses a more time-consuming
threshold encryption method and the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof technique has
higher computational complexity.
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(b) Validation Server (PPIM.IDHide)
Figure 4.5: Computational costs of customers and validation servers in each epoch
(PPIM.IDHide)
In addition, we also measure the computational cost of PPIM.IDTransfer with the
different number of VSs. The results are shown in Figure 4.6. To transfer one engaged
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customer’ secret to the next committee, each current committee member only needs to
perform the exponentiation in G̃, which is efficient compared with other complex group
operations. Even though the size of next committee is as large as 100, it takes around 400
ms to accomplish the transfer. Similarly, to receive one engaged customer’ secret, each next
committee member just needs to perform the exponentiation in G̃ as well. Even though
the size of current committee is as large as 100, it takes less than 12, 000 ms to accomplish
the verification, which is efficient. Note that, the delay can be optimized by increasing
the epoch length since the frequency of identity transfer decreases. Also, we utilize Java
programming language and the single-thread setting to simulate the procedure, and the
delay can be further reduced by applying C programming language (or other low-level
languages) and the multi-thread setting.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

































Next committee members (N=10, t=10)
Next committee members (N=30, t=20)
Next committee members (N=50, t=30)




PPIM’s communication overheads are mostly related to the number of distributed VSs and
the number of engaged customers. If there exist a large number of committee members
(VSs), more secrets are needed to be distributed to these VSs when the customer runs
PPIM.IDHide. When the rental duration is long (e.g., several epochs), the current com-
mittee members need to transfer the managed secrets owned by engaged customers to next
committee members. Therefore, we analyze the communication overheads of PPIM.IDHide
and PPIM.IDTransfer as follows. Assuming that the sizes of G̃, GT , and Zp̃ are denoted
by SizeG̃, SizeGT , and SizeZ the communication overhead of PPIM.IDHide between the
customer and the current committee member is (N + t + 14 + n′) ∗ SizeG̃ + 2 ∗ SizeGT +
(N + 12) ∗ SizeZ . The customer does not only need to upload the public key Ỹ to the
bulletin board, share the secret shadow {si}Ni=1 with, submit the encrypted secrets (u,w)
and the proof π to the committee members but also needs to download the latest accumu-
lator c and the revocation list Sinv from the bulletin board. The communication overhead
of PPIM.IDTransfer between current committee members and next committee members
is χ((t̂ − 1) ∗ SizeG̃ + N̂ ∗ SizeZ). For each secret si, each current committee member Pi
needs to write the commitment of the share Ĉi,k into the bulletin board and also share the
secret shadow ŝi,j privately with each committee member Pj in the next epoch. We show
the effects of different numbers of VSs, revoked customers and engaged customers on the
communication overhead in Figure 4.7. Although the communication overheads are linear
to the numbers of distributed VSs and engaged customers, it is still acceptable (less than
300 KB).
Table 4.3: Computational complexity of PPIM
PPIM CSSP Customer VS
IDRegister EXP G̃T 3 ∗ PAIRT + EXP G̃T -
IDHide - (29 + t+N) ∗ EXP G̃T + 6 ∗ PAIRT (26 + t) ∗ EXP G̃T + 9 ∗ PairT
IDTransfer - - (χ ∗ t̂+ χ ∗N ∗ (t̂+ 1))EXP G̃T
IDRecover (t+ 1) ∗ EXP G̃T - -
IDRevoke EXP G̃T - -
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a decentralized, accountable, and privacy-preserving

































































(b) Between current and next committee mem-
bers (PPIM.IDTranfer)
Figure 4.7: Communication overheads of customers and validation servers (epoch)
dation servers are employed to assist in managing customers’ real identities instead of a
single trusted authority, which significantly reduces the risk of the single point of failure and
builds decentralized trust for customers. Meanwhile, based on a new privacy-preserving
identity management scheme (PPIM), DAPA achieves privacy preservation for customers
and accountability for car sharing service providers simultaneously. DAPA enables a car
sharing service provider to verify the validity of customers’ identifications without reveal-
ing customers’ real identities, and it also allows a car sharing service provider to trace
misbehaving customers no matter how validation servers change over time. Moreover, ac-









With the popularity of smart mobile devices and the advancement of wireless network-
ing technologies, mobile crowdsourcing [148] has become a popular and top-of-the-line
approach to achieve real-time data collection and acquisition. Especially in an intelligent
transportation system [149], smart vehicles, drivers, and their smartphones can be regarded
as mobile sensors to sense and absorb information like real-time road conditions and traffic
alerts from the environment. This information can be fed back to drivers and other rela-
tive traffic transportation departments to assist in effective traffic management. Compared
with traditional road condition monitoring methods based on fixed-deployed sensors, e.g.
cameras, the crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring method offers many advan-
tages, including reducing the costs of sensor deployments, increasing the sensing coverage
area, and reducing the reaction delay of local traffic perturbations. For example, WAZE
1 is a typical crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring system, where users who in-
stalled an mobile application named WAZE can register themselves and report different
1https://www.waze.com/
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kinds of road conditions such as traffic jams, road surface harzards, and police traps, to a
WAZE monitoring service provider maintained by the Google company. After obtaining
enough road condition information, the monitoring service provider can build and update a
live road condition map, which can be shared among users and make other vehicle-related
services, e.g., navigation, more accurate and convenient.
Although crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring systems like WAZE bring
plenty of benefits, there still exist some realistic security and privacy issues, which may
cause privacy concerns and degrade the system’s quality. Obviously, the crowdsourcing-
based monitoring systems require each user to collect and upload some sensitive informa-
tion, such as a user’s current location to a monitoring service provider, which may violate
the privacy of users under privacy laws, such as GDPR [6]. To protect user privacy, some
privacy-preserving schemes [90, 91, 89] have been proposed recently. In these schemes,
users who care about their privacy generally can conceal their identities (anonymization)
or encrypt the road condition information and sensitive data with flexible access controls
(encryption) when reporting to a monitoring service provider. These countermeasures can
relieve users’ privacy concerns and motivate more users to participate in the system, which
has been widely acknowledged. Another inevitable risk that the crowdsourcing-based mon-
itoring systems face is data manipulation attacks [150]. We cannot simply assume that all
users in the system are honest to submit a real road condition. Large-scale biased and faked
road condition reports may lead to serious traffic management issues, e.g., serious traffic
jams [151]. To improve the system’s quality, not only the academic researchers [98] but also
the industrial companies 2 introduce some trust and reputation management mechanisms
for users. A user’s reputation score is viewed as an important indicator for measuring the
reliability of a user’s road condition report [152]. In other words, if a user’s reputation
score is low, his/her report may not appear on the live map. This approach can mitigate
the data manipulation attacks, but it somehow conflicts with the privacy requirements of
users. Without privacy preservation, any reputation management scheme [153] can be eas-
ily integrated with a crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring system, by enabling
a monitoring service provider to bind each user with a life-time reputation score. When
receiving a user’s report, the monitoring service provider can link the user to a specific
reputation score and can easily judge the report’s trustworthiness.
However, if the monitoring service provider is not fully trusted, the situation is totally
different. A straightforward idea is to deploy a trusted reputation authority in the sys-
tem to maintain the relationship between a user and his/her reputation score [96] without
breaking users’ identity privacy. A monitoring service provider can request the trust level
of each report from the trusted reputation authority and accordingly update its live map.
2https://support.google.com/waze/partners/answer/6324421?hl=en
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Nevertheless, this design has some drawbacks, e.g., the trusted reputation authority should
be always online, suffers from the single point of failure, and cannot be compromised in
the real world. To address these weaknesses, another idea is to substitute a centralized
trusted authority with decentralized authorities [100]. As long as one authority is honest,
adversaries cannot reveal the relationship between a user and his/her reputation score. But
this design requires a large number of time-consuming computations and multiple-rounds
communications, and decentralized authorities should work together to manage users’ rep-
utation scores. Furthermore, some privacy-preserving schemes [97, 98] loose the privacy
requirements to improve the efficiency of the reputation management. Instead of achieving
high-level user anonymity, they only achieve user pseudonymity. A reputation score is
bound with a pseudo-identity of a user, and the user’s reports can be linked if he/she uses
the same pseudo-identity, which is not desirable since the monitoring service provider could
utilize the information included in the report such as locations to deduce some sensitive
and private information of the user such as his home address. In this chapter, different
from the above-mentioned schemes, we propose a novel privacy-preserving crowdsourcing-
based road condition scheme that supports anonymous reputation management without
the assistance of any third-party authority. Namely, only users and a monitoring service
provider work together to manage users’ reputation scores while preserving users’ identity
privacy. Precisely speaking, even service providers do not know each user’s exact repu-
tation score or how it changes in the system, and only users know their exact reputation
scores.
There mainly exist two technical challenges in designing such a scheme: 1) how to bind
a user’s identity credential with his/her reputation score in a privacy-preserving manner;
and 2) how to maintain a user’s reputation score in a privacy-preserving manner but a
monitoring service provider can update the user’s reputation score according to his/her
reports. The challenge 1) means that a monitoring service provider can authenticate a
user’s identity credential and his/her bound reputation score included in a road condition
reports, but it cannot link the user’s two road condition reports. It also implies that a
user cannot share his/her reputation score with other users unless the user is willing to
share his/her identity credential. The challenge 2) means a monitoring service provider can
update a user’s reputation score according to the accuracy of the user’s reports, without
knowing the user’s identity or reputation score. To deal with these challenges, we employ
a cryptographic building block, i.e., zero-knowledge proof, and other basic cryptographic
primitives such as pseudo-random functions, digital signature, and cryptographic homo-
morphic commitment into our scheme. Specifically, the contributions of this chapter can
be summarized as three-folds.
B First, we propose a privacy-preserving crowdsourcing-based road condition moni-
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toring scheme, where a monitoring service provider can authenticate any registered
user’s reports and feedbacks but cannot link the user’s reports and feedbacks or reveal
his/her identity.
B Second, the proposed scheme additionally achieves anonymous reputation manage-
ment without the assistance of any online trusted authority or third-party authori-
ties, which is particularly fit for real-world applications. We give a detailed security
analysis of the proposed scheme in terms of three security properties: anonymity,
K-tolerant trust, and unforgeability.
B Third, we develop a proof-of-concept prototype based on JAVA, which is utilized to
evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. Based on the experimental results,
our scheme is demonstrated to be feasible and practical in terms of computational
and communication overhead.
5.2 Models and Design Goals
In this section, we formalize our system model, security model, and identify our design
goals.
5.2.1 System Model
In our system model, we consider a privacy-preserving crowdsourcing-based road condition
monitoring system, which mainly consists of two entities, namely a monitoring service
provider (MSP) and a set of users, as shown in Fig. 5.1.
B Monitoring Service Provider (MSP): A MSP is a cloud-based service that maintained
by an intelligent transportation company, e.g., Google, to crowdsource information
from its users (reporter) and offers services on real-time road conditions to its users
(receiver). In addition, MSP is also responsible for building a reputation management
system for users in a privacy-preserving manner. They can judge the reliability of a
road condition report based on the reputation score of the reporter.
B Users: Users are on-road users, who can register at the MSP and anonymously report
to the MSP about the real-time road conditions after the registration, including












Figure 5.1: System model
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assigned a reputation score by the MSP and the initial reputation score for each
user is the same. The reputation score can be updated (increased/decreased) by the
MSP anonymously, according to the accuracy of his/her reports. The accuracy is
determined by the received feedbacks (positive/negative).
Communication Model. Based on traditional certificate-based mechanisms, e.g., one-
way SSL/TLS, the communication channel between users and the MSP is assumed to be
secure and one-way authenticated (i.e., a user can authenticate a MSP’s certificate to verify
its identity and a confidential communication channel between them can be established).
5.2.2 Security Model
In our security model, the MSP is assumed to be honest-but-curious, i.e., the MSP faith-
fully follows the system protocols but may be curious about users’ identity privacy. This
assumption is practically reasonable, as the MSP has to follow the protocols so that the
road condition monitoring system can be accepted by users. In the meantime, since some
undetectable malwares could have been installed in the MSP to collect users’ identity
information, we can also assume the MSP is curious and violates users’ identity privacy.
On the other hand, we assume the majority of users are honest, but we do not exclude
some users may maliciously manipulate their reports and corresponding reputation scores
to corrupt the MSP’s monitoring service and diminish the accuracy of the road condition
monitoring platform. For these reasons, the following three security properties should be
satisfied.
B Anonymity : An honest-but-curious MSP cannot reveal the identity of a user who
honestly follow the system protocols, and cannot link the user’s reports, feedbacks
and reputation updating behavior.
B K-Tolerant Trust : A user can only make K reports before updating his/her repu-
tation score, and more than K reports from the same user can be detected by the
MSP. In addition, one user can only make one feedback for each report.
B Unforgeability : A user cannot forge his/her identity or modify his/her reputation
score binding with his/her identity, i.e., any forged identity and modified reputa-
tion score cannot pass the MSP’s verification and cannot be recognized as a valid
reputation score.
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Note that, since this work mainly focuses on privacy preservation, other active attacks,
e.g., denial of service (DoS) attack and sybil attack, are beyond the scope of this work,
and will be discussed in our future work.
5.2.3 Design Goals
Under the above-mentioned system model and security model, the following three goals
should be achieved in the proposed scheme.
B Functionality: The proposed scheme should achieve all basic functions of the system.
B Security : The security properties mentioned in the security model should be realized,
including anonymity, K-tolerant trust, and unforgeability.
B Feasibility : The proposed scheme should be feasible to be implemented, including all
system protocols and algorithms defined in the scheme.
5.3 Our Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present our privacy-preserving crowdsourcing-based road condition mon-
itoring scheme, which mainly consists of five phases, namely system setup, user registration,
data reporting, report feedback, and reputation updating, as shown in Fig. 5.2.
5.3.1 System Setup
Without loss of generality, we consider the MSP bootstraps the whole system in the sys-
tem setup phase, as the MSP builds the road condition monitoring system by deploying
an online road monitoring service and a corresponding mobile application. Any user can
download and install the mobile application and utilize the service. The online road min-
itoring service collects road condition reports from its clients and distills all reports into
usable traffic road data to update a real-time map on the client’s application. Accordingly,
a registered user can freely report to the MSP (i.e., the online road monitoring service)




• Event: Traffic jam
• Location: N2J 3Z4
• Datetime: 15:37 06/01/20
num event location datetime feedback
1 Traffic Jam N2J 3Z4 15:37 06/01/20 +3
2 Police Trap N2Y 3W7 15:45 06/01/20 -4
… … … …
User (Reporter) User (Receiver)







Figure 5.2: Phases of the anonymous crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring
scheme
Specifically, given a security parameter λ, the MSP first chooses three multiplicative
cyclic bilinear groups G, Ḡ and G of the same prime order q, which satisfies a bilinear
map e : G × Ḡ → G. The length of the prime order q is λ, and there does not exist an
efficiently computable isomorphism φ : Ḡ→ G, i.e., e is called a type-3 pairing. Then, the
MSP selects 3 independent generators (g, g, h) of G3 and a generator ḡ of Ḡ. Moreover,
the MSP sets a range [0, 2κ] for reputation scores, and chooses two cryptographic hash
functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → G. Also, the MSP chooses empty sets UList,
IList, SList and sets an accumulated value accu = g for the purpose of identity management.
Finally, the MSP publishes the public parameters pp, where
pp = (λ, q, g, h, ḡ, G, Ḡ,G, e,H,H ′, accu, IList, SList).
Next, based on the public parameters pp, MSP generates a pair of public and private
keys (pk, sk) as follows and publishes the public key pk: i) Set an upper bound n for the
accumulated value accu; ii) Choose 5 random elements (x, y, z, v, w, u) ∈R Z5q ; iii) Generate
the private key
sk = (X = gx, u)
; and iv) Generate the corresponding public key
pk = (Y, Z, V,W, X̄, Ȳ , Z̄, V̄ , W̄ ,U, Ū)
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Algorithm 1 URegister Algorithm
Input: (pp, pk).
Output: (uid, r, id, sn, ID, πID).
1: Choose a random element r ∈R Zq.
2: Choose a pseudo identity id ∈R Zq.
3: Choose a unique identity uid ∈R Zq.
4: Choose a serial number sn ∈R ZKq .
5: Generate a blinded pseudo identity ID = grW snY idZuid.
6: Generate a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof πID = NIZK1{(r, id, sn, uid) : ID =
grW snY idZuid}.
7: Output (uid, r, id, sn, ID, πID).
where Y = gy, Z = gz V = gv, W = gw, U = {U1 = gu, U2 = gu
2
, ..., Un = g
un}, X̄ = ḡx,
Ȳ = ḡy, Z̄ = ḡz, V̄ = ḡv, W̄ = ḡw, and Ū = ḡu.
5.3.2 User Registration
In order to participate in the crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring system, each
user first needs to real-name authenticate himself/herself to the MSP. Note that, if a user
has registered himself/herself before, the user cannot register again. After the real-name
authentication, the user runs an algorithm URegister as shown in Algorithm 1 to generate
the registration information (uid, r, id, sn, ID, πID), stores (uid, r, id, sn) locally, sends the
registration request (ID, πID) to the MSP, and waits for the response.
After receiving the registration request from the user, the MSP verifies the zero-
knowledge proof πID and responds FAIL back to the user if the proof is not correct. If the
verification passes, the MSP chooses an initial reputation score θ ∈ [0, 2κ] for the user, and
generates a signed blinded pseudo identity SID = (SID1 = g
r̂, SID2 = (X · V θ · ID)r̂).
Finally, the MSP responds (SUCCESS, SID, θ, accu, SList) back to the user, where accu
is the current accumulated value and SList is the latest set used for storing the used serial
numbers.
After receiving the response from the MSP, the user checks the response. If the response
is FAIL, the user fails to make the registration. If the response is SUCCESS, the user can
run an algorithm UCredGen as shown in Algorithm 2 to generate a signed pseudo identity
PID and a non-membership witness wit.
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Algorithm 2 UCredGen Algorithm
Input: (pp, pk, r, SID, θ, id, sn, SList).
Output: FAIL or PID.
1: Set PID1 = SID1 = σ.
2: Generate PID2 = SID2 · σ−r.
3: Set PID = (PID1, P ID2).
4: Verify e(PID1, X̄V̄
θȲ idW̄ snZ̄uid) = e(PID2, ḡ).
5: if the verification does not pass then
6: Output FAIL.
7: end if






′+ρ) = f(ρ) ·(sn+ρ)+d,
where ci is the coefficient of the polynomial f(ρ), n
′ is the size of SList, and d is a
constant.






and wit2 = d.
10: Output (PID,wit).
Finally, if the UCredGen algorithm does not output FAIL, the user locally stores
Cred = (uid, id, sn, PID,wit, θ)
as an anonymous credential and the registration completes.
Note that, when an additional sn′ is added into SList, the user will be notified and can
update his/her non-membership witness wit = (wit1, wit2) by the following equations.
wit1 = accu · witsn
′−sn
1 , wit2 = wit2 · (sn′ − sn).
If n′ almost reaches n, where n′ is current size of SList, the MSP needs to update its public
key pk and private key sk, notifies the users to update their anonymous credential Cred,
and re-set the set SList to be empty. The procedure of anonymous credential updating is
similar to the procedure of the reputation updating, which will be given in the following.
5.3.3 Data Reporting
A registered user can anonymously make a report (M,RID, tk, πM , T ) to the MSP, in-
cluding the details of a road condition M , a randomized pseudo identity RID, a one-time
token tk, a corresponding signature proof of knowledge πM , and a tag T for marking the
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Algorithm 3 UReport Algorithm
Input: (pp, pk, Cred).
Output: FAIL or (M,RID, tk, θ̄, πM , T ).




5: Choose k ∈ [0, K − 1].
6: Calculate tk = g
1
id+k+1
7: until tk /∈ IList
8: Choose two random elements (β, γ) ∈R Z2q .
9: Set a randomized reputation score θ̄ ≤ θ.
10: Set a road condition M .
11: Generate a unique tag T = H ′(M)uid.
12: Randomize the signed pseudo identity PID as RID = (RID1, RID2) where RID1 =
PIDβ1 and RID2 = (PID2 · (PID1)γ)β.
12: Generate a non-interactive signature proof of knowledge πM as follows.
πM = NIZK2{(θ, γ, id, sn, wit1, wit2, uid, k) :
∧ e(RID2, ḡ) = e(RID1, X̄V̄ θW̄ snȲ idZ̄uid)
· e(RID1, ḡ)γ ∧ e(wit1, ḡsn · Ū) · e(gwit2 , ḡ)
= e(accu, ḡ) ∧ wit2 6= 0 ∧ T = H ′(M)uid∧
tk = g
1
id+k+1 ∧ 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 ∧ θ̄ ≤ θ ≤ 2κ − 1}(M)
12: Output (M,RID, tk, θ̄, πM , T ).
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reporter. The road condition M consists of one of many types of information (e.g., map
issues, gas prices, traffic jams, and road closures, etc), the timestamp, and the location of
road condition. Specifically, the user runs an algorithm UReport as shown in Algorithm 3
to generate the report (M,RID, tk, θ̄, πM , T ), sends the report to the MSP, and waits for
the response. If the algorithm returns FAIL, it means the anonymous credential is not
valid, since the serial number sn has been used.
After receiving a report, the MSP verifies the correctness of the report by the following
steps. First, it checks whether the one-time token tk exists in IList. If tk ∈ IList, the
MSP rejects the report and responds REJECT back to the user since the report uses an
old token. Otherwise, the MSP adds the token tk into IList. Then, the MSP verifies
the signature proof of knowledge πM . If the verification does not pass, the MSP rejects
the report and responds REJECT back to the user since the zero-knowledge proof is not
correct. Otherwise, it marks the report with a unique report number num, marks the
reporter O = T , creates an empty set FList for the report’s feedback management, adds
T into FList, initializes a feedback index B = 0, stores (num,O,M, FList, B) into its local
database, and responds (ACCEPT, num) back to the user.
After receiving the response from the MSP, the user acknowledges that his/her report
has been accepted or rejected, locally stores num, and the data reporting phase completes.
At the same time, if the report is successful, the MSP updates the real-time map on its
online road monitoring service. The updated map is synchronized on the mobile application
at the client side, and other users can view the updated map and the report on their mobile
applications.
5.3.4 Report Feedback
When a road condition is updated on the real-time map, other users who locate in a near
region can view it. Also, they can give a positive or negative feedback to the report through
tapping on a thumbs-up symbol or a thumbs-down symbol on their mobile application, in-
dicating that the report is accurate or not. One user, except the user who made the report,
can give one and only one feedback to the report. In particular, the user runs an algorithm
UFeed as shown in Algorithm 4 to generate the feedback information (∆, RID, π∆, T ) ac-
cording to the content of the report M , sends the feedback (num,∆, RID, π∆, T ) to the
MSP, and waits for the response.
After the MSP receives the feedback, it can locate the feedback set FList and the
feedback index B according to the report number num, and checks whether T exists in
FList. If T ∈ FList, the MSP responds REJECT back to the user since it is a repeated
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Algorithm 4 UFeed Algorithm
Input: (pp, pk, Cred,M).
Output: (∆, RID, π∆, T ).
1: Choose two random elements (ε, η) ∈R Z2q .
2: Generate a unique tag T = H ′(M)uid.
3: Randomize the signed pseudo identity PID as RID = (RID1, RID2) where RID1 =
PIDη1 and RID2 = (PID2 · (PID1)ε)η.
4: Set a feedback ∆ = (num, 1/0), where 1 denotes a positive feedback and 0 denotes a
negative feedback.
4: Generate a non-interactive signature proof of knowledge π∆ as follows.
π∆ = NIZK3{(ε, θ, id, sn, uid) :
e(RID2, ḡ) = e(RID1, X̄V̄
θW̄ snȲ idZ̄uid)
· e(RID1, ḡ)ε ∧ T = H ′(M)uid}(∆)
4: Output (∆, RID, π∆, T ).
feedback. If T /∈ FList, the MSP verifies the signature proof of knowledge π∆. If the
verification does not pass, the MSP responds REJECT back to the user since the zero-
knowledge proof is not correct. Otherwise, the MSP accepts the feedback. If the feedback
is positive, the feedback index of the report B increases (B = B + 1), and the report will
last longer on the real-time map. Otherwise, B decreases (B = B − 1) and the report will
disappear very soon. The MSP finally responds ACCEPT back to the user. After receiving
the response, the user acknowledges that his/her feedback is accepted or rejected, and the
report feedback phase completes.
5.3.5 Reputation Updating
Assuming that there exist a report accuracy measurement method based on the feedback
index B, the MSP can judge the accuracy of a report and update the corresponding user’s
reputation score who made the report. For example, if B is larger than a threshold, the
MSP believes that the report is accurate. Concretely, according to the report number
num and the content of the report M , a registered user who previously reported the road
condition can runs an algorithm UUpdate as shown in Algorithm 5 to generate reputation
updating information (r̄, id, sn, ID,RID, T, πRP ), locally stores (r̄, id, sn), and sends the
reputation updating request (num, T, ID,RID, sn, πRP ) to the MSP.
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Algorithm 5 UUpdate Algorithm
Input: (pp, pk, num,M,Cred).
Output: (r̄, id, sn, ID, T,RID, πRP ).
1: Choose a random element r̄ ∈R Zq.
2: Choose two random elements (ω, τ) ∈R Z2q .
3: Choose a new pseudo identity id ∈R Zq.
4: Choose a new serial number sn ∈R Zq.
5: Set an updated blinded pseudo identity ID = gr̄V θW snY idZuid.
6: Randomize the signed pseudo identity PID as RID = (RID1, RID2) where RID1 =
RIDω1 and RID2 = (PID2 · (PID1)τ )ω.
7: Generate a unique tag T = H ′(M)uid.
8: Generate a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof πRP as follows.
πRP = NIZK4{(r̄, τ, id, sn, θ, id, uid) : T = H ′(M)uid
∧ ID = gr̄V θW snY idZuid ∧ e(RID2, ḡ)
= e(RID1, X̄V̄
θW̄ snȲ idZ̄uid) · e(RID1, ḡ)τ}
9: Output (r̄, id, sn, ID, T,RID, πRP ).
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After receiving the reputation updating request, the MSP first locates the report
(num,O,M, FList, B) according to the report number num, checks whether O = T and sn
exist in SList. If O 6= T , the MSP responds FAIL back to the user since the the user is
not owner of the report. If sn ∈ SList, the MSP responds FAIL back to the user since the
user’s pseudo identity is not valid. Then, the MSP verifies the zero-knowledge proof πRP
and responds FAIL back to the user if the zero-knowledge proof is not correct. Otherwise,
according to the accuracy of the report, the MSP sets a reputation change θ′, e.g., θ′ = 1 or
θ′ = −1. Next, the MSP chooses a random element l ∈R Zq, and generate a signed blinded
pseudo identity SID = (SID1, SID2), where SID1 = g
l and SID2 = (X · V θ
′ · ID)l).
Also, the MSP updates the accumulated value accu = accuu+sn, adds sn into SList, and
sends the reputation updating response (SUCCESS, SID, θ′, accu, SList) back to the user.
After receiving the response from the MSP, the user checks the response. If the response
is FAIL, the user fails to complete the reputation updating. If the response is SUCCESS,
the user first updates his/her reputation as θ = θ+ θ′ and updates his/her pseudo identity
id = id and serial number sn = sn. Then, the user can run the algorithm UCredGen as
shown in Algorithm 2 by inputing (pp, pk, r̄, SID, θ, id, sn, SList) to generate a new signed
pseudo identity PID and a non-membership witness wit. Finally, the user locally stores
Cred = (uid, id, sn, PID,wit, θ)
as an updated anonymous credential and the reputation updating completes.
5.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security requirements defined in the security model, and
prove that the proposed scheme achieves anonymity, K-tolerant trust, and unforgeability.
Since the zero-knowledge proof is one of the most significant constructions in our scheme,
before showing the detailed security analysis, we first demonstrate that the proposed zero-
knowledge proofs achieves completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge.
Theorem-1: The zero-knowledge proofs (NIZK1, NIZK2, NIZK3, NIZK4) in the proposed
scheme achieves completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge properties.
Proof: A standard Σ−protocol [154] is one of the most popular approaches to in-
stantiate a zero-knowledge proof, which can achieve completeness, special soundness, and
honest-verifier zero-knowledge. Completeness denotes that on input a public input x and a
private witness w where (x,w) ∈ R (R is a non-deterministic polynomial-time relation), a
prover P can prove to a verifier V that (x,w) ∈ R, and V always accepts P ’s proof. Special
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soundness denotes that there always exists an extractor that can efficiently extract w from
the the proof which satisfies (x,w) ∈ R, if receiving any x and any pair of accepting conver-
sations on input x with different random challenges ch and ch′ (ch 6= ch′). Honest-verifier
zero-knowledge denotes that there always exists a polynomial-time simulator S with the
input x and a random challenge ch, that can output an accepting conversation, with the
same probability distribution as conversations between a honest prover and a honest veri-
fier. In a random oracle model, an interactive Σ− protocol [154] can be easily transferred
to a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof NIZK that satisfies completeness, soundness,
and zero-knowledge properties based on Fiat-Shamir Heuristic [154].
As we discussed above, since NIZK1, NIZK3, and NIZK4 are non-interactive proofs
of discrete logarithm relation, which can be instantiated through a standard Σ−protocol
[154], NIZK1, NIZK3, and NIZK4 achieve completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge.
NIZK2 can be formed through several sub-proofs (NIZK5, NIZK6, NIZK7) as follows. Ad-
ditional three random elements (α, α′, ᾱ) ∈R Z3q and commitments com, com′, and com are
introduced to link these sub-proofs for easy understanding.
NIZK5{(θ, α, α′, ᾱ, id, sn, x, uid) :
com = gθhα ∧ com′ = gsnhα′ ∧ com = gxhᾱ∧
e(RID2, ḡ) = e(RID1, X̄V̄
θW̄ snȲ idZ̄uid) · e(RID1, ḡ)γ
∧ T = H ′(M)uid ∧ e(tk, ḡidḡxḡ) = e(g, ḡ)}
NIZK5 is a proof of discrete logarithm relation. Similar to NIZK1, NIZK3, and NIZK4,
NIZK5 achieves completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge.
NIZK6{(sn, α′, wit1, wit2) : com′ = gsnhα
′ ∧ wit2 6= 0
∧ e(wit1, ḡsn · Ū) · e(gwit2 , ḡ) = e(accu, ḡ)}
NIZK6 is a non-interactive proof of knowledge of a committed element not in an accumu-
lator value, which has been clearly defined in [33] and has been proven to be complete,
sound, and zero-knowledge.
NIZK7{(x, θ, α, ᾱ) : com = gxhᾱ ∧ x ∈ [0, K − 1]
∧ com = gθhα ∧ θ ∈ [θ̄, 2κ − 1]}
NIZK7 is a non-interactive zero-knowledge range proof, which can handle an arbitrary
range through the method proposed in [155] and can be easily transformed to a standard
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range proof. The proof has been proven to be complete, sound, and zero-knowledge in
[156]. Combining NIZK5, NIZK6, and NIZK7, we can easily derive the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof NIZK2, and thus NIZK2 achieves completeness, soundness, and zero-
knowledge.
Theorem-2: The proposed scheme achieves anonymity.
Proof: Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary who controls the MSP. To
prove that the proposed scheme achieves anonymity, we can prove thatA cannot distinguish
the output of a honest user from the output of a simulator S after engaging in a legal
number of data reporting protocols, report feedback protocols, and reputation updating
protocols.
For each data reporting procedure, S can simulate the output (M,RID, tk, πM , T ) as
follows.
B S sets a report condition M .
B S chooses a randomness uid ∈R Zq and compute T = H ′(M)uid.
B S chooses a randomness id ∈R Zq and a randomness k ∈R [0, 1, ..., K − 1], and
compute tk = g
1
ĩd+k̃+1 .
B S chooses two random group elements RID = (RID1, RID2) ∈R G2.
B S simulates a zero-knowledge proof πM of θ, γ, id, sn, wit1, wit2, uid, k such that
1. e(RID2, ḡ) = e(RID1, X̄V̄ θW̄ snȲ idZ̄uid) · e(RID1, ḡ)γ
2. e(wit1, ḡsn · Ū) · e(gwit2 , ḡ) = e(accu, ḡ) ∧ wit2 6= 0
3. T = H ′(M)uid ∧ tk = g
1
id+k+1
4. 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 ∧ θ̄ ≤ θ ≤ 2κ − 1
The output of S is computationally indistinguishable from the output of an honest user
due to the following reasons. According to the user registration protocol, A learns nothing
about the secrets (uid, id) since the commitment ID is perfect hiding [157] and the proof
πID is zero-knowledge. Hence, the values (uid, id) chosen by S are distinguishable from
those chosen by an honest user. Due to the security of the pseudo-random function, tk
is distinguishable from a random element in the group G under the q-DDHI assumption
[30]. Considering that H ′ is a random oracle, T is distinguishable from a random element
in the group G. RID1 and RID2 are distinguishable from two random elements in the
98
group G due to the security of a PS signature [26]. The proof πM can be simulated
by S and the simulated proof is indistinguishable from a real proof since the proof is
proven to be zero-knowledge. Therefore, the probability that A can distinguish a real user
and a simulator S is negligible. Similarly, for each report feedback procedure and each
reputation updating procedure, S can simulate the output (num,∆, RID, π∆, T ) and the
output (num, T, ID,RID, sn, πRP ). In the random oracle model, A can distinguish a real
user and a simulator S if and only if it could distinguish real proofs or simulated proofs,
or it could break the security of the PS signature, or it could break the perfect hiding
property of a Pedersen commitment. However, the probability is negligible.
Finally, we can conclude that the proposed scheme achieves anonymity.
Theorem-3: The proposed scheme achieves K-tolerant trust.
Proof: Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary who executes the user
registration protocol, data reporting protocol, report feedback protocol, and reputation
updating protocol with a simulator S acting as an honest MSP. For each user registration
request, S behaves exactly like an honest MSP but additionally utilizes the extractor of
the zero-knowledge proof NIZK1 to extract the secrets (id, sn, uid). For each reputation
updating request, S behaves exactly like an honest MSP but additionally utilizes the
extractor of the zero-knowledge proof NIZK4 to extract the secrets (id, sn). Based on the
value id, S could calculate a tuple ~χ = (χ1, χ2, ..., χK) where χi = g
1
id+i for i = 1 to K.
Based on the value uid, S could calculate a tag T ′ = H ′(M)uid according to the message
M . In addition to black-box access to A, S also controls over the random oracles H and
H ′. Due to the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof, ~χ contains all valid one-time tokens
that A can generate, except with negligible probability.
In order to break K-tolerant trust, one of the following three cases happens: i) A
convinces an honest MSP to accept an invalid one-time token tk and he/she can generate
a valid zero-knowledge proof for the token with some non-negligible probability; ii) A
convinces an honest MSP to accept an invalid serial number sn and he/she can generate
a valid zero-knowledge proof for the serial number with some non-negligible probability;
and ii) A convinces an honest MSP to accept an invalid tag T and can generate a valid
zero-knowledge proof for the tag with some non-negligible probability.
For the case i) where A convinces an honest MSP to accept an invalid one-time token tk
during the data reporting protocol, A must conduct a proof such that one of the following
statements is fake: 1) e(RID2, ḡ) = e(RID1, X̄V̄
θW̄ snȲ idZ̄uid) · e(RID1, ḡ)γ; 2) tk =
g
1
id+k+1 ; and 3) 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. The statement 1) can be faked with negligible probability
under the PS assumption, as violating statement 1) implies breaking the unforgeability of
the PS signature [26]. The statement 2) can be faked with negligible probability under
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the q-DDHI assumption [30] and the statement 3) can be faked with negligible probability
under the DL assumption [156]. To conclude, the total success probability of A in case i) is
negligible. Therefore, A must use a valid one-time token tk to achieve one data reporting.
To report more than K times, Amust use duplicated tokens with overwhelming probability,
and an honest MSP can detect it by checking the set IList. Otherwise, A must update
his/her pseudo-identity id, serial number sn, and reputation θ by running the reputation
updating protocol with the honest MSP.
For the case ii) where A convinces an honest MSP to accept an invalid serial number
sn during the data reporting protocol, A must conduct a proof such that the statement 1)
defined in case i) is faked and the statement e(wit1, ḡ
sn ·Ū) ·e(gwit2 , ḡ) = e(accu, ḡ)∧wit2 6=
0 is faked. The statement can be faked with negligible probability under the q-SDH
assumption [33], as violating the statement implies breaking the security of the accumulator
[33]. To conclude, the total success probability of A in case ii) is negligible. Therefore,
A must use a valid serial number sn to achieve one data reporting. If A uses old serial
numbers to make requests, an honest MSP can detect it by checking the set SList and the
requests are not accepted.
For the case iii) where A convinces an honest MSP to accept an invalid tag T during
the report feedback protocol, A must conduct a proof such that the statement 1) defined in
case i) is faked and the statement T = H ′(M)uid is fake. The statement can be faked with
negligible probability under the DL assumption. To conclude, the total success probability
of A in case iii) is negligible. Therefore, A must use a valid tag T to make the feedback
for a specific report M . When a user makes more than one feedbacks for the same report
M , an honest MSP can detect it by checking the set FList.
Since all three cases happen with negligible probability, the proposed scheme achieves
K-tolerant trust.
Theorem-4: The proposed scheme achieves unforgeability.
Proof: The unforgebaility of an anonymous credential Cred is quite straightforward
due to the unforgeability of the PS signature, i.e., the probability that an probabilis-
tic polynomial-time adversary A can forge a valid anonymous credential is negligible
under the PS assumption [26]. In addition, if A wants to convince an honest MSP
to accept an forged/modified reputation score θ during the data reporting protocol, A
must conduct a proof such that one of the following statements is fake: 1) e(RID2, ḡ) =
e(RID1, X̄V̄
θW̄ snȲ idZ̄uid) · e(RID1, ḡ)γ; and 2) θ′ ≤ θ ≤ 2κ − 1. As we discussed above,
the statement 1) and 2) can be faked with negligible probability. As a result, the total
success probability of A is negligible and the proposed scheme achieves unforgeability.
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5.5 Performance Evaluation & Implementation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of computa-
tional and communication overhead. The performance evaluation involves two parts: 1) we
analyze the computational and communication complexity of our scheme and two existing
schemes [102, 103]; and 2) we implement our scheme on a Macbook laptop and an Android
smartphone to demonstrate its feasibility and efficiency.
5.5.1 Complexity Analysis
We compare our scheme with Ni et al.’s scheme [102] and Hartung et al.’s scheme [103] in
terms of computational and communication complexity. The reason that we choose these
schemes is that they also address the identity privacy issue and the reputation management
issue at the same time without the assistance of online third parties. In short, Ni et
al.’s scheme [102] is designed based on a BBS+ group signature scheme [30] and a zero-
knowledge range proof scheme [155], and Hartung et al.’s scheme [103] is designed based
on a structure-preserving signature scheme [158] and a zero-knowledge range proof scheme
[155]. However, these schemes cannot be directly applied in our scenario, since they do
not support K-tolerant trust property. Therefore, we do not consider the K-tolerant trust
property in the comparison and we simplify our scheme to make the comparison fair.
For computational complexity, we count the number of two time-consuming operations
in these schemes: exponentiation operations in G (E) and bilinear pairing operations (P).
Other operations such as hashing operations and multiplication operations are neglected
as they can be done in ignorable time compared with E and P . The comparison results
are shown in Table 5.1. Compared with Ni et al.’s scheme [102] and Hartung et al.’s
scheme [103], our scheme is more computationally efficient since our scheme is constructed
based on a more efficient PS signature [26] and a more efficient zero-knowledge range proof
scheme [156]. For clearly showing the comparison of computational overhead, we also give
numeric results of a simulation in Figure 5.3, assuming that the reputation score range is
[0, 1023] (i.e., κ = 10), the running time of an exponentiation operation in G is 10 ms,
the running time of a bilinear pairing operation is 20 ms (Note that, the running time
is an approximate value which may be varied using different programming languages on
different testbeds).
For communication complexity, we count the number of elements in Zp, G and G
transmitted between users and MSPs in these schemes. The sizes of Zp, G and G are




































































































Figure 5.3: Comparison of computational overhead (numeric results)
Table 5.1: Comparison of computation complexity
Phases
User Registration Data Reporting Report Feedback Reputation Updating
User MSP User MSP User MSP User MSP
Ni et al. [102] 8E + 2P 8E (3κ+ 9)E + (2κ+ 9)P (4κ+ 10)E + (3κ+ 9)P 9E + 9P 9E + 10P 16E + 11P 16E + 10P
Hartung et al. [103] 8E + 5P 9E (3κ+ 9)E + (2κ+ 7)P (4κ+ 8)E + (3κ+ 9)P 9E + 7P 8E + 9P 15E + 12P 16E + 9P
Our Simplified Scheme 8E + 2P 8E (4κ+ 11)E + 7P (κ+ 18)E + 7P 8E + 7P 8E + 7P 15E + 9P 15E + 7P
Table 5.2: Comparison of communication complexity
Phases User Registration Data Reporting Report Feedback Reputation Updating
Ni et al. [102] 4|Zp|+ 3|G| 8|Zp|+ 2|G|+ (κ+ 1)|G| 8|Zp|+ 2|G|+ |G| 12|Zp|+ 5|G|+ |G|
Hartung et al. [103] 4|Zp|+ 4|G| 5|Zp|+ 4|G|+ (κ+ 1)|G| 5|Zp|+ 4|G|+ |G| 9|Zp|+ 7|G|+ |G|
Our Simplified Scheme 5|Zp|+ 2|G| (2κ+ 10)|Zp|+ 4|G|+ |G| 5|Zp|+ 3|G|+ |G| 10|Zp|+ 5|G|+ |G|
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scheme’s communication overhead is similar to the existing schemes. Although our scheme
is not the most efficient one, they are still acceptable.
5.5.2 Implementation & Experiment Results
To demonstrate the feasibility, we develop a proof-of-concept prototype in a Macbook
laptop and an Android smartphone. The configuration of the laptop is as mentioned below:
3.1 GHz Dual-Core Intel Core i7 and 16 GB 1867 MHz DDR3, and the configuration of the
smartphone is as mentioned blow: Kirin 980 2.6Ghz and 6GH RAM. All algorithms and
protocols of our scheme are implemented in the prototype, which is developed based on
Java language and a Java-based pairing-based library (JPBC) [147]. Due to Java’s cross-
platform property, the prototype can be easily ported from a laptop Java application to an
android application. According to the JPBC, we choose a type-f curve (a Barreto-Naehrig
curve) with the security level λ = 160 and the embedding degree 12, which supports an
asymmetric type-3 bilinear map. We also set κ = 10, which indicates the range of the
reputation score is [0, 1023].
For each phase, we run the prototype 100 times to obtain the average running time at
user side and MSP side on the laptop, and the experimental results are shown in Figure 5.4.
It only takes less than 1 seconds for a user to achieve user registration phase (Phase-
1), report feedback phase (Phase-3), and reputation updating phase (Phase-4), while the
data reporting phase (Phase-2) bears large computational costs. The reason is that a
user needs to prove two zero-knowledge range proofs in this phase, and the cost of a
range proof is decided by the parameter κ, according to our analysis. Since most of
the users may utilize the road condition monitoring applications on the smartphone, we
also run the prototype 100 times to obtain the average running time at user side on the
smartphone, and the experimental results are shown in Table 5.3. However, due to the
limited computational capability of the smartphone, the computational delay is larger but
the user can pre-compute partial values offline, especially the zero-knowledge proofs, to
significantly reduce the computational delay. If the partial zero-knowledge proofs are pre-
computed, the computation delay can be less than 1 second. During the user registration
phase and the reputation updating phase, if n′ is large, i.e., the number of used serial
numbers (the size of SList) is large, the delay of computing the witnesses wit1 and wit2
is large. Nevertheless, computing these witnesses will not affect the performance of our
scheme since the witnesses can be calculated offline. In addition, the communication
overhead is shown in Table 5.4. The largest communication data is less than 3 KB, which
is acceptable according to the networking performance of current wireless networks.
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Figure 5.4: Computation costs of the prototype on laptop: User Registration (Phase-1),
Data Reporting (Phase-2), Report Feedback (Phase-3), Reputation Updating (Phase-4).
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Table 5.3: Computation costs of the prototype on smartphone at user side (unit: second)
Phases User Registration Data Reporting
Delay 15.2313 100.7739
Phases Report Feedback Reputation Updating
Delay 30.6503 44.3577
Table 5.4: Communication overhead of the prototype (unit: bytes)
Phases User Registration Data Reporting
Size 630 2800
Phases Report Feedback Reputation Updating
Size 860 1610
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we focus on the scenario of crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring
and have proposed a novel privacy-preserving monitoring scheme that supports anonymous
user reputation management. The proposed scheme provides strong protection of users’
privacy via anonymizing users’ identities and users can self-maintain their reputation scores
without revealing them to a monitoring service provider. Since the proposed scheme does
not require any participation of third parties, it is realistic for real-world crowdsourcing
applications. We have also given detailed security analysis of our scheme and implemented
a prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of our scheme.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we have investigated privacy-preserving mechanisms for V2X services, espe-
cially focusing on identity privacy. By resolving the conflict between privacy and availabil-
ity from three aspects: privacy vs. linkability, privacy vs. accountability, and privacy vs.
reliability, a suite of effective privacy-preserving mechanisms have been proposed. In the
following, we summarize the main contributions of this thesis, introduce future research
directions, and give some final remarks.
6.1 Conclusions
The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
• First, we have studied the conflict between privacy and linkability for V2X services.
To clearly illustrate the conflict issue, we have focused on a specific automated valet
parking (AVP) service and analyzed the privacy requirements of users and the po-
tential attacks on the service. Based on the analysis, we have formalized a security
model and proposed a novel privacy-preserving parking reservation scheme for an
AVP service. In the proposed scheme, we have leveraged BBS+ signature to design
an anonymous authentication protocol to protect user privacy during the parking
reservation process. Moreover, we have designed several zero-knowledge proof proto-
cols and utilize a proxy re-signature technique to guarantee that a user cannot reserve
new parking slot before releasing his/her last parking slot. That is, a parking ser-
vice provider can resist against “Double-Reservation Attack”. In addition, we have
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given detailed security analysis to demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves
all desirable security and privacy properties.
• Second, we have studied the conflict between privacy and accountability for V2X ser-
vices. To clearly illustrate the conflict issue, we have focused on a specific car sharing
service. To overcome the issue of single point of failure and avoid the deployment of
a centralized trusted authority, we have introduced dynamic and decentralized vali-
dation servers to provide decentralized trust for users. Based on the architecture, we
have designed a novel privacy-preserving identity management scheme. Specifically,
by exploiting a verifiable secret sharing technique and cryptographic accumulators,
we have designed several zero-knowledge proof protocols to guarantee that correct
users’ identities are hidden but can be traced by distributed validation servers. Fur-
thermore, we have designed a dynamic identity transferring protocol to ensure that
validation servers can be dynamically changed over time, i.e., a validation server is
only responsible for maintaining users’ identities for a short period time such that it
is more difficult for adversaries to compromise user privacy to achieve higher security
guarantees. In addition, we have utilized a simulation-based method to prove that
the proposed scheme achieves user privacy preservation and accountability.
• Third, we have studied the conflict between privacy and reliability for V2X services.
To clearly illustrate the conflict issue, we have focused on a specific crowdsourcing-
based road condition monitoring service. To preserve user privacy, we have de-
signed a privacy-preserving crowdsourcing-based road condition monitoring scheme
based on PS signature and zero-knowledge proof. Without relying on a centralized
trusted authority to maintain the reputation scores for users, we have additionally
designed a novel reputation management and updating mechanism based on homo-
morphic commitments, cryptographic accumulators and pseudo-random functions,
where only users self-maintain their reputation scores. A new security property
named K-tolerant trust has been defined in the proposed scheme, to ensure that a
user cannot make more that K reports before updating his/her reputation score, i.e.,
his/her reputation score is the latest. In addition, we have thoroughly analyzed the
security properties of the proposed scheme to demonstrate that the proposed scheme
achieve user privacy preservation and reliability.
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6.2 Future Research Directions
This thesis introduces the V2X communication architecture and its services, identifies pri-
vacy challenges in V2X services, and proposes several promising privacy-preserving mech-
anisms to protect user privacy. As the thesis mainly focuses on the identity privacy of
users, there are still open research directions including but not limited to the following
three topics.
6.2.1 Blockchain-based Data Management for V2X Services with
Privacy Regulation Compliance
With the development of V2X communications, a large amount of V2X services will ap-
pear and more data is expected to be generated and maintained by not only users and
service providers but also various network operators and government departments. These
entities have strong motivations to share their data to boost their service quality and bring
more effective services to users. For example, a car insurance service provider can share
its user’s information with a car sharing service provider such that the user can utilize
his/her insurance to cover the insurance of a shared car when enjoying the car sharing
service. However, these entities do not trust each other, as there exist many data leak-
age events caused by data sharing. For instance, one of the biggest network operator in
Canada, Rogers, suffers from a serious data leakage caused by external service providers
1. Under the circumstances, a new data management architecture is required as sensi-
tive data collected from users may leak to more entities and cause more serious privacy
concerns. Moreover, privacy laws, e.g., General Data Protection Regulation, have been
published to regulate the process of data management by defining data controllers and
data processors. After the data is uploaded by users, how these data can be utilized in
V2X services should strictly comply with these privacy laws. Facing these two issues, to
cross trust boundaries among different entities and to provide data privacy protection in
the meantime, blockchain technology can be introduced to manage the decentralized data
owned by different entities. Blockchain has many useful characteristics, including immu-
nity, transparency, and decentralization, which are particularly fit for data management
and data sharing scenarios for V2X services. Moreover, smart contracts deployed in the
blockchain can be automatically run. Hence, they are suitable for writing privacy laws and
all data-related operations can automatically verified on the smart contracts to comply
with privacy laws. Nevertheless, a blockchain-based data management architecture still
1https://www.rogers.com/support/10022020
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faces many challenges. First, the blockchain has a scalability issue since it needs to run
a consensus protocol to reach a system consistence among all participators. Traditional
consensus protocols, such as proof-of-work protocol, proof of stake protocol, and byzantine
fault tolerance protocol, will lead to a large delay when there exist many participators.
Second, orginal public blockchain architectures such as bitcoin and ethereum expose all
data stored on chain publicly. Namely, public blockchains do not support privacy preser-
vation and consortium blockchains are more appropriate for achieve data management.
Therefore, in the future work, we aim to propose a blockchain-based data management
architecture for V2X service, which is fully compatible with privacy regulations.
6.2.2 Verifiable and Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning for
V2X Services
With the popularity of V2X services, machine learning and artificial intelligence will be
introduced to improve the service quality. Among all machine learning approaches, fed-
erated learning is a distributed machine learning approach which enables model training
on a large corpus of decentralized data from mobile users. In V2X services, mobile de-
vices owned by users, such as smart vehicles and smartphones, can collaboratively learn a
shared prediction model while keeping all the training data on the device without the as-
sistance of powerful cloud servers. Different from traditional machine learning approaches,
although the user is just required to run a local machine learning algorithm and exchange
some training parameters with other participators, the cooperation among different mobile
devices may still raise privacy concerns and users may be not willing to participate in a
federated learning for V2X services. Under this circumstance, privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms such as secure multi-party computation and differential privacy can be applied to
provide privacy preservation for users. Secure multi-party computation approaches like
homomorphic encryption and garble circuits enable users to contribute their data in a
ciphertext format and only final results are publicly revealed. These approaches can be
integrated with federated learning scenarios in V2X services to ensure the confidentiality
of individual’s data and parameters. From another point of view, differential privacy pro-
tects individual user privacy by adding noises and only the noised data is shared with other
users to achieve privacy-preserving federated learning. However, these privacy-preserving
mechanisms are not sufficient as they may degrade the performance of the federated learn-
ing. Secure multi-party computation requires time-consuming computations and multiple
rounds of communication which may cause tremendous time delays. Differential privacy,
compared with secure multi-party computation is more lightweight, but it may cause the
final result of model training to be inaccurate since a lot of noises have been added to
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the model. In addition, as the machine learning model is trained through multiple mobile
devices, the final training results should support to be verified to ensure that all contrib-
utors have contributed correct parameters and data during the model training process.
The verification becomes more difficult when privacy-preserving mechanisms are applied.
Therefore, in the future work, we aim to propose a verifiable and privacy-preserving fed-
erated learning architecture for V2X services, which can assist different V2X services and
their users to corporately achieve the training of machine learning model .
6.2.3 Location Privacy Protection Enhancement in V2X Services
Current works in this thesis mainly focus on protecting the identity privacy of users in V2X
Services. Although hiding users’ identities can somehow protect users’ location privacy by
cutting off the linkage between locations, it is not sufficient for V2X services since some
V2X services require users to continuously report their locations. As there exist hidden
connections between two continuous locations, adversaries have a great chance to link two
locations based on a user’s moving speed and the restrictions of a road network. Therefore,
some location privacy protection mechanisms have been proposed to address this issue, such
as location perturbation, spatial cloaking, dummy location. For a location-perturbation-
based method, some noises are added to users’ original locations, and thus adversaries
cannot extract the real locations from the noised locations. The performance of this method
is fully controlled by the degree of added noises. On one hand, if the added noises are too
huge, the system utility related to location-based V2X services will be decreased. On the
other hand, If the noises are too small, the location privacy cannot be guaranteed. For a
spatial-cloaking-based method, user can increase the granularity of his/her locations such
that the real locations can be hidden inside a cloaked region. By doing so, adversaries
can hardly distinguish the target location from a region. Obviously, this location privacy
protection mechanism is not suitable for the V2X service that requires accurate location
data, such as traffic monitoring services. For a dummy-based method, users can generate
dummy locations and mix his/her real locations with dummy locations to protect their
location privacy. The dummy size is an important parameter that determines the privacy
level of users and the performance of the system. Note that, the above-mentioned location
privacy protection mechanisms have a common characteristic, i.e., users need to balance
the privacy and system utility by changing some parameters. However, there does not
exist a widely accepted approach to help user determine what privacy level they need
in different situations. Therefore, in a future work, we aim to propose a scenario-adapted
location privacy protection scheme that combines all these three types of privacy-preserving
mechanisms. The location privacy level of users should be measured according to the
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service type, current locations, historical information, which can help users to make a
better decision.
6.3 Final Remarks
In this thesis, we have presented a set of privacy-preserving mechanisms for V2X services,
and identified three further research directions to encourage successive research efforts and
complement of this thesis. In addition, to further demonstrate the feasibility of our research
accomplishments, we will also seek industrial corporations to develop real-world products
to further confirm our research findings.
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[138] A. C. Hernandez, J. Castellà-Roca, and A. Viejo, “Key management system for pri-
vate car-sharing scenarios,” in Proceedings of IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference,
2018, pp. 1–7.
[139] I. Damg̊ard, V. Pastro, N. P. Smart, and S. Zakarias, “Multiparty computation
from somewhat homomorphic encryption,” in Proceedings of Annual International
Cryptology Conference, 2012, pp. 643–662.
[140] A. R. Choudhuri, M. Green, A. Jain, G. Kaptchuk, and I. Miers, “Fairness in an un-
fair world: Fair multiparty computation from public bulletin boards,” in Proceedings
of ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2017, pp. 719–728.
[141] E. Ben-Sasson, A. Chiesa, C. Garman, M. Green, I. Miers, E. Tromer, and M. Virza,
“Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from bitcoin,” in Proceedings of
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2014, pp. 459–474.
[142] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. F. Syverson, “Tor: The second-generation
onion router,” in Proceedings of USENIX Security Symposium, 2004, pp. 303–320.
[143] B. Schoenmakers, “A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its appli-
cation to electronic,” in Proceedings of Annual International Cryptology Conference,
1999, pp. 148–164.
[144] T. M. Wong, C. Wang, and J. M. Wing, “Verifiable secret redistribution for archive
system,” in Proceedings of IEEE Security in Storage Workshop, 2002, pp. 94–106.
125
[145] Z. Wang, X. Luo, and Q. Wu, “Verifiably encrypted group signatures,” in Proceedings
of International Conference on Provable Security, 2017, pp. 107–126.
[146] W. Lueks, M. H. Everts, and J. Hoepman, “Vote to link: Recovering from misbe-
having anonymous users,” in Proceedings of ACM on Workshop on Privacy in the
Electronic Society, 2016, pp. 111–122.
[147] A. De Caro and V. Iovino, “jpbc: Java pairing based cryptography,” in Proceedings
of IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications, 2011, pp. 850–855.
[148] X. Kong, X. Liu, B. Jedari, M. Li, L. Wan, and F. Xia, “Mobile crowdsourcing in
smart cities: Technologies, applications, and future challenges,” IEEE Internet of
Things Journal, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 8095–8113, 2019.
[149] B. Jan, H. Farman, M. Khan, M. Talha, and I. U. Din, “Designing a smart trans-
portation system: An internet of things and big data approach,” IEEE Wireless
Communications, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 73–79, 2019.
[150] G. Wang, B. Wang, T. Wang, A. Nika, H. Zheng, and B. Y. Zhao, “Ghost riders:
Sybil attacks on crowdsourced mobile mapping services,” IEEE/ACM Transactions
on Networking, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 1123–1136, 2018.
[151] K. C. Zeng, S. Liu, Y. Shu, D. Wang, H. Li, Y. Dou, G. Wang, and Y. Yang, “All your
GPS are belong to us: Towards stealthy manipulation of road navigation systems,”
in 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), 2018, pp. 1527–1544.
[152] Q. Yang and H. Wang, “Toward trustworthy vehicular social networks,” IEEE Com-
munications Magazine, vol. 53, no. 8, pp. 42–47, 2015.
[153] Z. Tian, X. Gao, S. Su, J. Qiu, X. Du, and M. Guizani, “Evaluating reputation
management schemes of internet of vehicles based on evolutionary game theory,”
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 68, no. 6, pp. 5971–5980, 2019.
[154] S. Agrawal, C. Ganesh, and P. Mohassel, “Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for
composite statements,” in Proceedings of Annual International Cryptology Confer-
ence, 2018, pp. 643–673.
[155] J. Camenisch, R. Chaabouni, and A. Shelat, “Efficient protocols for set membership
and range proofs,” in International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptology and Information Security, vol. 5350, 2008, pp. 234–252.
126
[156] B. Bünz, J. Bootle, D. Boneh, A. Poelstra, P. Wuille, and G. Maxwell, “Bulletproofs:
Short proofs for confidential transactions and more,” in 2018 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), 2018, pp. 315–334.
[157] T. P. Pedersen, “Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret
sharing,” in Proceedings of Annual international cryptology conference, vol. 576, 1991,
pp. 129–140.
[158] M. Abe, J. Groth, K. Haralambiev, and M. Ohkubo, “Optimal structure-preserving
signatures in asymmetric bilinear groups,” in Proceedings of Annual Cryptology Con-




(J1) C. Huang, D. Liu, J. Ni, R. Lu, and X. Shen, “Achieving Accountable and Ef-
ficient Data Sharing in Industrial Internet of Things”, IEEE Trans. on Industrial
Informatics, DOI: 10.1109/TII.2020.2982942.
(J2) C. Huang, R. Lu, J. Ni, and X. Shen, ”DAPA: A Decentralized, Accountable, and
Privacy-preserving Architecture for Car Sharing Services”, IEEE Trans. on Vehicular
Technology, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 4869-4882, 2020.
(J3) C. Huang, R. Lu, J. Ni, L. Xue and X. Shen, “Prove Your Expense Records: Build-
ing Trustworthiness for Anonymous Reviewers on Online Review Platforms”, IEEE
Trans. on Service Computing, Under Revision.
(J4) C. Huang, R. Lu, D. Liu, A. Yang, and X. Shen, “Privacy-preserving Crowdsourcing-
based Road Condition Monitoring With Anonymous Reputation Management”, ready
to submit, 2020.
(J5) L. Xue, D. Liu, C. Huang, X. Lin, and X. Shen, “Secure and Privacy-Preserving
Decision Tree Classification with Lower Complexity”, J. Communications and Infor-
mation Networks, DOI: 10.23919/JCIN.2020.9055107.
(J6) J. Hao, C. Huang, J. Ni, H. Rong, M. Xian, and X. Shen, “Fine-Grained Data Ac-
cess Control with Attribute-Hiding Policy for Cloud-Based IoT”, Computer Network
(Elsevier), Vol. 153, pp. 1-10, 2019.
(J7) C. Huang, R. Lu, X. Lin, and X. Shen, “Secure Automated Valet Parking: A
Privacy-Preserving Reservation Scheme for Autonomous Vehicles”, IEEE Trans. on
Vehicular Technology, Vol. 67, No. 11, pp. 11169-11180, 2018.
128
(J8) A. Yang, J. Weng, K. Yang, C. Huang, and X. Shen, “Delegating Authentication to
Edge: A Decentralized Authentication Architecture for Vehicular Network”, IEEE
Trans. on Intelligent Transportation Systems, to appear.
(J9) C. Zhang, L. Zhu, J. Ni, C. Huang, and X. Shen, “Verifiable and Privacy-Preserving
Traffic Flow Statistics for Advanced Traffic Management Systems”, IEEE Trans. on
Vehicular Technology, to appear.
Conference Papers
(C1) C. Huang, J. Ni, R. Lu, and X. Shen, ”Exploring Anonymous User Review: Link-
ability Analysis with Machine Learning”, Proc. IEEE Globecom’19, Waikoloa, HI,
USA, Dec. 9-13, 2019.
(C2) L. Xue, J. Ni, C. Huang, X. Lin, and X. Shen, ”Forward Secure and Fine-grained
Data Sharing for Mobile Crowdsensing”, Proc. 17th International Conference on
Privacy, Security and Trust (PST)’19, Fredericton, NB, Canada, August 26-28, 2019.
(C3) J. Hao, C. Huang, G. Chen, X. Ming, and X. Shen, ”Privacy-Preserving Interest-
Ability Based Task Allocation in Crowdsourcing”, Proc. IEEE ICC’19, Shanghai,
China, May 20-24, 2019.
(C4) C. Huang, J. Ni, R. Lu, and X. Shen, ”Online Advertising with Verifiable Fairnes”,
Proc. IEEE ICC’19, Shanghai, China, May 20-24, 2019.
(C5) J. Hao, C. Huang, J. Liu, M. Xian, and X. Shen, ”Efficient Outsourced Data Access
Control with User Revocation for Cloud-based IoT”, Proc. IEEE Globecom’18, Abu
Dhabi, UAE, Dec. 9-13, 2018.
(C6) C. Huang, D. Liu, J. Ni, R. Lu, and X. Shen, ”Reliable and Privacy-Preserving
Selective Data Aggregation for Fog-Based IoT”, Proc. IEEE ICC’18, Kansas City,
MO, USA, May 20-24, 2018. (Best Paper Award)
129
Vita
Cheng Huang received the B.Eng degree in Information Security and M.Eng degree in Infor-
mation Security from the Xidian University, Xi’an, China, in 2013 and 2016, respectively.
He was a Project Officer with the INFINITUS laboratory at the School of Electrical and
Electronic Engineering, Nanyang Technological University till July 2016. Starting from
August 2016, he is working toward the Ph.D. degree with the Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada. His cur-
rent research interests include applied cryptography, privacy preservation for vehicle-based
services, and blockchain security. Mr.Huang served as a Technical Program Committee
Member for many conferences, including IEEE Globecom’18, IEEE VTC-FALL’19, IEEE
ICC’20, and IEEE ICNC’20. He has won best paper awards at the conferences, includ-
ing IEEE ICCC’16 and IEEE ICC’18, and many prestigious awards, such as Faculty of
Engineering Graduate Scholarship Awards and Jon W. Mark Graduate Scholarship.
130
